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In spring 2001, I was considering taking a leave-of-absence from my job in 
Washington, DC, and joining my husband in Ann Arbor. On my return from a business 
trip to Gaborone, Botswana, I visited the offices of Francine Lafontaine and Scott Masten 
and asked them about taking a break from the corporate world and pursuing a PhD in the 
business economics department. After listening to my half-baked research interests about 
corporate restructuring, institutions, global competition and firm growth, they both 
recommended that I talk to Jan Svejnar. Before I left her office, Francine also cautioned 
me that a PhD study is going to be a long “break.”  
It turned out to be more than a long “break.” It set out a whole new journey for me. 
The journey started on August 19, 2002, when I flew into my first PhD class from Sophia, 
Bulgaria, and began to allow linear algebra to crowd out of my mind all the contract 
terms for the investment projects that I was working on. Six years later, with a 
dissertation in hand, it is time to thank all the people who generously helped me in 
passing the most important milestone of this new journey.  
I am especially indebted to my committee members. Jan Svejnar has been an 
inspiration for true scholarship. I am grateful for his extreme flexibility with my research 
interests, his patience with my adventurous endeavors, and his persistent emphasis on my 
following rigorous scientific reasoning and robust methodology. He encouraged me to 
always link strategy phenomena with the most fundamental economic concepts, and 
supported my pursuit of explanations that are beyond pure economics. Jan is a role model 
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who has successfully blended academic research into effective policy analyses, making a 
direct impact in the real world. He is a great person who, despite his demanding schedule, 
never hesitates to offer his wisdom, research experience, and generous help to people 
regardless of their rank and power.  
Gautam Ahuja helped me enormously, not only with my attainment of the PhD but 
also the job market process. His doctoral seminar is one of the best seminars in the PhD 
program. After visiting to many top-tier schools, I also start to appreciate the instrumental 
role that he played in building up the Strategy doctoral program at Michigan. His 
comprehensive and insightful overview of the strategy field, his passionate and generous 
support for my pursuit of a cross-discipline subject, his critical yet invaluable comments 
and suggestions on my dissertation and presentations at every important stage of my PhD 
study, have made me a much stronger student of management than I would have become 
on my own.  
Sendil Ethiraj has had a dominant influence throughout the dissertation process. I first 
went to Sendil with a gigantic organization chart of Citigroup, asking for his opinion 
about writing a dissertation explaining the complex organization structure. I had only the 
agency theory in mind. It was Sendil who helped me connect the structure with 
coordination. He attributed so much real-life phenomena to coordination that I jokingly 
asked whether countries need to coordinate with each other to start a war; now I truly 
believe the answer is yes. I am grateful to Sendil for his insightful guidance, invaluable 
advice, numerous rounds of stimulating discussion, and patient reading of consecutive 
drafts of the dissertation proposal. His exceptional mentorship has been instrumental in 
my development as a student of management and an academic writer. It is indeed my 
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fortune and pleasure to have worked with him. This dissertation would not have been 
possible without his close supervision and constant encouragement.  
I am thankful to Jagadeesh Sivadasan for offering much help during the dissertation 
process. He generously shared with me the DCA dataset, which is critical for my 
empirical analysis, and his research proposals and working papers to provide additional 
data. He showed me the true color of a pure empiricist and acted as a sounding board for 
the econometric issues in the dissertation. To hear from him that the dissertation makes a 
significant empirical contribution despite the data and methodological limitations is very 
encouraging. He demonstrated a remarkable capacity for managing multiple demanding 
tasks, including publishing, teaching, advising, and being a temporary PhD coordinator. 
I thank Scott Page for agreeing to serve on my committee. He has been a strong and 
generous supporter despite his busy schedule. He contributed much more than what I had 
originally expected from him: his expertise on complexity, political science and 
economics. Despite being a professor outside the business school, he provided a great 
amount of practical and corporate insights to my study. His superior capability and his 
passion to reach out to inter-disciplinary research institutions, real corporations, and a 
diverse group of students have been truly inspiring. 
Apart from my committee, I thank the many faculty members at Michigan who have 
been influential to my academic development. Francine Lafontaine has never hesitated to 
offer her genuine advice and support. Katherine Terrell has been a PhD coordinator with 
a warm heart. She also gave me very flexible assignments as a research assistant in my 
first year, so that I could finish my ongoing work projects on a part-time basis and 
transition smoothly into the PhD program. Margret Levinstein has been exceptionally 
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supportive to my application to use the Census data. Scott Masten has always been a 
great advisor to talk to. Michael Jensen is the first to show me how to write for a 
management journal, and how to become an interesting researcher and passionate 
educator at the same time. Hart Posen, Brian Wu, and Minyuan Zhao have read multiple 
versions of my papers and given very useful feedback. Their generosity with their time 
and constructive comments make the dissertation process less intimidating. Marina 
Whitman and Martin Zimmerman provided me their insights into the internal 
organization of firms by sharing their experiences at GM and Ford. James Westphal, 
Arvids and Rosemarie Ziedonis have given valuable advices at various points.  
In addition, I am grateful to many other professors who have taught me during my 
PhD study, including the visiting professors and those who have since left Michigan. 
They help lay a solid foundation for my intellectual pursuit. They include Jay Anand, 
Juan Carlos Hallak, Gerald Davis, John DiNardo, Fritz Foley, James Hines Jr., Kai-Uwe 
Kuhn, Illoong Kwon, John Laitner, James Levinsohn, Bill Lovejoy, Mark Mizruchi, 
Vikram Nanda, Serena Ng, Emre Ozdenoren, Joanne Oxley, Shinichi Sakata, Stephen 
Salant, Daniel Silverman, Jeffrey Smith, Lones Smith, Linda Tesar and Luigi Zingales, 
among others. 
I am fortunate to be surrounded by a group of dynamic and highly motivated PhD 
students. Anne, Aradhana, Ben, Bo Kyung, David B., David Z., Eun Hee, Francisco, John, 
Matt, Mike, Nathan, Na Eun, Noah, PK, Pranav, Renata, Sun Hyun, Vivek, Xiaoyang, 
Yao, Yuriy and many others provide me with a great amount of energy, inspiration, fun, 
and excitement. I thank them for their patience to sit through my numerous practice talks, 
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take notes, and share their thoughts on and beyond research. They make Ann Arbor a 
great place to study. I will miss their company. 
I thank Martine Boron, Chris Gale, Lynn-Marie Kujawa, and Faith Vleck for their 
invaluable assistance with the administrative matters. Paul Michaud and Zhi Wang made 
my computing tasks seamlessly easy. I am also grateful for the fellowships received from 
Gerald and Lillian Dykstra and the family of Thomas William Leabo. The Ross School of 
Business and the Mitsui Life Financial Research Center provided both fellowships and 
research grants. 
Beyond Michigan, I have received extremely valuable comments on my dissertation 
from a number of researchers. I gratefully acknowledge the insightful feedback and 
suggestions provided by John M. de Figueiredo, Michael Jacobides, Daniel Levinthal, 
Joseph Mahoney, Gabriel Natividad, Phanish Puranam, Charles Williams, and Peter 
Zemsky. I thank participants at the 14th Annual Consortium on Competitiveness and 
Cooperation for their helpful comments. I appreciate the thoughtful questions and 
comments made by seminar participants at Duke, GWU, LBS, Maryland, UCLA, UIUC, 
UNC, and USC.  
Like every other journey in my life, my pursuit of the PhD would not have been 
possible without the unqualified support and understanding of my family and friends. I 
begin by thanking my grandpa, for sharing his rich life stories during one of the most 
dynamic periods in Chinese history, and cultivating in me the thought that business can 
have a lasting impact on the society beyond wealth-creation. I am deeply indebted to my 
dear parents for always encouraging me to pursue my full potential, be it in academia or 
other professional fields. I thank my husband Jianzhi for his continued love and patience. 
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continue in my most difficult times. I am grateful to my parents and my in-laws, 
especially Xiao Qing and Xiao Yu, for taking extremely good care of my children to 
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This dissertation views firms as systems of interdependent activities and investigates 
the role of coordination costs in setting limits to firms’ growth strategies and organization 
structure. It contains three interrelated studies. Study I examines the impact of 
coordination costs on firms’ diversification strategies. A synergistic view of 
diversification suggests that firms are more likely to diversify into a new business that 
shares significant resources with their existing businesses: There is more potential for 
synergies. Study I argues that, to realize the potential synergies, firms need to actively 
manage the interdependencies caused by resource sharing, which adds to coordination 
demand from firms’ existing businesses, and may cause marginal coordination costs to 
outweigh marginal synergistic benefits. The impact of coordination costs is particularly 
significant if the existing businesses are already complex. The argument takes into 
account the joint effects of synergies and coordination costs, and offers a unique 
explanation for the limit to related diversification. Study II examines the impact of the 
activity system on the partitioning and recombination of organization units inside the firm. 
It investigates how the complexity and decomposability of the activity system affect the 
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firm’s choice of a more modular, integrated, or hierarchical structure. It argues that the 
degree of organization integration is constrained when the activity system is highly 
complex, whereas for a given level of complexity the degree of organization modularity 
is constrained by the decomposability of the activity system. Under both constraints, a 
hierarchical structure plays the important role of coordinating inter-unit 
interdependencies. Study III extends the inspection of organization structure from firm to 
unit level and examines the differential delegation of coordination responsibilities within 
a hierarchical structure. It exploits institutional differences across host countries where 
multinational corporations operate. It proposes that institutional differences affect the 
local units’ ability to coordinate via the differential availability of information and clarity 
of property rights; differential delegation is an important vehicle to countervail such 
coordination constraints. I find support for my hypotheses using data of U.S. equipment 












1.1. Theoretical motivation and outline of the dissertation 
 
Why do firms in the same primary industry vary in their scope in related product 
markets? For example, why does Honda make cars, trucks, motorcycles and even small 
aircraft (with its recent launch of HondaJet) whereas General Motors and Ford only make 
cars and trucks? What do “lean-manufacturing systems” and “vertical-disintegration 
processes” imply for firms’ horizontal scope? Finally, with the recent shift toward “flatter 
organizations” that is reported in both popular press and academic research, what roles do 
middle managers continue to play? 
This dissertation examines these questions with respect to coordination costs. More 
specifically, it views firms as complex systems of interdependent activities and 
investigates the role of coordination costs in setting limits to firms’ growth strategies and 
organization structure. 
Existing theories of firm growth “explained why there were firms but not how the 
functions which are performed by firms are divided up among them” (Coase, 1993: 73). 
We often observe that, even when there are significant transaction costs in the market, 
firms face limits to growth, suggesting that integration costs rise with firm size and scope. 
But how such integration costs increase with firm scale and scope is still puzzling 
(Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989). Without a theory of how integration costs increase with 
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firm scale and scope, an understanding of the limits to firm growth remains essentially 
incomplete. In this dissertation, I take a first step in outlining such a theory. The starting 
premise is that the benefits to carrying out an activity within the firm are increasing in the 
synergies or complementarities with the existing activities within the firm. Without such 
synergies, there is no added value to integration. Given this premise, it follows that firms 
must actively coordinate activities to realize the benefits of synergies. Thus, I focus on 
coordination costs as a central component of integration costs. I argue that limits to firm 
growth are intimately tied to the coordination costs associated with realizing synergistic 
benefits.  
Furthermore, focusing on coordination costs places a central emphasis on firm 
difference. To the extent that firms have different activity systems and thus different 
demand for coordination, we are likely to observe differences in firms’ growth strategies 
and structures even within the same industries. In this context, my theory of how 
coordination costs vary with firms’ activity systems is consistent with a variety of sub-
literatures in strategy that suggest persistent differences in firm strategies, structures, and 
performance (Axtell, 2001; Ijiri & Simon, 1964; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Nelson, 1991; 
Rumelt, 1991).  
The dissertation asks the following research questions: (1) How does the cost of 
coordinating the activity system limit firm scope? In particular, how does the activity 
system affect firm diversification strategies? (2) How does the need to coordinate the 
activity system affect the design of organization structure? In particular, how does the 
activity system affect organization partitioning (modularity) and recombination 
(hierarchy)? (3) How does the need to coordinate the activity system affect the design of 
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organization structure when the activities span heterogeneous institutions? In particular, 
how does the activity system affect the delegation of coordination responsibilities within 
a hierarchical structure? These questions are answered in sequence in three inter-related 
studies. The studies are presented following the literature review, in Chapters III, IV and 
V. 
Chapter III examines the joint effects of synergistic benefits and coordination costs on 
the direction of corporate diversification. It complements the dominant synergistic view 
of diversification by highlighting the costs of coordination. It studies how the complexity 
of a firm’s existing activity system influences its choice of a more vs. less related 
diversification strategy. 
While Chapter III focuses on the impact of the existing activity system on the external 
boundaries of the firm, Chapter IV examines its impact on the internal boundaries of the 
firm – the partitioning and recombination of organization units. In addition to complexity, 
Chapter IV analyzes the decomposability of the activity system based on the inherent 
interdependencies between activities. It studies how the complexity and decomposability 
of the activity system affect the tradeoff between specialization and coordination, and 
consequently the firm’s choice of a more modular vs. a more integrated organization 
structure, and the degree of hierarchy the firm adopts in its organization structure to 
coordinate interdependencies between organization units.  
Whereas Chapter IV predicts the degree of hierarchy in an organization structure, it is 
agnostic as to how coordination responsibilities over each individual activity could be 
differentially delegated within the hierarchical structure. Differential delegation is not 
necessary when the tradeoff between adaptation and coordination is the same across 
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business units – when the units’ activities and their local information are equally distant 
from each other. Differential delegation becomes important when the units carry out 
activities of varying degree of interdependencies with each other, or operate in different 
institutional environments that affect the local units’ ability to coordinate. Therefore, in 
Chapter V, I examine the differential delegation of coordination responsibilities within 
multinational corporations (MNCs), as a function of two variables: first, the degree of 
interdependence between a local unit’s activity and the activities of other units within the 
MNC, and second, the institutional environment surrounding the local unit.  
In the next three subsections, I elaborate on the relationship between diversification 
strategies and coordination costs, the role of organization structure in reducing 
coordination costs, and the impact of institutions on organization structure. 
1.1.1. Industrial diversification and coordination across business lines 
 
There is a strong consensus in the strategy literature that a driving force behind firm 
growth is the firm’s resources and capabilities that can be deployed to new market 
opportunities. In particular, scholars have long argued that firms should diversify into 
more related industries to pursue synergies (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 
1988). This synergistic view prescribes a continuous path for diversification, starting 
from the most related industries, through progressively less related industries, and 
stopping where potential synergistic benefits diminish to zero. Yet, one aspect of 
diversification that has been relatively understudied is the limit to related diversification. 
Is higher degree of relatedness (synergies) always better? Why do firms sometimes 
pursue less related diversification even before they exhaust opportunities in more related 
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markets? Why do firms differ systematically in the degree of relatedness among their 
businesses?  
To address these questions, Chapter III argues that to realize the potential synergies 
firms need to actively manage the interdependencies caused by sharing resources 
between products, which adds to coordination demand from firms’ existing businesses, 
and may cause marginal coordination costs to outweigh marginal synergistic benefits. 
The impact of coordination costs is particularly significant if the existing businesses are 
already complex. Taking into account the joint effects of synergies and coordination costs, 
firms may forego higher degree of relatedness in favor of lower degree of relatedness in 
choosing diversification strategies, when the net benefit – the difference between 
synergistic benefits and coordination costs – from the former is less than the net benefit 
from the later. Therefore, while diminishing synergistic benefits set a limit to 
diversification in general, increasing coordination costs set a limit to related 
diversification in particular.  
1.1.2. Organization structure 
 
The increasing costs of coordination that accompany firm growth have an important 
implication for organization structure, which is designed to delimit coordination 
complexity (Thompson, 1967). According to Williamson (1985: 135), a firm’s capacity 
for coordination is intimately related to the ability of boundedly rational management to 
selectively intervene in subordinates’ activities “wherever coordination yields net gains.” 
Paraphrasing Williamson, if the set of activities to be organized is held constant, and if 
firms can intervene selectively, a single firm coordinating via hierarchy should not be 
inferior to a collection of small firms coordinating in markets via the price mechanism. 
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Thus, limits to firms’ coordination capacity and ultimately their growth originate from 
their inability to selectively intervene. 
To see how organization structure can assist in achieving some (but not all) selective 
intervention, it helps to decompose the latter into two parts: the rule for when/where to 
intervene, and the intervention mechanism itself. The latter addresses the question of how 
to intervene. It includes design choices such as scheduling, incentive contracts, 
performance measurement, job assignment, and asset ownership. The selection rule 
prescribes the scope for intervention, i.e., when and where to intervene.  
A firm’s organization structure serves the important function of guiding where to 
intervene and by whom, in various ways. An organization structure provides the 
infrastructure for information processing, communication, and joint decision making 
within firms (Galbraith, 1973; Marschak & Radner, 1972; Simon, 1962; Tushman & 
Nadler, 1978). An organization structure assigns authority and decision rights to 
supervising units (March, 1994; Simon, 1947). They in turn coordinate the activities of 
their direct subordinate units. They set priorities when their subordinates have different 
opinions (Hart & Moore, 2005) and resolve conflicts when their subordinates have 
different expectations (Simon, 1991). An organization structure groups multiple 
interdependent tasks into one division and internalizes the tradeoffs between conflicting 
objectives within the same division (Williamson, 1985). With multiple verifications along 
the chain of command, an organization structure also makes commitment from any 
individual manager more credible (Foss, 2003). Finally, an organization structure may 
deter some influencing activities by making the benefits from such efforts a public good 
for employees within the same division (Inderst, Müller, & Wärneryd, 2005).  
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Among all these theoretical lenses, Chapter IV follows the approach of the team 
theory and modularity literatures, which examine organization structure without the 
additional complication of divergent incentives among agents. It investigates the 
tradeoffs between a modular and an integrated organization structure in specializing and 
coordinating decision making, and the role of a hierarchical structure in balancing these 
tradeoffs. It characterizes systems of interdependent activities along two dimensions: 
Complexity refers to the degree of interdependencies; decomposability describes one 
particular distribution pattern of interdependencies. It argues that, first, organization 
modularity has a curvilinear relationship with the complexity of its activities. At low to 
moderate level of complexity, integration brings more coordination benefits since it 
allows for more comprehensive decisions, taking into consideration the interaction terms. 
However, at high level of complexity, due to cognitive constraints of economic agents, 
firms have to partition the activity system despite the potential interdependencies 
between organization units. Second, for a given level of complexity it is possible to have 
more or less decomposability: A more decomposable activity system allows for more 
modular organization structure. Third, a hierarchical organization structure plays the 
important role of coordinating the interdependencies between the base units. Therefore, 
firms are more likely to adopt hierarchical structure when their activity system is highly 
complex or less decomposable.  
1.1.3. Geographic expansion and coordination across institutions 
 
Chapter III and IV investigate the impact of coordination costs on firm scope and 
structure. Given that institutions affect transaction costs in the market (North, 1990), and 
that firm boundaries are demarcated by the difference between coordination and 
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transaction costs, it is important to examine how organization structure interacts with 
institutions to reduce coordination costs relative to transaction costs. 
The most salient example of the interaction can be found in the context of MNCs. 
MNCs’ firm boundaries span heterogeneous institutional environments, which gives them 
competitive advantages in circumventing many obstacles in the market that have 
hindered the growth of domestic firms in both home and host countries. But if the 
primary function of MNCs is to exploit arbitrage opportunities across institutional 
environments, then institutional differences create coordination costs as well. 
Chapter V examines how institutional differences and the consequent coordination 
costs are managed via delegation of coordination responsibilities to local managers. It 
argues that, lack of complementary information and ambiguous property rights in host 
countries with weak institutions limit local units’ coordination capacity and reduce the 
amount of delegation that local units will receive from their MNC parent company. In 
addition, coordination is more important when activities are more interdependent. The 
extent to which a unit in a host country is engaged in activities that are interdependent 
with the MNC’s activities in other host countries captures interdependencies at the 
activity level; diversity in institutional environments across all countries in which the 
MNC operates captures interdependencies at the policy level. Therefore, activity 
interdependencies and institutional diversity will magnify the impact of institutions on 
the allocation of coordination responsibilities.  
1.2. Research design 
 
There are very few econometric studies of the relationships between activity-system 
interdependencies, firm scope, and organization structure at the firm level. This is mainly 
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due to the difficulty in operationalizing and measuring the key constructs, and the lack of 
detailed data on the internal activities and structure of the firm. For this reason, most 
prior work keeps the concepts at an abstract level and relies on computer simulations or 
case studies. This dissertation makes a few modest attempts to tackle those challenges. 
I operationalize system interdependencies based on the flow of intermediate inputs 
between business segments of diversified firms. I represent firms’ portfolios as networks 
of interrelated segments. I construct two measures that reflect, respectively, the degree of 
system interdependencies (COMPLEXITY) and the distribution of system 
interdependencies (DECOMPOSAILITY). These measures correspond closely to the 
theoretical definitions of system interdependencies in the modularity literature, based on 
either task structure matrices (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) or NK models (Kauffman, 1993; 
Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000). 
For organization structure, I rely on detailed reporting linkages within firms to 
construct my measures of modularity, hierarchy, and delegation. Though not perfect, the 
measures allow me to implement consistent analyses across a large sample of firms in a 
number of industries and over a long period of time, which is rare among existing studies 
of organization structure. 
I test my hypotheses on a sample of U.S. equipment manufacturers from 1993 to 2003. 
I build a unique dataset of firms’ internal activities and organization structures with data 
from various sources, such as the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, the BEA Input-
Output (IO) tables, Compustat Industrial Annual Financial and Compustat Segment 
datasets, the U.S. Bureau of Census, the World Bank, and the University of Michigan 
Office of Tax Policy Research. Some of these data have been available for a long time, 
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but have not been fully exploited to the benefit of investigating the internal reality of 
firms.  
Chapter III examines the joint impact of a new business’ potential for resource 
sharing with the existing businesses (a proxy for synergies) and the complexity of the 
existing businesses (a proxy for coordination costs) on the direction of diversification. I 
estimate the probability that a firm enters into a potential destination industry as a 
function of the potential for resource sharing between the existing and the new businesses, 
and the complexity of the firm’s existing businesses. I measure the potential for resource 
sharing using the similarity of resources between a target industry and the industries the 
firm already operates in. I measure complexity using the number of segment pairs in the 
firm’s existing portfolio that provide significant inputs to one another. I find that, 
consistent with the synergistic view, firms are more likely to diversify into a new 
business when it shares more resources with the firms’ existing businesses. However, 
firms are less likely to diversify into a new business when their existing businesses are 
more complex, suggesting the constraining effect of coordination costs on firm scope. 
Last but not least, the complexity of existing businesses mitigates the positive impact of 
the potential for resource sharing on the direction of diversification. These findings 
suggest the constraints that coordination costs impose on firms’ growth options. 
Chapter IV estimates the impact of the complexity and decomposability of a firm’s 
activity system on the degree of modularity and hierarchy of its organization structure. 
Decomposability is computed with a program designed by Guimerà et al. (2005a; 2005b; 
2004) based on the algorithm of simulated annealing. Organization modularity is defined 
as the number of base units at the bottom of the corporate hierarchy – units that do not 
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have subordinate units. Organization hierarchy is defined as the number of supervisory 
units weighted by their levels in the corporate hierarchy. I find that both organization 
modularity and organization hierarchy have a U-shaped relationship with complexity. In 
contrast, decomposability has opposite impacts on organization modularity and hierarchy: 
While it increases organization modularity, it reduces organization hierarchy. These 
findings confirm the coordination role of hierarchical structures in managing inter-unit 
interdependencies. 
In Chapter V, I am interested in the amount of coordination responsibilities delegated 
to an MNC unit in a particular host country. Since this is not directly observable, I track 
the location of the supervisory unit for each base unit, and estimate the observed 
probability that the base unit reports to a supervisory unit located in a foreign country. 
More base units reporting to foreign supervisory units implies that fewer coordination 
responsibilities are assigned to local supervisory units. Thus, there is more cross-border 
coordination. Consistent with my hypotheses, my results show that MNCs delegate less 
supervisory responsibilities to units in host countries with weak institutions than to units 
in host countries with strong institutions. In addition, MNC base units in host countries 
with weak institutions are more likely to be supervised by a foreign unit if their activities 
are more interdependent with the activities of their MNC parents, or if their MNC parents 
operate in more diverse institutional environments. These findings confirm that 
differential delegation within hierarchical structure is used by MNCs to achieve 





The core theoretical contribution of this dissertation is the development of a broad 
framework that relates intra-firm activities with firm growth and organization structure 
by emphasizing the firm as a complex system of interdependent activities. In doing so, it 
contributes to theories of the firm and organization structure. 
First, this theoretic framework complements existing theories of the firm by 
emphasizing that firm boundaries are not determined by technologies of a single plant or 
the “make-or-buy” decision of a single transaction but result from many choices 
regarding a variety of inter-related activities. With this fresh perspective, the dissertation 
joins the recent discussions by several authors around the process of vertical 
disintegration, modularization, and segregation of supply chains, and suggests that an 
implication of the process could be broader horizontal scope in related markets. Despite 
the amount of scholarly attention paid to the challenges of interdependencies for firms, 
few studies have looked at the impact of interdependencies on firm scope beyond vertical 
integration. This dissertation fills in this gap by highlighting the impact of 
interdependencies on the cost of coordinating across business lines or geographic markets 
and, subsequently, firm scope.  
Second, to the organization structure literature, the theoretical framework sheds new 
light on the recent theoretical debate about modular vs. integrated structures. It 
rejuvenates Simon’s insight of a match between the hierarchical structure of the activity 
system and that of the organization: Hierarchical structure enables hierarchical 
coordination. It shows that tradeoffs between specialization and coordination can be 
balanced not only through inter-temporal vacillation between modular and integrated 
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structures depending on the specific contingencies, but also through a hierarchical 
structure that allows for inter-module coordination. In addition, a hierarchical structure 
allows for differential delegation. Tradeoffs between adaptation and coordination under 
heterogeneous institutional environment can be balanced through differential delegation 
within a multinational hierarchical structure.  
The dissertation has important implications for strategy scholars and practitioners at 
the interface of diversification, organization and international business. To diversification 
strategists, it raises the salience of a balanced cost-benefit analysis of diversification 
strategies. To organization designers, it sets a boundary condition to “flatter 
organizations” that are well-received in popular press and academic research, and 
reestablishes the importance of hierarchical structures. To global strategists, it extends a 
recent literature that starts to examine MNCs’ global strategies in sidestepping 
institutional obstacles when location and ownership choices are limited. To policy makers, 
especially those focusing on developing countries, it expands the importance of 
institutions on FDI beyond the initial capital investment and technological transfer to 
include ongoing decision making and resource allocation across national borders.  
Last but not least, the dissertation makes a few methodological contributions to 
empirical studies on system interdependencies and organization structure. First, I build a 
unique dataset of a large sample of firms’ internal activities and organization structures 
with data from various sources. Second, I operationalize system interdependencies in a 
way that corresponds closely to their theoretical definitions in the modularity/complexity 
literature. Third, I adopt computational programs recently developed in physics and 
biology to quantify the decomposability of activity systems with non-randomly 
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distributed interdependencies. To my knowledge, the dissertation is the first to 
comprehensively quantify the theoretical relationships between system 
interdependencies, firm scope, and organization structure on a large sample of actual 
business organizations. It will hopefully encourage more empirical studies that will 












In this chapter I review the literatures on limits to firm growth, diversification as a 
strategy for firm growth, and organization structure as a mechanism for coordination. In 
addition, I survey the international business literature that prescribes global strategies for 
multinational corporations operating across heterogeneous institutional environments. I 
conclude each subsection with a discussion of potential gaps that motivate my research 
questions.  
2.1. Limits to firm growth 
2.1.1. Technology, transaction costs and capabilities 
 
The neoclassical economic explanations of limits to firm growth are based on 
technological constraints. Traditionally, firms are defined as a single product: Their size 
is determined by the lowest point on the long-run average cost curve in a perfectly 
competitive market (Viner, 1932), or the point where marginal cost equates marginal 
revenue if the competition is imperfect and demand curve is downward sloping. Lucas 
(1978) enriches these models by adding managerial resources as a separate input to the 
production function. Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) extend them by incorporating 
potential economies of scope across multiple products. These models do not distinguish 
between a plant and a firm and therefore do not treat separately multi-plant firms. It 
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remains an intriguing question why a firm cannot increase its scale or scope by pooling 
productive or managerial resources from two otherwise independently managed firms. 
Coase’s seminal work, later developed by Williamson, investigates why production is 
not all carried out within the market (i.e., why do firms exist) or within one big firm. The 
Coase/Williamson answer is that there are transaction/contracting costs in the market and 
integration costs in the firm. The relative magnitude of contracting vs. integration costs 
determines firm boundary. Because economic agents are only boundedly rational and all 
states of the world are not foreseeable, it is not always possible to write contracts that 
cover all contingencies. Such incomplete contracting leads to ex post haggling or 
opportunistic behavior. For example, when one party to a contract makes a relationship-
specific investment, it bears a risk of being held up by the other party—it has to sell its 
investment to a third party at a discount (due to the relationship specificity of the 
investment) if the two parties disagree ex post over the split of the  trade surplus. 
Expecting such opportunistic behavior, parties will incur extra costs to draft, verify, and 
protect contracts for numerous contingencies, or trade less than they would in an ideal 
world of complete contractibility. When making integration decisions, firms compare the 
contracting cost for purchasing a good from the market, and the cost of making it within 
the firm. The higher the relationship-specific investments required to produce the good, 
the more frequent the transaction; and the greater the uncertainty (including behavioral 
uncertainty), the more efficient it is to make the good within the firm (Williamson, 1979).  
The transaction cost view provides a powerful prediction of firm boundaries based on 
transaction-specific contracting cost in the market, but its treatment of integration cost 
within the firm is insufficient. While scholars acknowledge integration has its own costs 
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(Williamson, 1985), exactly how integration costs increase with firm scale and scope is 
still a mystery (Coase, 1988; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989). As a result, what determines 
whether a set of tasks are to be performed within a single firm or divided and contracted 
between two separate firms remains an open question (Coase, 1993: 73; Simon, 1991: 26). 
A firm is not a single production function or a single transaction, but an organization of 
numerous human actors carrying out various activities. Therefore to better understand 
integration costs we need to look inside firms at “the other activities that the firms are 
undertaking” (Coase, 1993: 67).  
Both neoclassical and transaction cost economics treat firm productivity and market 
conditions as exogenously given and focus on comparative efficiencies of markets and 
organizations in conducting economic activities. In contrast, the strategy literature and 
the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) in particular stresses the role of firm-specific 
resources and capabilities in driving variations across firms (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). Since such resources and “organizational capabilities” can be 
deployed across multiple plants, locations and industries (Chandler, 1990), RBV 
contributes a theoretical framework of endogenous innovation and growth at the firm 
level.   
According to Penrose (1959: 68), firms have excess resources for three reasons. First, 
indivisibility of resources forces firms to acquire the “least common multiple” and leave 
some residual resources idle. Second, the advantage of specialization entices small firms 
to hire specialized resources that are not used to their full potential due to limited scale of 
output, a case in point being a chemist being employed as a chemist for only part of the 
day and engaged in other duties such as inventory checking for the rest of the time. Third, 
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as the entrepreneurial firm accumulates and searches for new knowledge in production, 
more resources can be spared, and new uses for the excess resources can be learned.  
However, due to imperfection in factor markets, such capabilities may not be tradable 
across firms (Barney, 1991). Limited tradability forces firms to constantly look for new 
opportunities/markets to deploy their resources within firm boundaries. Therefore, the 
speed at which firms develop and deploy resources limits their growth. 
Penrose puts managers at the center stage of growing their firms: Their main tasks are 
to identify, develop and deploy firms’ excess resources and capabilities to maximize 
returns. Their internal experience, speed of learning, training and planning for future 
expansion determine firm growth.  
2.1.2. Coordination capacity, interdependencies and coordination costs 
 
A small body of literature, mostly theoretical, suggests that the limited capacity of 
boundedly rational managers to coordinate may cause decreasing returns to scale 
(Robinson, 1934). According to Williamson (1985: 135), coordination capacity is 
intimately related to the ability of boundedly rational management to selectively 
intervene in subordinates’ activities “wherever coordination yields net gains.” 
Paraphrasing Williamson, if the set of activities to be organized is held constant, and if 
firms can intervene selectively, a single firm coordinating via hierarchy should not be 
inferior to a collection of small firms coordinating in markets via the price mechanism. 
Thus, limits to firms’ coordination capacity and ultimately their growth originate from 
their inability to selectively intervene. 
Interdependencies give rise to the need for coordination or selective intervention: 
Activities are interdependent when performing one activity affects the marginal returns to 
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other activities (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). If agents perform independent activities, then 
limits to division of labor should only be determined by the extent of the market (Stigler, 
1951). Only when specialized agents perform interdependent tasks will coordination 
costs come into play (Becker & Murphy, 1992). Interdependencies among decision 
variables make them intractable, thereby limiting the size of activity systems that 
boundedly rational individuals can coordinate (1962).  
There are two types of bounded rationality: costly rationality and truly bounded 
rationality (Radner, 1996). Costly rationality refers to the costliness in making a rational 
decision when individuals are limited in their cognitive capacity and the task needs to be 
divided among multiple agents. The team theory literature divides coordination into three 
components: information processing, communicating, and deciding (Marschak & Radner, 
1972; Radner, 1992; Van Zandt, 1999a). Information processing can be further divided 
into independent computation and aggregation. Independent computation can be done by 
front units, while aggregation is better performed by supervisory units as they gather 
information from multiple front units. Cost of information processing is determined by 
cost of observation, memory, and computation, and are mainly reflected in the time and 
labor required for these tasks. Cost of decision making, in contrast, includes not only the 
time and effort involved, but also decision errors due to obsolete information.  
Specialization or decentralization in information processing lowers information 
processing cost since it allows for parallel information processing (both independent 
computation and aggregation). However, specialization leads to both communication 
costs and delay in decision making when information needs to be shared for joint 
decision making. To reduce communication cost and delay in decision making, 
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organizations can decentralize decision making. But the effectiveness of decentralized 
decision making is limited. When decision variables are highly interdependent, 
decentralization of decision making implies that individual decisions will be made based 
on partial information and will not be globally optimal.1 These tradeoffs in specialization, 
communication costs, and decision making set limits to organization design and firm 
growth. 
Truly bounded rationality refers to the fact that the solution of certain complex 
problems is beyond the capacity of any decision maker or teams of decision makers. This 
notion of coordination difficulty resulting from interdependencies can be traced to the 
concept of NP-hard or NK models first developed in computer science (Garey & Johnson, 
1979) and evolutionary biology (Kauffman, 1993) and later introduced to the 
management literature (Levinthal, 1997). NK models are often used to characterize the 
complexity that managers face in decision making, including the search for, imitation of, 
and adaptation to some optimal solutions.  
In the NK model, N is the number of decisions to be made, like the multiple 
dimensions that managers search along for optimal strategic choices. K is the number of 
decisions that are interdependent. The relationships are not known a priori. As a firm 
grows, both N and K increase. For example, as the firm raises its output level, it may 
need to procure raw materials from more suppliers, satisfy the need of more 
heterogeneous customers, or supervise more employees. When there is no 
                                                 
1  A separate literature considers agency problems with decentralized decision making: It collocates 
information and decision rights but forces top management to give away control. When employees have 
different objectives than top management, top management’s concern for loss of control limits firm size 
(Williamson, 1967). It is not clear whether agency problems still exist without the presence of 
interdependencies, or without interdependencies why firms cannot adopt market-based incentives to 
discipline the agents. 
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interrelationship among the N decisions, it is feasible that managers divide the problems 
among themselves and each searches for an optimal solution along a single dimension. 
Jointly they will find a global optimal for the entire problem set. However, when there is 
interdependence among the N decisions, i.e, K>0, the search becomes more complicated. 
Even in the simplest case where all N decisions are binary, the time and costs required to 
search through all the 2K combinations of decisions increase non-polynomially in K. The 
problem falls under a special class called NP problems in computer science (Garey & 
Johnson, 1979). The numerous complex interactions construct a rugged rather than a 
smooth selection landscape with many local optima, which slows down adaptation 
toward a global optimum (Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997).  
Radner compares this truly bounded rationality with costly rationality (1996: 1366): 
Here we come face to face with the hard core of ‘bounded rationality’. It is not that, 
in themselves, the costs of observation, communication, memory storage, and 
routine computation, necessarily prevent a team of decision makers from 
conforming to … rationality. Rather, it is that the task of designing decision rules 
that satisfy savage’s consistency requirements is beyond the intellectual capabilities 
of any organizer or team of organizers. 
 
The challenges of interdependencies for firms have been studied at multiple levels. At 
the project level, they complicate the innovation and product design process (Ethiraj & 
Levinthal, 2004b). At the organization level, they obscure the evolutionary path firms 
take to search or decipher best practices (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000), and subject 
firms to more decision errors (Siggelkow, 2002b). At the operational level, they reduce 
the value of many operational practices if they are not implemented with their 
complementary parts. For example, innovative human resource practices (e.g., high-
power incentive pay, teams, flexible job assignments, employment security, and training) 
achieve substantially higher levels of productivity only if they are implemented together 
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(Ichniowski, Shaw, & Prennushi, 1997). At the industry level, interdependencies lead to 
industry structures with persistent heterogeneous profits across firms (Lenox, Rockart, & 
Lewin, 2006). However, despite the amount of attention paid to the challenges of 
interdependencies for firms, only recently have scholars looked at the impact of 
interdependencies on firm scope.  
These recent studies broaden the notion of transaction costs to include not only 
transaction hazards among opportunistic agents (Williamson, 1985), but also the 
“mundane” costs of defining, describing, measuring, adjusting, searching, and 
compensating for the transfer of material, information, and energy among agents with 
congruent interests (Baldwin, 2008; Jacobides, 2000; Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987; 
Schilling & Steensma, 2001).  While transaction hazards cause difficulty in making joint 
effort, the “mundane” transaction costs make joint decision challenging: They are often 
exacerbated by interdependencies.  
Just as firms can mitigate transaction hazards by encouraging joint effort through 
distinctive governance instruments such as low-power incentives and long-term 
employment, they can also be more efficient in dealing with the mundane transaction 
costs. First, firms facilitate communication and information processing through internal 
information infrastructure and firm-specific language. The information infrastructures 
enable not only the division of communication and processing tasks but also the 
integration of information for joint decision making (Arrow, 1974; Galbraith, 1973; 
Marschak & Radner, 1972; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). Firm-specific language, which 
includes meanings, codes, and routines, improves communication and interpretation 
(Arrow, 1974; Crémer, Garicano, & Prat, 2007; Nelson & Winter, 1982). In addition, 
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firms reduce the load of communication, information processing, and calculation through 
authority, identity, rules, and routines. Authorities are assigned to supervisors; 
subordinates give up their decision rights for long-term employment with the firm (March, 
1994; Simon, 1947). Supervisors set priorities when subordinates have different opinions 
over the use of joint assets (Hart & Moore, 2005), and resolve conflicts when 
subordinates have different expectations of joint efforts (Simon, 1991). Identification 
with a firm and routines of the firm help employees to internalize the “rules of the game,” 
form stable expectation of others’ behavior, and behave consistently (Akerlof & Kranton, 
2005; Kogut & Zander, 1993, 1996; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
Despite these advantages, internal coordination is not always less costly than external 
transaction. A few authors observe firms’ vertical scope changes dynamically as 
transaction costs reduce relative to coordination costs. The reduction in transaction costs 
can be caused by exogenous technological changes that lower communication and 
information-processing costs (Argyres, 1996; Malone et al., 1987; Schilling & Steensma, 
2001), or by firms’ conscious design efforts toward product standardization and 
component modularization that reduce the interdependencies and hence the need for joint 
decision among component manufacturers (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Langlois & 
Robertson, 1995; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). Even though these changes reduce both 
intra-firm coordination costs and  inter-firm transaction costs, inter-firm transaction (e.g., 
outsourcing) may become more efficient than integration since suppliers can specialize in 
different components to achieve greater economies of scale and learning (Jacobides & 
Hitt, 2005), and buyers can have more flexibility in selecting suppliers based on their 
capabilities (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Hoetker, 2005; Langlois & Robertson, 1992). These 
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studies, however, focus on vertical scope. How changes in interdependencies (as a result 
of the modularization and outsourcing processes) cause changes in firm’s horizontal 
scope is yet to be examined. 
2.1.3. Summary and potential gaps  
 
Neoclassical economics, contractual or transaction costs economics, and resource-
based view of the firm each provides powerful yet incomplete explanations for limits to 
firm growth. Neoclassical economics offers technological constraint as a limit to plant 
size, but is silent about firm size. Transaction costs economics locates individual 
transactions within or outside firm boundary but fails to explain the scope of the entire 
firm. RBV adds the effect of managers but emphasizes their experience and learning 
rather than coordination capacity. In addition, while the two economic theories focus on 
coordination and efficient allocation of existing resources between the market and the 
firm, RBV emphasizes growth and deployment of new resources within firms. It is time 
to reunite the theories and investigate how coordination challenges limit firms’ ability to 
deploy excess resources for growth. Firm boundaries are not determined by technologies 
of a single plant or the “make-or-buy” decision of a single transaction but result from 
many choices regarding a variety of interrelated activities. Outsourcing a single function 
affects the integration calculation for the procurement of interdependent functions 
(Novak & Stern, 2007).  Although the literature has stressed the challenges of 
interdependencies at multiple levels, the impact of interdependencies on firm scope has 






A context where growth and interdependencies interact is related diversification. 
Diversification extends firm scope; relatedness implies interdependencies. In this section 
I survey the literature on diversification, with a focus on efficiency (as opposed to agency) 
explanations for firms’ choice of diversification strategies, and the challenges of 
coordination. 
2.2.1. Diversification, firm growth and coordination capacity 
 
To scholars advocating firm-specific resources and capabilities, diversification is an 
important engine for growth as firms deploy their excess resources to new market 
opportunities (Penrose, 1959). It should be a normal state of affairs in firm expansion 
(Pitelis, 2002). The theoretical argument resonates with reality: Despite the popular claim 
that firms are returning to their core competency, large firms remain highly diversified 
throughout recent history. Seventy percent of the largest 500 U.S. public companies 
operate in more than five industries (measured at the 4-digit SIC level) (Montgomery, 
1994). Firms like 3M and GE pursue diversification as a permanent rather than a 
transitory strategy (Matsusaka, 2001). Among U.S. manufacturing firms, 40% produce 
more than one product (measured at the 5-digit SIC level) and account for more than 90% 
of total sales (Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006; Nocke & Yeaple, 2006). 
A few studies explicitly model the conjecture that diversification may be an efficient 
growth strategy endogenous to firm capabilities. Firms may diversify to find an industry 
that is best matched with their industry-specific capabilities (Matsusaka, 2001), or to gain 
information about their general capabilities (Bernardo & Chowdhry, 2002). Firms also 
may diversify if they experience decreasing returns to scale in any industry with respect 
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to their capabilities (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002), or if negative demand shock in their 
home industry results in excess capabilities (Gomes & Livdan, 2004; Levinthal & Wu, 
2006). Finally, firms may diversify to leverage their capabilities in coordinating multiple 
product lines (Nocke & Yeaple, 2006).   
Among all the theoretical models, that by Nocke and Yeaple (2006) is of particular 
interest since it explicitly models firms’ heterogeneous coordination capacity. In their 
model, production capabilities are homogenous across product lines and firms, that is, the 
marginal production cost is the same and constant at the product level. The authors show 
that even in this case, diversification is an efficient profit maximizing strategy for firms 
endowed with greater coordination capacity (or “organizational capabilities”) at the firm 
level. In equilibrium, each firm chooses its scope so that the profit of the marginal 
product line is equal to the negative effect that the marginal product line exerts on the 
profits of the infra-marginal product lines. Firms with greater coordination capacity will 
therefore diversify more: The higher marginal costs of the marginal product are offset by 
the less negative impact the marginal product imposes on infra-marginal products. As a 
result, firm size and scope are increasing in the firm’s coordination capacity. The model 
sheds light on the important relationship between coordination capacity and firm scope in 
product market. However, it does not specifically model why coordination costs increase 
with firm scope. Neither does it address the issue of interdependencies.  
2.2.2. Related diversification: Benefits and challenges 
 
Businesses are related to one another “when a common skill, resource, market or 
purpose applies to each” (Rumelt, 1974: 29). Prior research has supplied ample 
justifications for related diversification. First, related diversification achieves greater 
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economies of scope (Panzar & Willig, 1981; Teece, 1982). According to Bailey and 
Friedlander (1982), economies of scope arise from reuse or sharing of inputs, joint 
utilization of fixed or intangible assets among multiple products, or joint production of 
networked products. Economies of scope achieved from joint production result in lower 
unit cost for each product. Resources that can be shared across multiple product lines 
include intermediate products (Lemelin, 1982), marketing and distribution channel 
(Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991), R&D and technology (MacDonald, 1985; Silverman, 
1999), and human capital (Farjoun, 1994). Second, related diversification facilitates 
learning and replication of experiences/capabilities: The more closely related the 
businesses, the easier it is for current management to replicate or train new managers 
with the knowledge the firm already has learned from its existing businesses (Prahalad & 
Bettis, 1986; Teece et al., 1994; Winter & Szulanski, 2001).  A common knowledge base 
helps product market sequencing (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000), technology search and 
selection or development (Breschi, Lissoni, & Malerba, 2003; Chang, 1996; Kim & 
Kogut, 1996). Finally, related diversification generates inter-temporal economies of 
scope as firms exit old businesses and use existing experiences and resources to enter 
related new businesses (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004).  
While the literature has been overwhelmingly supportive of related diversification, 
the boundary condition of the strategy has been overlooked. Only a few authors have 
examined the difficulties in implementing such a strategy. Among them, Jones and Hill 
(1988) argue that related diversification implies all three types of task interdependencies 
– reciprocal, sequential, and pooled, whereas unrelated diversification implies only 
pooled interdependencies. Because it is more difficult to monitor highly interdependent 
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tasks when employees can act opportunistically, coordination costs are the highest for 
related diversifiers and lowest for unrelated diversifiers. Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson (1992) 
propose that to benefit from economies of scope, firms need to establish cooperative 
relationships among business units, rather than resort to standard financial controls or 
market-based disciplines; Nayyar (1992) argues that such relationships are costly and 
difficult to sustain. Gary (2005) constructs a simulation model to show that growth in a 
related market can strain the original excess capacity that is to be shared between the 
primary and related markets; overstretching the resources increases costs exponentially.  
These studies provide invaluable insights into the tradeoff between the synergistic 
benefits from related diversification and the difficulty in maintaining the 
interrelationships among various business activities. However, the detailed mechanisms 
through which the difficulty or costs cancel out the benefits are yet to be fully developed 
and tested. In addition, none of these studies explains within-industry variation in limits 
to related diversification. Given that explaining differences in firm strategies is an 
important mandate for strategy research (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982), the omission is 
unsatisfactory.   
2.2.3. Summary and potential gaps 
 
In summary, a large body of the strategy literature, RBV in particular, suggests that 
related diversification is more beneficial than unrelated diversification: It allows firms to 
take advantage of their core resources and capabilities without significant loss of 
applicability, reap intra- and inter-temporal economies of scope, and facilitates learning 
and replication, all of which promote firm growth. While the literature provides ample 
theoretical support for related diversification, very little has been studied regarding the 
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“dark” side of the strategy, namely the challenges it poses on management to coordinate 
interrelated activities.   
In addition, while the diversification literature has recently recognized that 
heterogeneity in firm capabilities may be an important driving force behind firms’ 
diversification strategies, more has to be learned about what differences in firms’ 
capabilities determine their propensity to related diversification. The literature has 
identified production skills and knowledge gained from experience with existing 
businesses as a significant factor to determine firms’ probability of entering a “similar” 
industry (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Klepper & Simons, 2000). Firms’ capabilities to 
coordinate interdependent activities, an inevitable consequence of related diversification, 
have been largely ignored. This is an unsatisfactory omission since theoretically firms’ 
capability to coordinate multiple product lines suffices to endogenously drive firm scope 
under modest conditions such as decreasing return to scale or downward sloping demand 
curve in each segment. For example, in Nocke and Yeaple’s  (2006) model, the only 
disadvantage of firms operating in a single market is the downward sloping demand 
curve which limits firms’ output in each market. Firms pursuing growth have to look for 
profit opportunities in other markets and balance the tradeoff against increasing 
coordination costs. Firms with greater coordination capacity will be able to accommodate 
broader scope for related diversification. 
2.3. Organization structure 
 
Organization structures are established to delimit coordination complexity 
(Thompson, 1967). The most common organization structure is hierarchical with multiple 
levels of supervisory units. According to Chandler (1977: 7): 
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[T]he existence of a managerial hierarchy is a defining characteristic of the modern 
business enterprise. A multiunit enterprise without such managers remains little more 
than a federation of autonomous offices. [...] Such federations were often able to 
bring small reductions in information and transactions costs but they could not lower 
costs through increased productivity. They could not provide the administrative 
coordination that became the central function of modern business enterprise.2 
 
The hierarchical structure has traditionally been viewed by different organization 
economists as different mechanisms for coordination. 3  It has been viewed as an 
information processing network (Radner, 1992), a supervision and control system (Calvo 
& Wellisz, 1978; Williamson, 1967), an incentive structure and internal labor market 
(Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Waldman, 1984), a nexus of 
contracts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), etc.  
Following these distinct yet interrelated intellectual roots, a recent strand of literature 
in organizational economics studies the optimal structure of hierarchies as a means to 
mitigate various tradeoffs that firms face with coordination. A common feature across 
these theoretical models is some sort of interdependencies between activities that require 
joint processing. Units need to not only divide the workload of information processing 
but also communicate and share information in order to make decisions (Bolton & 
Dewatripont, 1994; Patacconi, 2005; Radner, 1992, 1993). They collect and share 
information about costs and benefits of their investment projects so that corporate 
resources can be allocated among them and the most profitable projects be selected 
(Friebel & Raith, 2006; Geanakoplos & Milgrom, 1991; Hart & Moore, 2005; Inderst et 
al., 2005). They own complementary knowledge and help each other solve problems 
(Beggs, 2001; Garicano, 2000; Rajan & Zingales, 2001). They make decisions and take 
                                                 
2 Cited in Alonso et al. (forthcoming). 
3 See Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) for an earlier review of the literature. 
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actions to adapt to their local demands as well as to accommodate changes in other units’ 
environment (Alonso, Dessein, & Matouschek, forthcoming; Dessein & Santos, 2006). 
Such divergent objectives, together with different assumptions about decision makers’ 
capabilities and incentives, lead to different structural designs.  
In the following subsections I examine some of these models in greater detail. I will 
review the literature with progressively more complications. Subsection 2.3.1 reviews the 
team theory literature that views hierarchy as no more than an information infrastructure. 
Subsection 2.3.2 surveys the modularity literature that sees hierarchy as a structured 
network of tasks. Subsection 2.3.3 adds the complication that employees in organizations 
can have conflicting expectations and preferences, and shows how organization structure 
can mitigate some of these problems to achieve coherent organization goals. Subsection 
2.3.4 entertains the possibility that many of these organization goals are contradictory to 
each other and hence create tradeoffs in organization design. Subsection 2.3.5 covers 
empirical evidence, and subsection 2.3.6 concludes. 
2.3.1. Hierarchy as a information processing system  
 
A hierarchical structure is viewed by team theorists as a way to process information 
acquired by front-line units from their business environment, to transfer the original or 
partially processed information to upper-level management for decision making, and to 
relay management’s instructions to front-line employees (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 
1973; March & Simon, 1958; Marschak & Radner, 1972; Simon, 1947; Thompson, 1967; 
Williamson, 1967). The main processes analyzed by this literature are division of labor in 
information acquisition, and communication and aggregation required for joint decision 
making. “[A] wealth of information creates a poverty of attention” on the part of the 
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receiver (Simon, 1971: 40). 4 Managers are viewed as information processors of limited 
cognitive capacity; their cognitive constraints limit firm size (Van Zandt, 1999a, 1999b). 
By specifying information structure and decision rules, different hierarchical structures 
enable different degrees of specialization in information acquisition, information 
processing, and decision making. Their efficiency is therefore measured by the costs of 
information acquisition, processing and communicating, and speed in decision making 
(Marschak & Radner, 1972).  
While it is relatively easier to divide the tasks of information acquisition and 
processing, it is often difficult to divide decision making. This is because specialized 
decision making may lead to error when they are based on incomplete information. For 
example, Geanakoplos & Milgrom (1991) show that, when managers divide up the task 
of resource allocation by referring only to information they obtain about the costs of 
workshops under their direct supervision, they ignore the information regarding potential 
synergistic cost-saving opportunities among themselves. Only their common supervisor 
with broader information set will attend to these opportunities and lower the joint 
production cost. Aggregation of information and joint decision making are still required 
to achieve all potential synergies. The greater synergy, the wider span of control a 
manager should have, “allowing him or her to reallocate resources across more shops” 
(Geanakoplos & Milgrom, 1991: 220). Broader span, however, gets us back to the 
problem of limited managerial decision capacity. 
                                                 
4 Also according to Simon (1973), “[T]he scarce resource is not information; it is processing capacity to 
attend to information. Attention is the chief bottle-neck in organizational activity, and the bottleneck 
becomes narrower and narrower as we move to the tops of organizations, where parallel processing 
capacity becomes less easy to provide without damaging the coordinating function that is a primary 
responsibility of these levels” (p. 270). 
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A hierarchical structure economizes on communication by reducing the channels of 
communication and eliminating what would otherwise be an unmanageable spaghetti 
tangle of interconnections as a result of specialization (Arrow, 1974; Langlois, 2002; 
Zannetos, 1965). At the same time, a structure where many middle managers compute 
independently and in parallel lowers information processing cost (Radner, 1993). Middle 
managers share the burden of information processing and bring more information to bear 
in the decision-making process for the firm as a whole (Geanakoplos & Milgrom, 1991). 
However, a hierarchical structure also has its weakness. It may lead to delay in decision 
making as information processing and communication becomes sequential along the 
vertical chain (Keren & Levhari, 1979). The delay reduces the efficacy of the decisions 
since they are likely to be made based on old information (Van Zandt, 2003). Given these 
tradeoffs, firms are often limited in their freedom to adjust organization structure and 
enhance their coordination capacity.  
2.3.2. Hierarchy as a structured task system 
 
Baldwin and Clark (2006) view the firm as a network that transfers material and 
energy, in addition to information – the focus of team theorists, between tasks. The costs 
of standardizing, counting and evaluating these transfers are “mundane” transaction costs. 
Because transfers between highly interdependent tasks are more difficult to standardize, 
count and evaluate, they should not be converted into transactions between units. Instead, 
they should be grouped into the same unit or “module” and insulated from the rest of the 
system. Modularization refers to this process of breaking up the system into loosely 
coupled subsystems where highly interdependent parts are grouped into subsystems, and 
between-subsystem interactions are minimized. Therefore, a modular structure, or a 
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network of encapsulated local systems with dense blocks and thin cross points, facilitates 
complex transfers without making all of them transactions.  
The concept of modularity was first applied to product design and innovation 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000).5 Modularized product design in turn enables modularization in 
organization structure through divisionalization (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), 
outsourcing (Novak & Eppinger, 2001), or vertical disintegration (Jacobides, 2005). A 
modular structure has its benefit and potential drawbacks. For example, while a modular 
organization structure facilitates local exploration of knowledge, it reduces overall 
system-wide exploration and innovation (Marengo & Dosi, 2005; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 
2006). A major design goal is therefore to partition organization structure at an 
appropriate level according to the decomposability of underlying tasks. While a precise 
match may not always be possible (Nickerson & Zenger, 2002), over- or under-
modularizing the organization structure relative to the task structure leads to poor 
performance, not only for the particular modules but also for the entire system (Ethiraj & 
Levinthal, 2004b). 
However, the role of hierarchy has largely been overlooked by the modularity 
literature. A “modularity theory of the firm” (Langlois, 2002) acknowledges that a 
hierarchy arises as a non-modular form to coordinate interactions among the modules. 
But the design of the hierarchy has been much less studied in the modularity literature 
than the design of the modules.  
In sum, the team theory and the modularity literature complement each other in 
prescribing specific design rules for organization structure. They assume different types 
of bounded rationality – costly rationality and truly bounded rationality, as described in 
                                                 
5 See Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) for a summary of earlier studies. 
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Section 2.1.2. They also take different approaches toward structure design (Van Zandt, 
1999a). On the one hand, the team theoretical approach explicitly models the constraints 
in information processing, communication, and decision making, imposing relative stable 
assumptions on the environment. On the other hand, the modular or non-optimal 
approach often resorts to computers to simulate limits to rationality in the faces of 
complex environmental or evolutionary forces. In addition, while team theorists have 
accomplished rather elaborate predictions of organizations’ hierarchical structures, 
modularity theorists have confined their prescriptions on organization structure to basic 
encapsulated systems. At the same time, while the modularity literature broadens the 
team theoretic perspective by generalizing the interactions between tasks to be 
multidimensional, it has overlooked the impact of between-unit interdependencies on 
organization structure. More progress can be made by examining the intermediate 
structures that make up a hierarchy, or the lines that connect the boxes. 
2.3.3. Hierarchy as a control mechanism 
 
Both the team theory and the modularity literature view organizations as systems of 
problems or tasks. To team theorists, managers are information processors who solve 
either static or stochastic control problems in real time (Van Zandt, 2003). To modularity 
theorists, organizations are encapsulated systems of interdependent tasks (Baldwin & 
Clark, 2006).   But real organizations are populated with employees and decision makers 
with divergent goals, expectations, and preferences (Cyert & March, 1963). Even 
without local incentives, agents do not necessarily converge in expectation or preferences 
due to multiple equilibriums that can be sustained in dynamic exchanges among groups. 
In this respect, organization structure provides additional coordination mechanisms by 
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assigning authority and decision rights to various supervisors (March, 1994; Simon, 
1947). Supervising units coordinate the activities of their direct subordinate units. They 
set priorities when subordinates have different opinions (Hart & Moore, 2005) and 
resolve conflicts when they have different expectations (Simon, 1991).  
Hart & Moore (2005) explicitly assume that a hierarchical structure, compared to the 
market, delineates authority in decision making: “[H]ierarchy is a substitute for 
renegotiation” (p. 698). In their model, each asset has a chain of command. Managers of 
different ranks may have different opinions as to how the asset should be used but it is 
the manager of the highest rank that makes the final decision. To the extent that assets 
could have a joint value that is greater than their individual value, a manager whose task 
is to coordinate as opposed to specialize should be assigned greater authority and hence a 
higher rank in the hierarchy, so that she can take control of all the assets required for all 
the interrelated activities. The larger the gains to coordination are, the more preferable a 
hierarchical structure is. 6  
2.3.4. Tradeoffs in organization design 
 
Organization design involves complex tradeoffs. Whether between specialization 
benefits and communication costs, comprehensiveness of information and delay in 
                                                 
6 In addition to divergent expectations, employees or their units also may differ in their incentives and 
pursue private benefit at the cost of their firms’ profitability. The incentive-based organization economics 
literature views hierarchy as a governance mechanism where managers’ primary tasks are to monitor and 
supervise the effort of those of lower ranks (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Calvo & Wellisz, 1978; Qian, 1994; 
Rajan & Zingales, 2001; Williamson, 1967). A few recent studies incorporate the idea of multi-tasking into 
structure models with agency problems. These models allow managers to engage in strategic 
communication, lobbying or knowledge expropriation (Alonso et al., forthcoming; Friebel & Raith, 2006; 
Inderst et al., 2005). While interesting and technically sophisticated, these recent agency models depend on 
additional behavioral assumption of private benefit and strategic communication. Team theorists have 
argued that the incentive-based theory is incomplete without the team theory. “The incentive-based 
mechanism design literature … has for the most part ignored communication costs. Most of it makes use of 
direct revelation mechanisms in which, in one round of simultaneous communication, all agents 
communicate all their private information” (Van Zandt, 1999a: 142). 
 37 
 
decision making, truthful communication and diligent effort, these tradeoffs are difficult 
to balance. Often optimizing based on one pair of tradeoffs leads to sacrifice in benefits 
along other dimensions. These tradeoffs provide further explanation for Williamson’s 
problem of impossibility of selective intervention, albeit from an organization structure 
perspective. 
For example, a recent paper (Dessein & Santos, 2006) simultaneously models the 
conflicting demands of specialization, coordination, and adaptation on organization 
design. In addition, it differentiates between ex ante and ex post coordination, which is 
determined by how locally adaptive the organization chooses to be. When activities are 
interdependent but local adaptation is of less importance, organizations may pursue 
specialization and eliminate the need for coordination by setting rigid rules ex ante, 
forgoing adaptive benefits. When local adaptation is important, organizations should 
broaden the responsibilities of units to facilitate ex post coordination, forgoing the benefit 
from specialization. Coordination costs are reflected in the sacrifice of potential benefits 
from specialization and adaptation. 
The idea that there are tradeoffs in organization design is not new to organization 
theorists. Structural contingency theory or the “fit” paradigm stresses that there is not one 
“best” way of structuring. Only a good fit between an organization’s structural design and 
its environmental demands will lead to effectiveness. External contingencies arise from 
diversity or uncertainty of the local environment (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967), and internal contingencies are mainly caused by technology or 
interdependence among task components (Thompson, 1967). For example, external and 
internal contingencies determine organizations’ information processing needs (Galbraith, 
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1973). Since different structures provide different capacity for information processing, 
organization performance depends on the match between the demand and supply of 
information processing (Tushman & Nadler, 1978).  
In sum, the design of organization structure involves complex tradeoffs. The nature of 
a firm’s technology and its external environment may put different demands on structure. 
These divergent demands limit the firm’s ability to adopt an “optimal” structure. 
2.3.5. Empirical studies of organization structure 
 
Most empirical studies of organization structure are found in the literature on 
contingency theory. They generally focus on three issues: the association between 
technology or environment and structure, the impact of changes in technology or 
environment on changes in structure, and the performance consequence of a fit between 
technology or environment and structure (Donaldson, 2001). The first issue is often 
studied using cross-sectional personnel reporting data based on small-scale surveys. After 
controlling for firm size, the role of technology or environment is often found to be 
limited (Child & Mansfield, 1972). The second issue is often examined based on case 
studies. Structural innovation is shown to play an important role in accommodating 
firms’ strategic changes (Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1982). The third issue has been studied 
with longitudinal data with highly simplified measures. For example, Hoskisson (1987) 
compares firm performance before and after the implementation of an M-form structure 
and finds it only improves performance for unrelated diversifiers but not related 
diversifiers or vertically integrated firms. Several reviewers have pointed out that this 
empirical literature has been plagued by lack of consistency in the choice of constructs 
and their operational definitions and measures, difference in levels of analysis, confusion 
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between formal and informal structures, etc., which lead to weak and inconclusive results 
(Child, 1973; Donaldson, 2001; Pennings, 1992; Scott & Davis, 2006). 
There have been some recent efforts to systematically quantify organization structure 
for firms across industries. Argyres (1996) counts the number of product divisions and 





__*5.1__ + . Rothwell (1996) counts 
the number of levels in the longest line of control from the plant manager to the first line 
(lowest level) supervisor (LONG), and the number of people reporting to the plant 
manager (SPAN). He then constructs a measure of hierarchy 
as: 5.022 )/(sin SPANLONGLONGH +== θ . Argyres and Silverman (2004) check the 
presence of central R&D laboratories as opposed to divisional R&D units to measure 
centralization. Rajan and Wulf (2006) count the number of levels between division heads 
and the CEO to proxy for the “flatness” of organization structure. These studies provide 
some guidance for my measures of organization structure.7  
2.3.6. Summary and potential gaps 
 
In summary, organization structure has been studied in numerous strands of literature 
in organization theory and organization economics. They include, among others, team 
theory, modularity theory, agency theory and contingency theory. The consensus is that 
there is not an optimal organization structure. Instead, there are many tradeoffs in 
                                                 
7 Using large-sample, confidential surveys, a separate group of studies examine the centralization and 
decentralization of authority, regardless of the physical shape of the organization structure. The typical 
survey questions include whether the firm is organized into profit centers (Acemoglu et al., 2007), the 
degree of using work-teams and allocating decision rights or responsibility to workers (Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson, & Hitt, 2001; Foss & Laursen, 2005). These measures are about allocation of authority rather 
than partitioning and integration of organization units for the purpose of coordination. 
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structural design, such as those between specialization and coordination; those among 
information processing, communication, and decision making; and those between 
delegation and control.   
There are some gaps in this literature. Mainly, the literatures tend to be developed 
independently of each other. For example, the team theory and the modularity literature 
both treat problem solving and decision making as key functions of organization structure, 
but they each has a different focus. Team theory pays limited attention to the complex 
interrelations between decisions, and the modularity literature has not adequately 
addressed the role of hierarchy in handling inter-module interdependencies. In addition, 
the enduring research interests and extensive modeling efforts about organization 
structure are in stark contrast with scarce empirical evidence, due to difficulty in 
construct operationalization and lack of detailed data for large samples of firms. 
2.4. Institutions and multinational hierarchy 
 
The literature reviewed in Section 2.3 suggests that organization structure affects 
coordination costs inside the firm. Given that institutions affect transaction costs in the 
market (North, 1990), and that firm boundaries are demarcated by the difference between 
coordination and transaction costs, understanding limits to firm growth requires an 
examination of how organization structure interacts with institutions to reduce 
coordination costs relative to transaction costs. 
The most salient example of the interaction can be found in the context of 
multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs are believed to have superior capabilities that 
allow them to overcome the fixed costs of setting up plants overseas and exploit the 
additional market demand or lower costs in host countries (Buckley & Casson, 1981; 
 41 
 
Helpman, Melitz, & Yeaple, 2004). As a result, their firm boundaries span heterogeneous 
institutional environments. In addition to superior capabilities accumulated in their home 
market, multinational presence gives MNCs further advantages in circumventing many 
obstacles in the market that have hindered the growth of domestic firms in both home and 
host countries.  
In this section, I first survey the literature about the aspects of institutional 
underdevelopment that affect firm growth. I then review MNC strategies that deal with 
institutional drawbacks, namely location choice, governance mode, and organization 
structure.  
2.4.1. Institutions and firm growth 
 
Coase (1960) makes the essential link between institutions, transaction costs, and 
neoclassical economic theories: With positive transaction costs, institutional 
arrangements such as property rights assignment alter resource allocation. North (1990) 
defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction” (p. 
3). Some of these constraints are formal, such as rules, laws and constitutions. Others are 
informal and include norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct. 
Institutions shape the incentive structure of economic societies by setting the rules of the 
game. In response, organizations design strategies to win the game according to the rules.  
North connects institutions to economic growth: Institutions influence the costs of 
both exchange and production. They affect the costs of measuring and enforcing the 
terms of exchange, and the uncertainty discount pertaining to such costs. For example, 
information disclosure provisions and property rights structures reduce measurement 
costs; judicial systems lower enforcement costs. Together they shape the transaction costs 
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at which firms can secure their inputs and sell their outputs. In addition, institutions 
influence firms’ (and their financiers’) perception of their business risks, affect firms’ 
investment decisions and cost of capital, and consequently change firms’ production costs. 
The empirical evidence suggests several mechanisms through which institutions 
affect firm growth. For example, law and order give firms confidence in granting trade 
credit to their customers and promote sales (Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002a); 
they also encourage banks to provide long-term financing for investments (Demirguc-
Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). Efficient judicial systems support firm expansion: Firms in 
R&D-intensive industries are larger in countries with better patent protection (Kumar, 
Rajan, & Zingales, 2001). More developed local financial markets supply cheaper 
external capital to supplement firms’ internal cash flows (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 
2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). In contrast, less secure property rights discourage private 
investment and hinder firm expansion (Johnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002b). Crime 
and political instability curb firm growth (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 
2006). 
Despite their significantly negative impact on the growth of domestic firms, weak 
institutions do not impose an equally binding constraint on MNCs. In fact, MNCs are 
established to arbitrage between differential institutional constraints, effectively putting 
“sovereignty at bay” (Kobrin, 2001; Vernon, 1971). Trade barriers make MNCs more 
competitive than domestic importers or exporters (Caves, 1996). Firms with greater 
foreign operations benefit more from differences in tax regimes by shifting assets and 
redistributing profits among host countries (Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004a, 2006a). 
Capital account restrictions imposed by policymakers or underdeveloped local financial 
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markets only prompt MNCs to arbitrage through the internal capital market, giving them 
additional competitive advantage relative to domestic firms (Baker, Foley, & Wurgler, 
2005; Desai, Foley, & Forbes, 2005; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004b, 2006b). Weak 
regimes for intellectual property rights (IPR) protection dampen incentives of local 
inventors but not those of MNCs: They manage to source from weak IPR countries 
innovations that are of greater value to their internal use than to their potential 
competitors (Zhao, 2006). 
The literature suggests that MNCs can use two global strategies in circumventing 
institutional constraints to their growth: location choice and governance mode; each has 
its limitations. Location choice refers to the selection of host countries depending on the 
quality of their institutions. Every location has its advantages and disadvantages. For 
example, MNCs can locate their affiliates at places where local talent and technologies 
are abundant (Almeida, 1996; Chung & Alcácer, 2002), or where it is less likely that the 
firm’s knowledge will leak to a competitor (Yoffie, 1993), but it is difficult to achieve 
both objectives at the same location. In addition, some locations are unavoidable due to 
the attractiveness of local factor endowment, labor costs or market demand. Very few 
MNCs can afford to avoid countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, or China (BRIC 
countries), despite their weak institutions. Finally and most fundamentally, if MNCs only 
go to locations where institutions are strong and markets are efficient, then they do not 
have a competitive advantage over domestic firms trading across borders. 
Governance mode refers to the choice of ownership based on the quality of 
institutions. It also has several limitations. First, depending on the parties’ (including the 
government’s) bargaining power, the MNC and its local partners may settle on a transfer 
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price that effectively redistributes profits regardless of their equity or contractual 
entitlement (Svejnar & Smith, 1984). Second, the optimality of various governance 
modes in dealing with weak institutions is often undetermined. For example, a joint-
venture gives local partners the incentive to help the MNC effectively navigate the 
corrupt government bureaucracy, but can also put the MNC at the risk of being 
expropriated by the local partners for their own benefits (Henisz, 2000; Wei & Javorcik, 
2002). Finally, from the agency literature, we know that even 100% ownership does not 
guarantee control, since ownership and control are different elements of corporate 
governance (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Ownership only gives owners 
the right to residual profits. In contrast, control provides a broad range of intangible 
benefits. For example, managerial control over the production and procurement processes 
provides managers with experience and know-how, which improve their outside options 
for alternative employment or entrepreneurship, and competition the MNC (Feenstra & 
Hanson, 2005). The weaker the institutions, the more ownership rights will diverge from 
control benefits (Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002). 
2.4.2. Institutions and organization structure 
  
Limited by location and governance choices, MNCs have organization structure as a 
natural element of design. In fact, organizational forms such as family firms, business 
groups, and Japanese bank-centered “Keiretsu” have all been credited for improving 
operational efficiency when there are “institutional voids” (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Hoshi, Kashyap, & Scharfstein, 1991; Khanna & Palepu, 2000).  
Viewing MNCs as global networks of production and distribution, an emerging strand 
of literature examines MNCs’ internal organization of global activities as an explicit 
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strategy. For example, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) investigate MNC 
strategies in assigning production and distribution tasks either separately or collectively 
among affiliates. In addition to production and distribution, Alcacer (2006) includes 
R&D activities into his analyses. He examines firms’ organization strategies to balance 
the tradeoff between agglomeration benefits and competitive pressure in making location 
choices. He suggests that MNCs colocate a centralized R&D unit with other firms to 
benefit from knowledge spillover, but disperse the production and marketing activities to 
less congested places to avoid competition. Zhao (2006) focuses on R&D activities and 
proposes that even R&D activities can be strategically disaggregated. She shows that 
MNCs can divide up R&D tasks and assign affiliates in weak IPR countries to work on 
innovations that are only valuable after being combined with innovations developed by 
affiliates in other countries, effectively reducing the independent value of the innovations 
developed in weak IPR countries and lowering expropriation risks.   
While innovative and insightful, these studies do not directly test the underlying 
organization structures that make task reassignments possible. The strategy of operating a 
global value chain involves reallocating resources and combining efforts among affiliates 
across borders, which requires significant coordination effort. Given that organization 
structure affects coordination costs, understanding the organization structure of MNCs 
will help us understand the vital forces behind their growth.  
2.4.3. Summary and potential gaps 
 
Weak institutions limit firm growth because they increase both transaction and 
production costs. These costs reduce the efficiency of resource allocation. The 
comparative advantage of MNCs lies in their ability to arbitrage proprietary assets across 
 46 
 
institutional barriers and reallocate resources to where they are most needed. Location 
choices and governance modes, two of the most studied strategies for MNCs, are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for achieving the goal of arbitrage. Organization 
structure, by directing information and decision rights, may help lower coordination costs 
for cross-border activities and achieve growth. 
2.5. Summary of the literature review 
 
Firm boundaries are not defined by a single production technology or transaction, but 
by managers’ capacity to coordinate sets of interdependent activities. Absent limits to 
managers’ coordination capacity, firms should face less binding constraints in pursuing 
growth strategies such as related diversification, an otherwise “beneficial” strategy due to 
synergies.   
Organization structure directs the flow of information and channel of communication; 
divides the task of information processing and decision making; prescribes expectations, 
priorities, and roles of authority; and aligns incentives. It therefore may have an 
important bearing on firms’ coordination capacity and consequently their growth.    
The role of structure in directing information and providing authority for resource 
allocation is crucial when firms operate in heterogeneous institutional environments. 
MNCs, through their multinational hierarchical structure, may be able to arbitrage across 
institutional constraints and grow beyond the scope of domestic firms. 
In the next three chapters I present three empirical studies. Chapter III examines the 
impact of coordination costs on firms’ choice of diversification strategies. Chapter IV 
investigates how firms design their organization structure to enhance coordination 
capacity and alleviate coordination costs. It examines the role of a hierarchical structure 
 47 
 
in balancing the tradeoffs of a modular vs. an integral structure. Chapter V extends the 
inspection of hierarchical organization structure from firm to unit level and studies the 
delegation of coordination responsibilities within a hierarchical structure. It exploits 
institutional differences across host countries where MNCs operate. It shows that, 









Synergies, Coordination Costs and the Direction of Diversification 
 
 
[The Nature of the Firm] explained why there were firms but not 
how the functions which are performed by firms are divided up 
among them. 
– Coase (1993: 73) 
 
[Integration costs of a particular activity] may be determined by the 
other activities that the firms are undertaking. 
– Coase (1993: 67)  
3.1. Introduction 
 
As a critical engine for firm growth, diversification is of central concern to strategy 
scholars (Chandler, 1962; Montgomery, 1994; Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 
1982). The focus of the diversification literature over the last three decades has been the 
comparative synergistic benefits of more vis-à-vis less related diversification: Firms 
diversifying into less related industries will find it more difficult to transfer managerial 
knowledge, capabilities, routines, and repertoires (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Penrose, 1959; 
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), or to apply physical, human, and technological resources 
(Farjoun, 1994; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Silverman, 1999) to the new business. 
This synergistic view prescribes a continuous path for diversification, starting from the 
most related industries, through progressively less related industries, and stopping where 
potential synergistic benefits diminish to zero. Yet, one aspect of diversification that has 
been relatively understudied is the limit to related diversification. Is higher degree of 
relatedness (synergies) always better? Why do firms sometimes pursue less related 
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diversification even before they exhaust opportunities in more related markets? Why do 
firms differ systematically in the degree of relatedness among their businesses?  
To address these questions, this paper argues that, to realize the potential synergies, 
firms need to actively manage the interdependencies created by sharing resources 
between products, which adds to coordination demand from firms’ existing businesses, 
and may cause marginal coordination costs to outweigh marginal synergistic benefits. 
The impact of coordination costs is particularly significant if the existing businesses are 
already complex. Taking into account the joint effects of synergies and coordination costs, 
firms may forego higher degree of relatedness in favor of lower degree of relatedness in 
choosing diversification strategies, when the net benefit – the difference between 
synergistic benefits and coordination costs – from the former is less than the net benefit 
from the later. Therefore, while diminishing synergistic benefits set a limit to 
diversification in general, increasing coordination costs set a limit to related 
diversification.  
Despite its importance to the completeness of the theory of diversification, the 
coordination cost of related diversification has been highlighted by only a handful of 
scholars (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; Jones & Hill, 1988; Nayyar, 1992). While these 
studies insightfully point out that related diversification implies greater coordination costs 
than unrelated diversification, they do not specify or operationalize a mechanism that 
may cause both synergies and coordination costs, let alone the contingencies under which 
coordination costs may surpass synergies.  
Meanwhile, the impact of coordination costs on firm scope has received renewed 
interests from scholars (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Fine & Whitney, 1999; Hoetker, 2006; 
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Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides & Hitt, 2005; Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Schilling & 
Steensma, 2001). This literature, however, has largely been focused on vertical 
integration rather than horizontal diversification. There have been some recent calls for 
the representation of the firm as a system of interdependent tasks, rather than horizontal 
or vertical scopes (Baldwin, 2008; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b; Sanchez & Mahoney, 
1996). Yet, due to difficulty in operationalizing interdependencies systematically across a 
large sample of firms in different industries, most of the prior work on system 
interdependencies keeps the concept at an abstract level and relies on computer 
simulations (Burton & Obel, 1980; Ethiraj, Levinthal, & Roy, 2008; Lenox et al., 2006; 
Lenox, Rockart, & Lewin, 2007; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 
2007), or case studies (Siggelkow, 2001, 2002a). 
The current study first pinpoints the sharing of resources between different businesses 
as one driver for both synergies and coordination costs. When different businesses 
require similar resources, sharing the resources creates synergies. However, sharing 
resources also requires coordination (e.g., scheduling, adjustment, joint design), which is 
costly. Therefore, the potential to share resources between the existing and the new 
businesses has both a positive and a negative effect on the direction of diversification.  
The study then specifies a contingency under which marginal coordination costs of 
related diversification surpass marginal synergistic benefits: the complexity of the firm’s 
existing businesses. Complexity refers to the number of activities that are interdependent 
with each other. It has been argued to impose significant coordination demand on 
managers and consequently affect firm profits, firm scope, and industry dynamics 
(Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004a, 2004b; Lenox et al., 2006, 2007; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 
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2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007). Since the firm’s overall coordination capacity is 
limited (Simon, 1947), greater demand for coordination from a more complex business 
portfolio leads to a higher rate at which the coordination cost increases with the degree of 
resource sharing between the existing and the new businesses. Therefore, different levels 
of complexity of different firms’ existing businesses generate different demands for 
coordination, thereby imposing different constraints on the degree of related 
diversification firms pursue. By connecting related diversification with the existing 
businesses of the firm, the paper implies that firms’ scope choices may be substitutive. 
Efforts to reduce coordination along some dimensions (e.g., disintegration through 
modularization and outsourcing) may free up coordination capacity for other activities, 
such as related diversification.  
I examine the impact of the potential for resource sharing with a new business and the 
complexity of existing businesses on the direction of diversification using a unique 
dataset of U.S. equipment manufacturers from 1993 to 2003. I measure the potential for 
resource sharing using the similarity of resources between a target industry and the 
industries the firm already operates in. I measure complexity based on the flow of work 
inputs between the industries the firm already operates in. I find that, consistent with the 
synergistic view, firms are more likely to diversify into a new business when it shares 
more resources with the firms’ existing businesses. However, firms are less likely to 
diversify into a new business when their existing businesses are more complex, 
suggesting the constraining effect of coordination costs on firm scope. Last but not least, 
the complexity of existing businesses mitigates the positive impact of the potential for 
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resource sharing on the direction of diversification. These findings suggest the constraints 
that coordination costs impose on firms’ growth options. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I elaborate on the joint 
effects of synergies and coordination costs, and develop the theory and hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the study setting and the research design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 
5 discusses the limitations and concludes. 
3.2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
3.2.1. Benefits of related diversification 
 
Potential synergies or scope economies for related diversification arise from sharing 
common inputs and joint production (Bailey & Friedlaender, 1982; Panzar & Willig, 
1981; Teece, 1980). For example, indivisible physical inputs, such as a machine that can 
be used for manufacturing multiple products, are an importance source of scope economy 
(Teece, 1982). The notion of “common inputs” has been expanded to include managerial 
know-how (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), marketing and distribution channels (Montgomery 
& Hariharan, 1991), technology, knowledge and human capital (Chang, 1996; Farjoun, 
1994; MacDonald, 1985; Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999). Given that firm 
resources are in limited supply (Penrose, 1959), there is an opportunity cost to diversify 
(Levinthal & Wu, 2006). A diversifying firm will rank potential target industries 
according to the degree to which its resources are applicable to each industry; greater 
applicability increases the probability of entry (Silverman, 1999). The synergistic view 
therefore suggests the following baseline hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, firms are more likely to diversify into a new business 
when it shares more resources with the firms’ existing businesses.   
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3.2.2. Coordination costs and diversification 
 
Firms’ incentive to diversify depends on not only the potential synergies, but also the 
coordination costs (Markides, 1995). Coordination is to manage interdependencies 
between activities (Malone & Crowston, 2001). At the transaction level, it is often 
believed that an integrated firm is more efficient than two separate firms at coordinating 
interdependent activities. However, at the firm level, because the firm’s overall 
coordination capacity is limited (Simon, 1947), coordination costs rise as the firm’s 
coordination demand approaches the limit of its coordination capacity. Therefore, to 
understand the coordination costs of diversification, a firm-level strategy, we need to 
investigate other activities within the firm that also demand coordination. A firm is better 
represented by a system of tasks that are interdependent with each other to varying 
degrees (Bladwin, 2008): It is a “miniature economy” that carries out a subset of the tasks 
embedded in the larger economic system (Holmstrom, 1999). Such system view 
conjectures that firm boundaries should be determined by the distribution of the 
interdependencies in the task system: They should be located at the thin cross points – 
points where there is low degree of interdependence between tasks, since it will be more 
costly to coordinate between two firms when their tasks are highly interdependent 
(Baldwin, 2008; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b).  
Whether a crossing point is too thin to be integrated or too thick to be left out depends 
on the demand for coordination from the tasks that are already integrated. The more 
complex the integrated tasks – the denser the interrelations among them – are, the greater 
the existing coordination demand. Complexity raises the demand for communication 
among agents about factors that affect each others’ decisions, and the actual decisions 
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when multiple equilibriums exist (Arrow, 1974; Becker & Murphy, 1992). Complexity 
also raises the demand for information processing to track the multiple interactions 
among decision variables (Simon, 1957, 1962). Finally, because of the increased 
workload of communication and information processing, complexity raises the 
probability of decision errors (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Sutherland, 1980). Given 
the opportunity cost of coordination capacity to managing any interdependent tasks, the 
greater the existing coordination demand is, the less likely the firm will integrate a new 
task, or diversify into a new business. 
I therefore propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, firms are less likely to diversify into a new business 
when their existing businesses are more complex. 
3.2.3. Coordination costs of related diversification 
 
While coordination costs pose a challenge to diversification in general, firms pursue a 
higher degree of relatedness – potential synergies – as their diversification strategy may 
incur greater coordination costs. This is because synergies do not come for free. To 
achieve synergies, firms need to create and actively manage the interrelationships 
between tasks, which is costly (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; John & Harrison, 1999; 
Jones & Hill, 1988; Nayyar, 1992). For example, to achieve economies of scope, 
managers have to undertake the difficult task of balancing the need for differentiation vs. 
standardization when they produce different products on the same platform (Krishnan & 
Gupta, 2001; Robertson & Ulrich, 1998).  
Figure 1 illustrates a cost-benefit analysis of different diversification strategies. For 
simplicity, assume there are only two groups of industries that the firm is considering 
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diversifying into. The first group of industries has greater potential for synergies (and 
hence are more related) with the firm’s existing businesses, whereas the second group of 
industries is less related. Industries within each group are equally related with the firms’ 
existing businesses. SBMR and SBLR represent potential synergistic benefits that can be 
achieved from diversifying into the two groups, respectively; CCMR and CCLR represent 
the respective coordination costs that are required to realize the potential synergies.  Let’s 
first assume that the coordination costs to diversify into the two groups are the same 
(Figures 1a and 1b). If the firm sees opportunities only in the first group, it will diversify 
up to the point where the net benefit is the greatest, or where the marginal benefit equals 
to the marginal cost (DMR*, Figure 1a). Likewise, if the firm sees opportunities only in the 
second group, it will diversify up to the point where the marginal benefit equals to the 
marginal cost (DLR*, Figure 1b). If the firm sees opportunities in both groups, then it will 
compare the slopes of SBMR and SBLR, and pick an industry that provides the highest 
marginal benefit as it builds up its portfolio. If SBMR is steeper than SBLR (copied from 
Figure 1a for comparison) all the way up to DMR*, the firm will diversify only into the 
first group. If, in contrast, SBMR becomes less steep than SBLR as the firm expands out, 
the firm will diversify into both groups, depending on the relative marginal benefit of 
adding industries from either group. 
Now let’s allow the coordination cost curve to rise faster for diversifying into the first 
group than for the second group. This change in assumption has two immediate 
consequences for the degree of related diversification. First, as the coordination cost 
curve rotates inward for the first group, marginal coordination cost increases, and the 
optimal level of diversification into the first (more related) group decreases. In addition, 
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as the net benefit from the first group decreases, it becomes less attractive; the firm is 
even more likely to diversify into the second (less related) group. The proportion of 
industries that the firm operates in the two groups depends on the relative steepness of 
CCMR vs. CCLR.8  
The relative steepness of CCMR vs. CCLR depends on the complexity of the firm’s 
existing businesses. The more complex the existing businesses are, the greater the 
existing demand for coordination, the more the coordination costs will increase with the 
degree of relatedness between the existing and the new businesses, and the less likely the 
firm will pursue a related diversification strategy.  
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the effect of H1 will be mitigated by the complexity of 
the firms’ existing businesses. 
3.3. Research design and methodology 
3.3.1. Empirical context 
 
I tested my hypotheses on a sample of U.S. equipment manufacturers from 1993 to 
2003. Together these firms produce fabricated metal products, industrial machinery and 
                                                 
8 A similar but less detailed figure is presented in Jones and Hills (1988). There are, however, significant 
differences between the two figures. First, Jones and Hill compare related diversification and (totally) 
unrelated diversification that only benefits from internal capital markets; while I compare more vs. less 
related diversification. Second, Jones and Hill assume that “for unrelated diversification higher levels of 
diversification are necessary for capital market gains to be realized.” Hence, they claim “related 
diversification to be associated with the highest level of profit” (pg. 169 and Figure 3b). My analysis does 
not rely on such assumption. Finally, while Jones and Hills insightfully point out that bureaucratic cost will 
increase geometrically with the level of related diversification, they do not specify whether the cost 
increases at different rates for the same type of diversification within different firms. As a result, while 
bureaucratic costs are different for related and unrelated diversification, bureaucratic costs for each type 
(related or unrelated) are the same across firms. The diversification choice again boils down to the benefit 
side; total benefits drive net benefits when costs are fixed: “In essence the choice is governed by the extent 
to which commonalities between divisions allow for the exploitation of rent-yielding resources through 
sharing. The closer commonalities, the greater the ability to exploit rent-yielding resources, the greater the 
total economic benefits associated with related diversification, the greater the relative profitability of this 
strategy when compared with unrelated diversification”(pg. 170, italic added). In contrast, I am more 
explicit about how complexity rotates the coordination cost curve and changes the relative net benefits of 
more vs. less related diversification strategies for different firms.  
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equipment, electrical and electronic equipment, transportation equipment, and 
instruments and related products (SIC 34-38). According to data provided by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA), equipment manufacturers produce about $1.6 trillion of 
output in terms of shipment value, or 30% of the output produced by all manufacturing 
sectors. When adjusted for inflation, their shipment value grew by 85% from 1993 to 
2002, whereas the average growth rate for the entire manufacturing sector was only 32%. 
I chose this empirical setting primarily because equipment manufacturing entails 
multiple stages and requires large quantities of intermediate inputs, which provides large 
variation in firm scope and complexity across firms in the same primary industry. In 
addition to cross-sectional variations, firms in the equipment manufacturing sectors have 
also experienced significant scope changes over the last two decades. Many have been 
evolving toward “vertical disintegration,” whereby a previously integrated production 
process is divided up between two sets of specialized firms in the same industry (Baldwin 
& Clark, 2005; Fine & Whitney, 1999; Macher, Mowery, & Hodges, 1998). These cross-
sectional and longitudinal variations provide strong explanatory power to my empirical 
models. 
3.3.2. Data and sample 
 
I built a unique dataset of firms’ internal activities and their interrelationships with 
data from various sources. These data have been available for a long time, but have not 
been fully exploited to the benefit of investigating the internal reality of firms.  
First, I started with the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA) offered by 
LexisNexis. DCA provides corporate reporting information on parent companies and 
their “units” (e.g., groups, departments, divisions, subsidiaries, etc.), down to the seventh 
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level of corporate linkage. In addition, the dataset describes up to 30 segments (four-digit 
SIC level) for each unit. A similar dataset, albeit for Canadian firms, was used by 
Lemelin (1982) in his study of related diversification.9 Several factors contribute to the 
reliability of the DCA data. According to LexisNexis, the dataset is compiled from 
information reported by the companies, as well as from annual reports and business 
publications in the LexisNexis database. In addition, each company is contacted directly 
for information verification (LexisNexis, 2004). An example of the segments operated by 
all automakers is provided in Table 1. 
While the DCA dataset provides unique and more comprehensive information about 
firms’ business segments, it has several limitations. For example, it does not provide 
sufficient information for the units. An important piece of information that is missing is 
unit size or the level of firm activity in each segment. In robustness checks, I adjusted 
complexity by weighting each interdependent segment pair with the number of units 
operating in the pair; results were similar. Another limitation of the DCA dataset is that 
firms do not report their units consistently over time, resulting in some units disappearing 
from the dataset for a few years before they reappear in the dataset. If not corrected, this 
will lead to overestimation of entry. For units that reappeared during the sample period, I 
interpolated the data for the missing years, assuming their scope had remained unchanged 
                                                 
9Prior research on diversification primarily relies on the Compustat segment dataset. However, as pointed 
out by various authors, the dataset has its limitation when used to measure diversification (Davis & 
Duhaime, 1992; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Villalonga, 2004). Mainly the dataset tends to under-report 
firms’ level of diversification due to its10% materiality rule (Lichtenberg, 1991). In addition, it does not 
capture vertical integration (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1976; Villalonga, 2004). These 
shortcomings are particularly problematic for my study of intra-organizational activities. A major 
advantage of the DCA dataset is that it provides unique and more comprehensive information about firms’ 
business segments. For example, Villalonga (2004) finds, based on confidential plant-level datasets 
provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, that the most diversified firm operates in 133 segments; but the 
number of segments reported by the same firm in the Compustat dataset is ten. More consistent with the 




during those years. This approach would not capture units that reappeared after my 
sample period. However, given that only 1% of the units in the dataset have gaps in their 
appearance in the dataset over the entire sample period, and the average number of 
missing years for these units is only three years, I do not expect the impact of missing 
years to be significant for the entire sample. 
I started with the DCA dataset for publicly traded firms from 1993 to 2003, which 
covers firms with revenues of more than $10 million and more than 300 employees 
(LexisNexis, 2004). The dataset contains 9,850 parent companies and 120,113 units. 
2,075 parent companies list their primary industries as in the equipment manufacturing 
sectors.  
Second, to construct interrelationships among the business segments, I used the BEA 
Input-Output (IO) tables. The tables contain the value of pair-wise commodity flows 
among roughly 500 private-sector, intermediate industries. The tables are updated every 
five years. Since the IO industry code system was changed by BEA in 1997, to ensure 
comparability I used the tables for 1992.10  
Finally, in order to obtain financial data for the parent companies, I augmented my 
dataset with Compustat Industrial Annual Financial and Compustat Segment datasets. I 
matched the datasets by parent company names first through a software program11 and 
then through manual checks. Ambiguous matches were further verified via company Web 
sites. I matched 1,246 (60%) diversified companies in the equipment manufacturing 
sectors. I dropped 164 firms for which there were missing values in the Compustat 
financial data. There are 459 four-digit SIC manufacturing industries (SIC2011-SIC3999). 
                                                 
10 Several authors have observed that the coefficients have been fairly stable over the years. 
11 I thank Minyuan Zhao for her help with the matching. 
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I was able to extract industry growth, concentration and financial data from the U.S. 
Bureau of Census and Compustat for 429 of them. Each of these 429 industries that a 
firm does not operate in the previous year is a potential target for entry. I used lag value 
for all my independent and control variables. My final sample contained 1,082 firms, 
5,311 firm-years, and 1,973,939 firm-year-destination-industry observations. 
3.3.3. Variable definitions and operationalization 
 
Dependent variables  
 
DIVERSIFICATION (Dijkt) was coded as a dummy variable based on the DCA 
dataset. Dijkt =1 if firm i diversified from its primary industry j into industry k in year t. 
Similar to prior studies (MacDonald, 1985; Silverman, 1999), I treated any industry k in 
which firm i did not operate in the previous year (t-1) as a potential destination industry 
in the current year (t). Any industry that the firm operated in the previous year was 
excluded from the set of potential destination industries. Among the potential destination 
industries, those that firm i did operate in year t were entries, and coded as 1.12  
Independent variables  
 
INPUT-SIMILARITY (ISik, 1992) measures the degree to which firm i’s primary 
industry share productive inputs with a potential destination industry k. From the BEA IO 
tables, Fan and Lang (2000) calculate the correlation coefficients across industry input 
structures between the amounts of intermediate inputs from every other industry in the IO 
                                                 
12 However, while both MacDonald (1985) and Silverman (1999) code entries as those potential destination 
industries that the firm does not participate at the beginning of the sample period but participates at the end 
of the sample period, I code entries according to the firm’s portfolio in each year during my sample period. 
This is in order to measure entry timing more accurately and to take advantage of the panel nature of my 
data. To ensure consistency with prior findings, I used MacDonald’s and Silverman’s approach in 
robustness checks; my main results hold. 
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tables that the two industries directly require per dollar of their respective output. I used 
their coefficients. The measure is based on the assumption that the manufacturing firms’ 
resources are embedded in the productive processes. Therefore, the more similar the 
productive inputs required by the firms’ existing and the new businesses are, the greater 
the potential for resource sharing and joint production. 
Such measure has been used in prior studies of diversification (Alfaro & Charlton, 
2007; Fan & Lang, 2000; Lemelin, 1982; Matsusaka, 1993; Schoar, 2002; Villalonga, 
2004). The approach is consistent with the attempt by strategy researchers to “develop 
indirect indicators of … underlying similarities among SIC industries based on secondary 
data about industrial activity,” when “direct measurement may be difficult or impossible” 
(Robins & Wiersema, 1995: 282). It does not depend on the hierarchical scheme of the 
SIC system to define relatedness, but uses resource, input, and task similarity between 
industries to proxy relatedness and synergy potential (John & Harrison, 1999). Other 
similar measures of inter-industry input similarity, such as similarity in human capital 
(Chang, 1996; Farjoun, 1994) and technology (Robins & Wiersema, 1995) have also 
been used in prior studies to proxy inter-segment relationships within firms, or to predict 
the direction of diversification.13  
COMPLEXITY(Kit-1) was defined as the number of segment pairs in firm i’s 
portfolio in year t-1 that supplied significant productive inputs to each other. 
                                                 
13 The major shortcoming of the measure is that it captures input similarity at the industry rather than the 
firm level. Segments within a firm can choose to share inputs between two segments more or less than the 
average flow of inputs between the two industries. This results in a measurement error which may cause an 
attenuation bias toward zero and make my results more conservative. Despite this shortcoming, the 
measure has a major advantage of being exogenous to any individual firm’s decision and is therefore less 
likely to be correlated with unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
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There are very few econometric studies of complexity – degree of interdependencies 
– in task systems at the firm level. This is because the construct is difficult to 
operationalize and measure. For this reason, most of the prior work on system 
interdependencies keeps the concept at an abstract level and relies on computer 
simulations (Burton & Obel, 1980; Ethiraj et al., 2008; Lenox et al., 2006, 2007; 
Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007) or case studies (Siggelkow, 
2001, 2002a).  
I made a modest attempt to tackle this challenge. A firm often produces not only the 
final goods but also various intermediate inputs and their ancillary outputs along the 
value chain. I operationalized complexity as the number of productive tasks that are 
interdependent through the flow of work inputs (Wageman & Baker, 1997). Theoretically, 
productive complexity has been argued to impose significant coordination demand on 
managers and consequently affect firm profits and industry dynamics (Lenox et al., 2006; 
Lenox, Rockart, & Lewin, 2007). 
My measure is similar to a “density” measure if the firm’s business portfolio were to 
be viewed as a system of tasks supplying inputs to one another. It corresponds to the 
theoretical definition of complexity in the modularity literature, based on either task 
structure matrices (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) or NK models (Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 
1997; Rivkin, 2000). It captures the prevalence of interactions among tasks. Similarly, 
Burton and Obel (1980) use a computer-simulated IO table to measure technological 
complexity and its impact on performance under an M-form structure.  
I defined the flow of productive inputs between two industries as significant if they 
on average contribute more than 1% of the inputs to one another, based on the BEA IO 
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Tables. The few prior studies that measure interrelationships between two industries 
based on the IO tables choose either 5% (Matsusaka, 1993; Schoar, 2002; Villalonga, 
2004), or 1% (Lemelin, 1982) as the threshold. I used 1% in my main analyses and 5% in 
robustness checks; results were similar. 
Control variables  
 
Following Silverman (1999), I controlled for other factors that may affect a firm’s 
diversification decision, such as firm characteristics, destination industry characteristics, 
and firm-industry relatedness characteristics. Firm-level variables included size 
(employees), age, R&D intensity, accumulative level of diversification (number of 
segments) and its square term, 14  geographic dispersion, among others. Destination-
industry variables include growth, concentration, and R&D intensity.15 In addition, I 
included the intensity of capital expenditure to control for the size of capital sunk cost 
that has been pointed out in the industrial organization literature as a major obstacle for 
entry (e.g., Sutton, 1991).16Firm-industry relatedness variables capture the fungibility of 
firm-specific resources to the target industry (Silverman, 1999). They included the 
absolute difference between the firm’s R&D intensity and the destination industry’s R&D 
intensity, and the absolute difference between the firm’s capital intensity and the 
destination industry’s capital intensity.  
                                                 
14 By controlling for the number of segments (N) and N squared, I indirectly controlled for the total number 
of segment pairs: N(N-1)/2. 
15 Industry growth and concentration data were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census; R&D data was 
obtained from Compustat segment datasets; Advertising intensity was not included due to large amount of 
missing values in the Compustat datasets. 
16 In addition to capital intensity, in robustness checks, I also controlled for asset liquidity - defined as the 
share of used capital in aggregate industry capital expenditure - in the primary and destination industries to 
more accurately measure sunk costs (Balasubramanian & Sivadasan, forthcoming; Schlingemanna, Stulz, 
& Walkling, 2002). As expected, asset liquidity turned out to be positively associated with diversifying 
entry. However, since the SIC codes were changed in 1997, I was able to test the impact of asset liquidity 
only for a sub-sample-period: 1993-1995. My main results hold with the addition of asset liquidity. 
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In addition, I included growth and concentration in the firm’s primary industry to 
control for opportunity costs of diversification. In robustness checks, I included a 
leverage ratio (Mansi & Reeb, 2002), an Equity-Dependence Index (Baker, Stein, & 
Wurgler, 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Lamont, Polk, & Saa-Requejo, 2001), and a 
corporate governance index (Gompers, Joy, & Metrick, 2003), to control for alternative 
motivations for unrelated diversification, based on portfolio, internal-capital-markets, and 
agency theories; results were similar.  
3.3.4. Model specification 
 
Following prior studies (Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Silverman, 1999), I used a 
logit model to predict the probability that a firm diversifies into a particular industry. I 
extended the prior models by including the measure of complexity. According to the 
model, the expected probability of entry is:  
1,1,1,1,1992,31,21992,10 *]1[ −−−−− Λ++++++== titktjtijktijkijkt IIKISKISDE ββββ          (1) 
where, 
ijktD =1 if firm i diversifies from primary industry j into industry k in year t; 
1992,jkIS  is input similarity between industries j and k based on 1992 IO tables; 
1, −tiK  is complexity calculated based on firm i’s portfolio in year t-1; 
1, −tjI and 1, −tkI  are characteristics of industries j and k, respectively, in year t-1; 
1, −Λ ti is a vector of characteristics of firm i in year t-1. 
I predict β1 >0, β2 <0 and β3 <0.  
Since there are large quantities of non-entries, the standard logit model may 
underestimate the probability of entries, and the coefficients may be biased (King & Zeng, 
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2001a, 2001b). As a robustness check, I ran a rare-event logit model (RE Logit) to correct 
for the potential biases (Tomz, King, & Zeng, 1999). The rare-event logit model has been 
applied in prior studies of market entry that involve large quantity of non-entries (Jensen, 
2003; Wu, 2007).  
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
On average, there are 1,973,939 potential entries during my sample period; 204,906 
in 1994 and 230,531 in 2003. Entry occurred in about 1,178 (0.06%) of the potential 
destination industries. Sample firms' diversifying entry ranged from zero SIC to 22 SICs 
entered. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. The average firm has a sales 
revenue of about $235 (exp(5.46)) million; 86% of which comes from the firm’s primary 
segment. On average the firm has 1.43 (exp(0.36)) million employees. Capital investment 
and R&D expenditure account for 5% and 8% of sales, respectively. An average firm 
operates in more than seven segments; the most diversified firm (Emerson Electric) 
operates in 105 segments. The average growth in the firms’ primary industry is 13%. The 
primary industries are fairly competitive, evidenced by the low concentration ratio. On 
average, firms have 40 (47%) segments pairs that supply more than 1% of productive 
inputs to one another.  
At the industry level, the average correlation coefficient in input similarity between 
the primary and destination industries is 0.28. The average growth rate in the destination 
industry is 1%, whereas the average Herfindahl Index is 726. Capital investment and 
R&D expenditure account for 8% and 7% of sales, respectively, in the destination 
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industries. The absolute difference in capital (R&D) intensity between the firm and the 
destination industry is 12% (21%). There is great variation across industries, suggesting 
that an entry model controlling for individual industry characteristics is appropriate. 
Table 3 summarizes the average level of diversification, complexity and probability 
of diversifying entry, by sector and year, respectively. First, there is large variation across 
sectors. Firms in the transportation equipment sector are most diversified, and firms in 
the electrical and electronic equipment sector have the most complex productive system. 
To control for sectoral differences, I add sector dummies. Second, with rare exceptions 
and consistent with the disintegration literature, there is a general trend toward 
simplification of productive systems, evidenced by reducing level of complexity over the 
years. There is no general trend in diversification and diversifying entry over the years. 
To control for macro conditions that may affect firms’ general diversification pattern, I 
add year dummies. 
Table 4 summarizes the pair-wise correlation coefficients between the key variables 
in this study. 
3.4.2. Direction of diversification 
 
Table 5 estimates the probability that the firm diversifies into a potential destination 
industry. All regressions are estimated following Equation (1). Since STATA’s RELogit 
model does not report goodness-of-fit statistics, I start with the standard logit models to 
show the improvement in the goodness-of-fit statistics with the addition of each 
independent variable. I then compare the coefficients with those based on a RELogit 
model in the last two columns. Results are similar across these models. 
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Control variables  
 
Column (1) includes all the control variables. First, the impact of firm characteristics 
is in line with expectation. Firm size, measured based on employment, is positively 
associated with entry: Larger firms are more likely to diversify, suggesting that they may 
have more resources to share across segments. Firms’ stock of diversification, in terms of 
number of segments it operates in the previous year, is positively correlated with entry, 
again suggesting that they may have more resources to share across segments. In contrast, 
geographic expansion is negatively associated with product diversification; this may be 
due to constraints in coordination capacity but is left for future study. The impact of firm 
age is insignificant. 
Second, at the industry level, as expected, growth in the destination industry is 
positively correlated with entry, whereas growth in the primary industry is negatively 
correlated with diversifying entry (although the impact is not always significant). At the 
same time, market concentration in the target industry is negatively correlated with entry, 
whereas the impact of concentration in the primary industry is ambiguous. These results 
suggest, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Silverman, 1999), that the characteristics of 
the primary industry alone are not as significant as expected, but the characteristics of the 
destination industry are important.  
Finally, at the firm-industry level, capital intensity of the firm is negatively associated 
with diversifying entry, whereas the impact of capital intensity in the destination industry 
is insignificant, so is the difference in capital intensity between the firm and the 
destination industry. Consistent with prior studies, R&D intensity in the destination 
industry seems to attract diversifying entry, and the difference in R&D intensity between 
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the firm and the destination industry deters entry (Silverman, 1999). Surprisingly, R&D 
intensity at the firm level is negatively associated with entry.  
Hypothesis testing  
 
Column (2) in Table 5 introduces input similarity. The results show that, consistent 
with H1, the degree to which the primary and destination industries share productive 
inputs is positively correlated with the probability of entry. Introducing input similarity 
also significantly improves the fit of the logit model, as evidenced by the log-likelihood 
ratio test (χ2(1) =1,294.92, p<0.0001). 
Column (3) introduces complexity.  As suggested by H2, complexity is negatively 
associated with diversifying entry in general. The log-likelihood ratio again significantly 
improves (χ2(1) =16.44, p<0.0001). Column (4) introduces the interaction term between 
input similarity and complexity. Consistent with H3, complexity mitigates the positive 
impact of input similarity on entry; and input similarity intensifies the negative impact of 
complexity. The log-likelihood ratio improves further (χ2(1) =24.05, p<0.0001). The 
coefficient of input similarity remains positive and significant. To control for macro 
conditions at given time that may affect all firms’ diversification pattern, Column (5) 
includes the year dummies; results were similar, albeit with less statistical significance.  
Columns (6) and (7) use the rare-event logit model to address potential bias that may 
result from using the standard logit model. Compared to Columns (4) and (5), the 
coefficients of the independent variables based on the rare-event logit model are similar. 
To quantify the impact on the estimated probability of entry for an increase in each of 
the two main independent variables from its mean to one standard deviation above the 
mean, I calculate a risk ratio after running the rare-event logit model (King & Zeng, 
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2001a) in Column (6). The risk ratio is computed as the ratio between the probability of 
entry conditioning on the independent variable being set at one standard error above the 
mean, and the probability of entry conditioning on the independent variable being set at 
the mean, keeping all other variables at their mean values. The results show that 
increasing input similarity from its mean value to one standard deviation above the mean 
more than triples the probability of entry. Increasing complexity from its mean value to 
one standard deviation above the mean reduces the probability of entry by 9%. 
Since the marginal effect of interaction terms in logit models cannot be straightly read 
from the coefficients (Allison, 1999; Hoetker, 2007; Huang & Shields, 2000; Norton, 
Wang, & Ai, 2004), I plot in Figure 2 the estimated probability of entry against selective 
values of input similarity and complexity.  It shows that across all deciles, input similarity 
is positively associated with entry. Complexity shifts the probability curve down and 
outward, as my hypotheses suggest. 
Robustness checks  
 
Table 6 presents results from robustness checks. One limitation of Equation (1) is that 
it only takes into account the potential synergies between the firm’s primary industry and 
the destination industry. However, diversification may be an evolutionary process (Teece 
et al., 1994). Firms may enter into a new business that is related to any of its existing 
businesses, rather than just the primary business.  Column (1) therefore tests the 
following alternative specification, where I replace the primary industry j with the set of 
N industries that firm i already operates in year t-1: J=[j1, j2, …, jN], and input similarity 
of the destination industry k to the primary industry j with the maximum input similarity 
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of k to any of the industries that the firm operates in year t-1: 
},...,max{max_ 1992,1992,1992,1992, 21 kjkjkjJk NISISISIS = .  
1,1,1,1992,1,31,21992,10 max_**max_*]1[ −−−−− Λ++++++== titktJjktitijkiJkt IIISKKISDE ββββ
                   (2) 
Column (2) replaces the number of interdependent segment pairs with the share of 
interdependent segment pairs to standardize the measure of complexity. Column (3) 
adjusts this complexity measure by weighing it with the number of organizational units 
operating in each segment pair. This is because the DCA dataset does not provide the size 
of the firms’ operation in each segment. If a firm only produces a small amount of output 
in a segment, the coordination demand may not be as significant as if the firm produces a 
large amount of output in that segment. These alternative measures of complexity lead to 
similar results, except for H2. In Columns (1) and (3), the impact of complexity is 
insignificant; H2 is not supported. H1 and H3 are supported in all the columns. 
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 2 show that, consistent with my 
hypotheses, input similarity increases the probability of diversification, whereas 
complexity mitigates the positive effect of input similarity, and input similarity intensifies 
the negative impact of complexity. All three hypotheses are supported. The results are 
robust across most of the alternative specifications. 
3.5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study examines the joint effects of potential synergies and coordination costs on 
the direction of corporate diversification. It argues that, while synergy is a necessary 
condition for related diversification, it is not sufficient. The choice between target 
industries that are more related with the firm’s existing businesses and those that are less 
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related depends on the comparison of not only synergistic benefits but also coordination 
costs. Coordination costs accompany efforts to realize potential synergies, and may 
surpass potential synergies, making diversification into highly related industries less 
attractive. The analysis of coordination costs is particularly important when the firm’s 
existing businesses are already complex, leaving less extra capacity to coordinate the 
potential interrelationship between the existing and the new businesses. 
My empirical results support these arguments. I find that, consistent with the 
synergistic view, firms are more likely to diversify into a new business when it shares 
more resources with the firms’ existing businesses. However, firms are less likely to 
diversify into a new businesses when their existing businesses are more complex, 
suggesting the constraining effect of coordination costs on firm scope. Last but not least, 
the complexity of existing businesses mitigates the positive impact of the potential for 
resource sharing on the direction of diversification. These findings suggest the constraints 
that coordination costs impose on firms’ growth options. 
The study has several limitations. First, it treats the complexity of productive tasks 
that a firm operates in house as exogenous or predetermined. It does not further 
investigate why some firms choose to integrate complex productive tasks, whereas others 
outsource them. The literature provides several explanations for why some firms are 
more integrated than others. Firms may integrate to leverage its core competencies into 
adjacent value chain tasks (Leiblein & Miller, 2003). For example, as a pioneer of the 
automotive industry, Ford developed capabilities in making machine tools better than any 
suppliers, and decided to manufacture the tools in house (Argyres & Zenger, 2007; 
Langlois & Robertson, 1995; Williams et al., 1993). Firms may also integrate to facilitate 
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coordination along certain dimensions (Chandler Jr., 1977; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; 
Scherer, 1980; Williamson, 1975). Finally, firms also may integrate to accommodate 
differential positioning strategy for its products (Argyres & Bigelow, 2007). The current 
study does not argue against these justifications for integration. Rather, it points out that 
there is an opportunity cost of coordination that may lead to less subsequent related 
diversification. How firms endogenously decide complexity and the degree of related 
diversification is left for future study.  
In addition, the study examines one type of synergies and coordination costs – those 
arising from sharing productive inputs across businesses. Whether the propositions can be 
generalized to other types of synergies, such as synergies in knowledge base (Robins & 
Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999), is still an open question. Take knowledge as an 
example. On the one hand, knowledge, once it is developed, is more like a public good 
and less constraining in its application to new businesses (Teece, 1980; Wu, 2007). On 
the other hand, to ensure the proper development and diffusion of knowledge, significant 
coordination effort has to be exerted. A key element in knowledge development is 
researchers’ ability to search beyond and recombine their individual knowledge bases 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). 
Broad search, however, requires that collaborative interrelationships between research 
units, as well as between knowledge-creating and knowledge-using units, be established 
and actively managed (Argyres, 1996; Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000). In addition, the more complex are the interdependencies among 
different elements of knowledge, the more costly the coordinated research and 
development effort (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow 
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& Rivkin, 2006). For example, large pharmaceutical companies like GlaxoSmithKline 
have thousands of scientists working on drugs across multiple therapeutic classes. The 
budget allocation, task design, review, approval and decision processes throughout the 
cycles of drug development all take a significant amount of coordination effort (Huckman 
& Strick, 2005). Therefore, it is plausible that coordination costs also set a limit to 
diversification aimed at sharing technologies. However, an empirical test of the 
proposition in the context of technology involves major data work; it is therefore left for 
future study. 
Despite the caveats, the study makes two important contributions to the literature on 
firm scope. First, it extends the cost-benefit analysis of diversification strategies and 
offers a unique explanation for the limit to related diversification: Diseconomies of scope 
in the form of coordination costs reduce the net benefit from related diversification. Such 
explanation sheds light on several empirical anomalies about firms’ diversification 
strategies, primarily the lack of consistent evidence that related diversifiers outperform 
unrelated diversifiers (see reviews in Grant, Jammine, & Thomas, 1988: Table 1; 
Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997: 565), and the prevalence of unrelated diversification strategy 
among diversified firms (e.g., Berger & Ofek, 1995: 43 and Table 6; Schoar, 2002: Table 
I). To address the performance irregularity, significant methodological improvements 
have been made to sharpen the measure of firm-specific resources (Farjoun, 1994; Robins 
& Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999). These methodological improvements, however, do 
not fully address the underlying theoretical puzzle. That is, if a performance difference 
exists between the more vs. less related diversification strategies, what prevents firms 
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from pursuing the more beneficial strategy? The current study highlights the importance 
of a performance prediction based on analysis of both benefits and costs. 
In addition, the study extends the modularity literature on firm scope by uniting 
studies of horizontal diversification with those of vertical integration, and providing a 
more comprehensive theory of firm boundary arising from the structure of task networks. 
The impact of task interdependencies has received considerable interest in recent studies 
of firm scope (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Fine & Whitney, 1999; Hoetker, 2006; Jacobides, 
2005; Jacobides & Hitt, 2005; Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Schilling & Steensma, 2001), 
but the focus has been on vertical (dis)integration. In this connection, the current study 
reinforces recent efforts to redirect our attention to the representation of the firm as a 
system of interdependent tasks (Baldwin, 2008; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b; Sanchez & 
Mahoney, 1996). In doing so, it suggests that firms’ scope choices are interdependent: 
They can be substitutive due to constraints in firms’ coordination capacity. When making 
vertical integration decisions, firms also need to consider the implication of these 








Integration, Modularity and Hierarchy 
 
 
The major components of a complex organization are determined by the 
design of that organization. Invariably these major components are 
further segmented, or departmentalized, and connections are established 
within and between departments. It is this internal differentiation and 
patterning of relationships that we will refer to as structure.  
 
– Thompson (1967: 57) 
 
The primary theorists of modularity at a systems level … don’t provide 
clear guidance for how to characterize intermediate points along the 
range from modular to integral. 
 




The choice between a modular and an integrated organization structure is of central 
concern to organization theorists. On the one hand, modularity facilitates specialization 
and adaptation. On the other hand, integration promotes coordination and ensures fit 
among interdependent activities. How to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the 
two structures has been an important line of enquiry over more than half a century (Burns 
& Stalker, 1961; Galbraith, 1973; Simon, 1962; Thompson, 1967), and has recently 
attracted renewed attention (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Marengo & Dosi, 2005; Puranam, 
Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). 
The difficulty to choose between the two structures arises from the underlying 
inherent interrelations or interdependencies among the tasks to be managed. Such 
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interdependencies are ubiquitous within organizations (Thompson, 1967), which not only 
provides potential gains from integrated coordination efforts but also places cognitive 
burdens on the coordinators (Simon, 1962).  If the distribution of the inherent 
interrelations is such that the task systems are fully decomposable, that is, they can be 
divided into subsystems with dense intra-module interdependencies but rare inter-module 
interdependencies, then a corresponding modular organization structure can distribute the 
cognitive burden among organization units and enhances the overall coordination 
capacity of the organization. Unfortunately, most task systems are nearly rather than fully 
decomposable (Simon, 1962). With significant inter-module interdependencies in the 
underlying task system, a modular organization structure will miss opportunities that may 
enhance the overall performance of the organization (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b; 
Fleming & Sorenson, 2001a; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). 
To address these tradeoffs, prior studies turn to the contingencies under which one 
organization structure is more favorable than the other. For example, modular 
organization designs are favored when the task systems are too complex to allow 
integrated coordination efforts (Parnas, 1972), when flexibility and speedy innovations 
are more important than overall performance (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000), or when 
corporate strategies such as outsourcing and diversification mandate changes in firm 
scope (Galunic & Eisenhardt, 2001; Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Schilling & Steensma, 
2001). 
This paper examines a different direction of design effort that has been understudied 
in the recent literature: hierarchy. A defining feature of a hierarchical organization 
structure is the intermediate units situated between the CEO and the base units at the 
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bottom of the organization. A hierarchical organization structure is important because it 
is a non-modular form to coordinate interactions between the modules (Langlois, 2002). 
It is most effective in dealing with nearly decomposable task systems. On the one hand, 
Simon (1962) states that the near decomposability of task systems “is a major facilitating 
factor enabling us to understand, to describe, and even to see such systems and their 
parts” (p. 477, italics added). 17  On the other hand, Simon (2002)  proposes that a 
hierarchy structure “is an exceedingly powerful architecture for effective organization …. 
[I]t appears with regularity also in human social organizations – e.g., business firms and 
government agencies – with their many-layered hierarchies of divisions, departments and 
sections” (p. 598, italics added).   
Despite the importance implied by Simon’s statements, how should the underlying 
structure of the task system and the hierarchical structure of the organization be matched 
remains an open question. While the recent literature has largely focused on the correct 
partitioning of interdependent tasks into modules, less has been said about how a 
hierarchical organization structure should be further built to connect the modules and 
manage the residual interdependencies between modules. The few studies that recognize 
the importance of a hierarchical structure have simplified their analyses to a two-level 
structure with two units and a CEO at the top (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow & 
Rivkin, 2005, 2006). The focus of these studies is delegation of decision rights or 
information processing responsibilities within a given hierarchical structure of one CEO 
and two managers, rather the design of the structure itself, such as the number of units 
and their relationships with each other. More complicated (and realistic) hierarchical 
                                                 
17 According to Simon (1962), complex systems are hierarchical when they can be divided into subsystems 
that, in turn, can be further divided into their own subsystems. 
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structures with multiple layers and intermediate units, and their role in managing 
interdependencies, have been largely overlooked. This paper fills in this gap. 
I propose that a hierarchical structure improves three key elements of coordination: 
communication, information processing and decision making (Marschak & Radner, 
1972). It allows for both specialization in information processing and communication, 
and integration in decision making. A hierarchical organization structure reduces the 
communication cost of a modular structure by organizing inter-module communication 
channels from a horizontal web into vertical conduits, and lowers the information 
processing cost of an integrated structure by allowing parallel aggregation. A hierarchical 
organization structure also allows intermediate units to manage interdependencies 
between subordinate units, thereby enhancing the overall quality of decision making for 
the firm. 
Following prior literature (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b; 
Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003), 
I characterize systems of interdependent tasks along two dimensions: Complexity, which 
refers to the degree of interdependencies, and decomposability, which describes one 
particular distribution pattern of interdependencies. I argue that an integrated structure 
generates more coordination benefits since it helps coordinators to take into consideration 
the interactions between tasks. However, when their task systems are highly complex, 
firms have to adopt modular structures to divide the coordination responsibilities 
according to the cognitive capacity of individual units. When the task systems are highly 
complex or when they are not decomposable, organization modularization is suboptimal. 
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A hierarchical structure with intermediate coordinating units that manage the 
interdependencies between base units (modules) is needed.   
Using a unique dataset of U.S. equipment manufacturers from 1993 to 2003, I show 
that both organization modularity and organization hierarchy have a U-shaped 
relationship with task complexity. In contrast, task decomposability has opposite impacts 
on organization modularity and hierarchy: While it increases organization modularity, it 
reduces organization hierarchy. These findings confirm the coordination role of 
hierarchical structures in managing inter-module interdependencies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I elaborate on the 
relationship between task systems and organization structure and develop the theory and 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the study setting and the research design. Section 4 
presents the results. Section 5 discusses the limitations and concludes. 
4.2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
4.2.1. Task complexity and organization integration 
 
A major benefit of an integrated structure is that it promotes coordination and ensures 
stability and fit among interdependent activities. Coordinating interdependent activities 
often implies joint decision making, which raises the demand for information sharing and 
communication among individual decision makers – about factors that affect each others’ 
decisions and the decisions themselves when multiple equilibriums exist (Arrow, 1974; 
Becker & Murphy, 1992). Such communication is often rich, multilateral, and intense; it 
usually requires face-to-face discussion and direct observation (Wheelwright & Clark, 
1992). Integration is a more efficient coordination form since it provides a more 
homogenous communication system (Arrow, 1974; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Monteverde, 
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1995), a common incentive regime for knowledge transfer (Teece, 1993), and a shared 
authority structure that reduces the need for multilateral communication (Conner & 
Prahalad, 1996; Demsetz, 1988).  
As pointed out by Puranam (2001), these coordination advantages apply not only to 
the external but also internal boundaries of the firm – the boundaries of the organization 
units within firms: Employees in the same unit are subject to a more homogenous 
communication system than employees in other units  (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967); they 
are also subject to more homogenous incentive regimes (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997) and 
authority structure (Simon, 1947). Hence activities that are more interdependent with 
each other are more likely to be integrated in the same unit than to be separated into two 
units (Puranam, 2001; Thompson, 1967).  
Despite the coordination advantages of an integrated structure as mentioned above, it 
has a major limitation: It places a significant amount of coordination workload on a few 
integrated units. Complexity raises the demand for information processing. Problems 
with multiple interdependent components are difficult to solve, mainly because of the 
proliferation of the interaction terms as the number of decision variables increases 
(Simon, 1962). At high level of complexity, the computation demand may exceed the 
cognitive capacity of any unit, and the coordination responsibility must be divided into 
multiple units. 
In addition, because of the increased workload of communication and information 
processing, complexity raises the probability of decision errors (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 
2000; Sutherland, 1980). Decision errors are likely to occur when the set of strategic 
choices exceeds “the resolution power of available mathematical, statistical or logical 
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algorithms, either in terms of the number of state variables that must be accommodated, 
or in terms of the degree of stochasticity of relationships or dynamic sequences” 
(Sutherland, 1980: 964). Complexity therefore results in: (1) escalation of computation 
load that prohibits global optimization, and (2) reduction in analytical precision 
(Sutherland, 1980). 
Therefore, at low to medium level of complexity, an integrated structure gives rise to 
more coordination benefits than a modular structure. At high level of complexity, due to 
constraints in individual units’ coordination capacity, firms will divide the coordination 
responsibilities among multiple units despite the potential interdependencies among them.  
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the degree of organization modularity (integration) 
first decreases (increases) then increases (decreases) with the complexity of the 
organization’s tasks. 
4.2.2. Task decomposability and organization modularity 
 
Conditioned on the degree of interdependencies – complexity – of a task system, the 
extent to which an organization can set up a modular structure is dictated by the 
distribution patterns of the underlying inherent interdependencies between tasks 
(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b; Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2000; 
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2007; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). One such pattern is the 
decomposability of the task system. It describes the degree to which the distribution of 
the inherent interactions, by nature, allows the designers to break up a task system into 
loosely coupled subsystems – whether the system is fully, nearly, or non-decomposable 
(Parnas, 1972; Simon, 1962).   
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A modular organization structure reduces the coordination burden of individual units 
via “information hiding” (Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Parnas, 1972). A modular organization 
structure enables a unit to focus on coordinating the interrelations among tasks within the 
unit, while be ignorant of interrelationships among tasks within other units (Baldwin, 
2008). Figure 3 provides an illustration. In the figure, the nodes represent segments; the 
edges represent the inherent interdependencies between segments. Firms A and B have 
the same number of tasks and task-pairs that are interdependent with each other. Firm A’s 
task system is fairly decomposable; the tasks can be grouped into three distinctive 
modules, each being coordinated by an organization unit. In contrast, Firm B has a much 
less decomposable task system; any segmentation of the tasks will leave out significant 
interrelationships between the modules. For firm B, a modular organization structure will 
not help coordination. Rather, it will cause the coordination efforts to be more 
fragmented than what the underlying task system demands, thereby sacrificing significant 
amount of coordination benefits between the units. 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, the degree of organization modularity increases with 
the decomposability of interdependencies among the organization’s tasks. 
4.2.3. Organization hierarchy 
 
Despite their respective coordination advantages, both the integrated and the modular 
organization structures have their limitations. As discussed above, an integrated structure 
is limited by the cognitive capacity of the individual units. At the same time, a modular 
structure is limited by the fact that most real systems are nearly rather than fully 
decomposable (Simon, 1962), and inter-module interdependencies are ubiquitous within 
organizations (Thompson, 1967). When decision variables are densely interconnected, an 
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overly fragmented structure leads to local search and prohibits broad-scope information 
processing (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), which may cause 
decision errors. For example, the more divisionalized the firm, the less likely it will 
pursue an R&D strategy that would have broad implications for the firm (Argyres, 1995).  
It is therefore necessary to think beyond the extreme cases of modular or integrated 
structures. There is the need to recombine the activities divided across organization units 
and ensure fit at the firm level (Puranam, 2001). A hierarchical structure allows 
hierarchical coordination (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). It emerges as a non-modular form 
to coordinate interactions between the modules (Langlois, 2002).  
Compared to alternative organization structures, a hierarchy possesses coordination 
advantages in communication, information processing, and quality of decision making. It 
changes a horizontal web of inter-unit interconnections into vertical communication 
channels, which economize on communication (Arrow, 1974; Langlois, 2002; Zannetos, 
1965). In addition, it enhances the organization’s overall capacity for information 
processing. A structure where intermediate units compute independently and in parallel 
reduces the workload for each unit (Radner, 1993) and brings more information to bear 
for the firm as a whole (Galbraith, 1973, 1977). For example, it saves the CEO’s energy 
for coordinating low-frequency, between-division interactions that yield firm-wide 
benefit, after high-frequency interactions have been dealt with by division managers 
within their respective divisions (Harris & Raviv, 2002).18 Furthermore, by taking inter-
unit interdependencies into account, a hierarchical structure reduces the probability of 
decision errors. Accurate decisions rely on complete information. When the interactions 
                                                 
18 The higher the frequency of interactions is, the less likely that a formal hierarchical structure can be 
substituted with cross-functional project teams and committees, since these transitory structures will offer 
less adequate coordination and more confusion in authority (Galbraith & Lawler, 1993). 
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among decision variables are not decomposable, specialization in information processing 
will result in loss of information about significant interactions between variables across 
units. Decisions made based on incomplete information about these inter-unit interactions 
are not likely to be globally optimal (Marengo & Dosi, 2005; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). 
In this regard, a hierarchical structure helps more comprehensive decision making. For 
example, the intermediate units may capture opportunities of joint cost saving that lower-
level managers may have missed (Geanakoplos & Milgrom, 1991).  
Given the underlying interdependencies among the tasks, the level of inter-unit 
interdependencies is a function of the degree of task partitioning, or specialization  
(Puranam, 2001; Simon, 1991). Organization modularization not only partitions the tasks, 
but also causes shifts in focus, knowledge generation, objectives, and incentives, and 
makes them more heterogeneous across units (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; March & 
Simon, 1958); this results in greater demand for higher-level coordination.  
These arguments suggest that a hierarchical structure is needed when organization 
modularization at the base level is suboptimal due to constraints in cognitive capacity. 
When firms have to over-partition their organization structure relative to the underlying 
task systems due to cognitive constraints, there will be interdependencies left between the 
units at the base level that need to be handled by higher-level coordinators. According to 
H4 and H5, over-partitioning is more likely when the task systems are highly complex, or 
when they are less decomposable. 
H6a: Ceteris paribus, the degree of organization hierarchy first decreases then 
increases with the complexity of the organization’s tasks. 
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H6b: Ceteris paribus, the degree of organization hierarchy decreases with the 
decomposability of interdependencies among the organization’s tasks.  
4.3. Research design and methodology 
4.3.1. Challenges and proposed solutions 
 
There are very few econometric studies of the relationship between interdependencies 
in task systems and organization structure at the firm level. This is because these 
constructs are difficult to operationalize and measure. The current paper makes a few 
modest attempts to tackle these challenges. 
Interdependencies in task systems 
 
As summarized by Lenox, Rockart, and Lewin (2008), a real firm undertakes 
numerous tasks that may be interdependent along multiple dimensions and at multiple 
levels, such as business and corporate strategies (Levinthal, 1997; Porter, 1996; Rivkin, 
2000; Siggelkow, 2001, 2002a), production technologies and managerial practices 
(Ichniowski et al., 1997; Milgrom & Roberts, 1990, 1995), product design (Baldwin & 
Clark, 2000; Henderson & Clark, 1990), etc. It is therefore difficult to measure 
interdependencies systematically across a large sample of firms in different industries. 
For this reason, most of the prior work on system interdependencies keeps the concept at 
an abstract level and relies on computer simulations (Burton & Obel, 1980; Ethiraj, 
Levinthal, & Roy, 2008; Lenox et al., 2006, 2007; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Rivkin 
& Siggelkow, 2007) or case studies (Siggelkow, 2001, 2002a). The few exceptional 
econometric studies are limited to the product (Hoetker, 2006) or transaction level 
(Puranam, 2001), rather than at the firm level. 
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Lenox et al. (2006, 2007) offer some insights through their theoretical models. They 
argue that the NK model of system interdependencies (Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997; 
Rivkin, 2000) can be applied to a complex production function that includes not only 
capital and labor, but also a firm’s specific activities; such productive interdependencies 
pose decision challenges for managers, and affect firm profits, entry, and survival.  
Following such insight, I operationalized system interdependencies through the flow 
of work inputs (Wageman & Baker, 1997): Two tasks are interdependent if they supply 
significant inputs to one another. In addition, similar to recent theoretical as well as 
empirical papers (Lenox et al., 2006, 2007; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005; Yayavaram & 
Ahuja, forthcoming), I treated interdependence as the inherent relationship between tasks 
that is dictated by the nature rather than chosen by the firm. In contrast, organization 
structure is treated as a firm decision rather than a state of nature. 
Furthermore, I assumed that the potential interdependencies among all activities are 
the same at the economy level, but firms have a choice of whether to exploit a particular 
interrelationship. In other words, there is the exogenous potential for interdependencies 
among activities at the economy level, but firms can affect interdependencies in their 
specific systems by choice of activities (Lenox et al., 2006, 2007). If a firm integrates 
two activities that can potentially supply significant amount of intermediate goods to one 
another, rather than transacting through the market, then I infer that inside this particular 
firm, the requirements of these two activities are specialized to each other, and the two 
activities are interdependent. In contrast, if the firm integrates only one activity and 
leaves the other outside its boundary, then I infer that the firm has chosen to standardize 
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its requirement of the excluded activity, in order to make it procurable from the market 
and not interdependent with the integrated activity or activities. 
Based on these assumptions, I treated each segment in a diversified manufacturing 
firm’s business portfolio as a (highly-aggregated) task. Accordingly, for each firm-year in 
my sample I constructed a task network. I first denoted the firm’s segments as nodes in 
the network. I then placed linkages between segment pairs where there is significant flow 
of inputs between them. The approach offers a few benefits. First, it is close to the 
theoretical representation of system interdependencies as a complex production function 
under task structure models like the NK model. Second, the construction of the task 
networks allows me to develop comprehensive measures of system interdependencies, 
such as their degree (complexity) and distribution (e.g., decomposability). Third, these 
task networks demonstrate more realistic distribution patterns that can accommodate a 
broader range of task structures than what is allowed by an NK model, which assumes 
each node to be interdependent with equal number of other nodes (Ghemawat & 
Levinthal, 2000). Finally, since firms’ segments change over time, my approach allows 
me to build time-varying measures at the firm level, and to implement econometric 
analyses that partially address the problem of unobserved heterogeneity across firms. 
Organization modularity and hierarchy 
 
Operationalizing organization modularity and hierarchy is no less challenging. This is 
mainly due to the lack of detailed information on internal structures and measures that 
allow comparison across firms (Rajan & Wulf, 2006). As a result, historically, 
organization theorists have used personnel reporting data based on small-scale surveys to 
study various aspects of organization structure. Several reviewers have pointed out that 
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this empirical literature has been plagued by lack of consistency in the choice of 
constructs and their operational definitions and measures, difference in levels of analysis, 
confusion between formal and informal structures, etc., which lead to weak and 
inconclusive results (Child, 1973; Donaldson, 2001; Pennings, 1992; Scott & Davis, 
2006). 
The data constraints have limited empirical studies on organization modularity to the 
external rather than internal boundaries of the firm (Hoetker, 2006; Schilling & Steensma, 
2001). Similar to studies on interdependencies, a majority of the analyses on internal 
organization modularity have relied on computer simulations (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004a; 
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006). 
There are rare exceptions. For example, Argyres (1996) counts the number of product 





__*5.1__ + . The 
concept of divisionalization is similar to modularization.19  
As for organization hierarchy, again, prior work has largely relied on computer 
simulation of structures with two managers and a CEO (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; 
Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005, 2006). The focus of these studies is the delegation of decision 
rights or information processing responsibilities within a given hierarchical structure of 
one CEO and two managers, rather the design of the structure itself, such as the number 
of units and their relationships with each other. More complicated (and realistic) 
hierarchical structures with multiple layers and intermediate units, and their role in 
                                                 
19 Puranam and his coauthors (Puranam, 2001; Puranam et al., 2006) look at integration decisions after 
technology acquisitions, and define an acquired unit as being “integrated” into the acquirer’s structure if it 
stops to be a profit center or operational unit. However, their level of the analyses is at the unit rather than 
the firm level. 
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managing interdependencies, have been largely overlooked. In addition, there are only a 
few empirical studies on the physical structure of organizations, mostly based on firms’ 
organization charts.20 Rothwell (1996) counts the number of levels in the longest line of 
control from the plant manager to the first line (lowest level) supervisor (LONG), and the 
number of people reporting to the plant manager (SPAN). He then constructs a measure 
of hierarchy as: 5.022 )/(sin SPANLONGLONGH +== θ . Argyres and Silverman (2004) 
check the presence of central R&D laboratories as opposed to divisional R&D units. 
Rajan and Wulf (2006) count the number of levels between division heads and the 
CEO.21 
Following these studies, I measured organization structure based on organization 
charts. For organization modularity, I treated base units – units without subordinate units 
– as “modules” and count their numbers. In robustness checks, I used Argyres’ (1996) 
measure – counting only the divisions and subsidiaries and weighting the subsidiaries by 
1.5; results were similar. 
For organization hierarchy, I took into account the number of layers in the 
organization structure. However, since I am interested in hierarchy as a mechanism to 
coordinate interrelations between organization base units, rather than a mechanism to 
delegate authority or empower workers, I used a measure that is different from the simple 
number of layers. In order to capture the coordination capacity of intermediate units – 
                                                 
20 Using large-sample, confidential surveys, a separate group of studies examine the centralization and 
decentralization of authority, regardless of the physical shape of the organization structure. The typical 
survey questions include whether the firm is organized into profit centers (Acemoglu et al., 2007), the 
degree of using work-teams and allocating decision rights or responsibility to workers (Bresnahan et al., 
2001; Foss & Laursen, 2005). Since these measures are about allocation of authority rather than 
partitioning and integration of organization units, they are less relevant to my construct. 
21 Similarly, Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) measure changes in the degree of hierarchy in French 
establishments by asking if they have removed managerial levels in their organization. 
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units situated between the CEO and base units, I counted the number of these units, and 
weighted them by their rank or seniority in the organization charts.  
4.3.2. Empirical context 
 
I tested my hypotheses on a sample of U.S. equipment manufacturers from 1993 to 
2003. I chose this empirical setting primarily because equipment manufacturing entails 
multiple stages and requires large quantities of intermediate inputs, which provides large 
variation in firms’ internal activities and system interdependencies across firms in the 
same primary industry. In addition to cross-sectional variations, firms in the equipment 
manufacturing sectors also have experienced significant scope changes over the last two 
decades. Many have been evolving toward “vertical disintegration,” whereby a 
previously integrated production process is divided up between two sets of specialized 
firms in the same industry (Baldwin & Clark, 2005; Fine & Whitney, 1999; Macher et al., 
1998). These cross-sectional and longitudinal variations provide strong explanatory 
power to my empirical models. 
4.3.3. Data and sample 
 
I built a unique dataset of firms’ internal activities and organization structures with 
data from various sources. These data have been available for a long time, but have not 
been fully exploited to the benefit of investigating the internal reality of firms.  
First, I started with the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA) offered by 
LexisNexis. DCA provides corporate reporting information on parent companies and 
their “units” (e.g., groups, departments, divisions, units, subsidiaries, etc.), down to the 
seventh level of corporate linkage. In addition, the dataset describes up to 30 segments 
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(four-digit SIC level) for each unit. Several factors contribute to the reliability of the 
DCA data. According to LexisNexis, the dataset is compiled based on information 
gathered from the companies, as well as from annual reports and business publications in 
the LexisNexis database. In addition, each company is contacted directly for information 
verification (LexisNexis, 2004).  
While the DCA dataset provides unique and more comprehensive information about 
firms’ business segments and organization structures, it has several limitations. For 
example, it does not provide sufficient information for the units. An important piece of 
information that is missing is unit size or the level of firm activity in each segment. In 
robustness checks, I adjusted complexity by weighting each interdependent segment pair 
with the number of units operating in the pair; results were similar. Another limitation of 
the DCA dataset is that firms do not report their units consistently over time, resulting in 
some units disappearing from the dataset for a few years before they reappear in the 
dataset. If not corrected, this will lead to overestimation of changes in the task system and 
organization structure. For units that reappeared during the sample period, I interpolated 
the data for the missing years, assuming their segments and structure had remained 
unchanged during these years. This approach would not capture units that reappeared 
after my sample period. However, given that only 1% of the units in the dataset have gaps 
in their appearance over the entire sample period, and the average number of missing 
years for these units is only three years, I do not expect the impact of missing years to be 
significant for the entire sample. 
I started with the DCA dataset for publicly traded firms from 1993 to 2003, which 
covers firms with revenues of more than $10 million and more than 300 employees 
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(LexisNexis, 2004). The dataset contains 9,850 parent companies and 120,113 units. 
2,075 parent companies list their primary industries as in the equipment manufacturing 
sectors.  
Second, to construct interrelationships among the business segments, I used the BEA 
Input-Output (IO) tables. The tables contain the value of pair-wise commodity flows 
among roughly 500 private-sector, intermediate industries. The tables are updated every 
five years. Since the IO industry code system was changed by BEA in 1997, to ensure 
comparability I used the tables for 1992.22  
Finally, in order to obtain financial data for the parent companies, I augmented the 
dataset with Compustat Industrial Annual Financial and Compustat Segment datasets. I 
matched the datasets by parent company names first through a software program23 and 
then through manual checks. Ambiguous matches were further verified via company Web 
sites. I matched 1,621 (78%) parent companies in the equipment manufacturing sectors. 
Since the focus of my study is coordination across business segments and organization 
units, I dropped 589 firms that report only one segment or only the parent company in 
their organization structure. In addition, I dropped 167 firms for which there were 
missing values in the Compustat financial data. My final sample contained 865 firms and 
4,522 firm-years observations. 
4.3.4 Variable definitions and operationalization 
Dependent variables  
 
ORGANIZATION MODULARITY was defined as the number of base units, or units 
that have no subordinate units in the corporate hierarchy.  
                                                 
22 Several authors have observed that the coefficients have been fairly stable over the years. 
23 I thank Minyuan Zhao for her help with the matching. 
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ORGANIZATION HIERARCHY was defined as the number of supervisory units, or 
units that have at least one subordinate unit, weighted by their rank or seniority in the 
corporate hierarchy. 
Independent variables  
 
I constructed measures of system interdependencies using DCA data and BEA IO 
tables. I defined two segments as interdependent if they on average contribute more than 
1% of the inputs to one another based on the IO table. The few prior studies that measure 
interrelationships between two industries based on the IO tables choose either 5% 
(Matsusaka, 1993; Schoar, 2002; Villalonga, 2004), or 1% (Lemelin, 1982) as the 
threshold. I used 1% in my main analyses and 5% in robustness checks; results were 
similar. Once the interdependencies between segment pairs were dichotomized into 1s 
and 0s, a firm’s portfolio can be represented by a network with the segments as nodes, 
and linkages in place wherever the interdependence between a segment pair (two nodes) 
is 1. I then constructed two measures that reflect, respectively, the degree of system 
interdependencies (COMPLEXITY) and the distribution of system interdependencies 
(DECOMPOSAILITY). 
These networks are only rough proxies for the true underlying interrelationships 
between a firm’s productive activities. They capture interdependencies at the industry 
rather than the firm level. Segments within a firm can choose to supply inputs to one 
other more or less than the average flow of inputs between two industries. This results in 
measurement errors, which, if correlated with the true value of the interdependency 
variables, cause an attenuation bias toward zero and make my results more conservative.  
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Despite the shortcoming, the measures have the major advantages of being exogenous 
to any individual firm’s decision (other than the choice of segments), and are therefore 
less likely to be correlated with unobserved firm heterogeneity. For this reason, measures 
of inter-industry relationships in production inputs (Lemelin, 1982), human capital 
(Chang, 1996; Farjoun, 1998), or technology (Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 
1999) have been used by various scholars to proxy inter-segment relationships within 
firms. In particular, the use of IO-table coefficients as proxies for inter-segment 
relationships within diversified firms has been adopted by recent studies in both finance 
(Fan & Lang, 2000; Matsusaka, 1993; Schoar, 2002; Villalonga, 2004) and economics 
(Alfaro & Charlton, 2007). 
COMPLEXITY(K) was measured using the share of segment pairs in a firm’s 
portfolio that supplied significant (more than 1%) productive inputs to each other. The 
measure corresponds to the theoretical definition of complexity in the modularity 
literature, based on either task structure matrices (Baldwin & Clark, 2000) or NK models 
(Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000). It captures the prevalence of 
interactions among tasks or decisions. Similarly, Burton and Obel (1980) use a computer-
simulated IO table to measure technological complexity and its impact on performance 
under an M-form structure.  
DECOMPOSABILITY(DECOMP) was measured using a modularity index for the 
task network, computed using a program designed by physicists Guimerà et al. based on 
an algorithm of simulated annealing (2005a; 2005b; 2004), and further improved by 
biologists Wang and Zhang (2007). 
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The extent of decomposability (modularity) for a particular modular separation of a 






where N is the number of modules, L is the total number of edges (links) in the network,     
ls is the number of edges within modules, and ks is the sum of the degrees of the nodes in 
module s (Guimerà & Amaral, 2005b; Newman & Girvan, 2004). The degree of a node is 
the number of edges that the node has. In essence, M is the difference between the 
observed and expected proportions of within-module edges in the network. Here, the 
expected proportion is computed from a non-modular network where edges are equally 
likely to be within and between modules. 
The program first identifies the optimal modular separation of the actual network by 
maximizing M in Equation (1). Since the M values of two networks with different sizes or 
different average degrees cannot be compared directly, the program then randomly 
rewires – redistributes the edges in the network, retaining the number of nodes and edges 
and each node’s degree. Finally, it compares the M value of the original network with the 
average M values of the randomized networks, and scales the difference between the two 
with the standard deviation of the M values of the randomized networks. The result is the 
modularity index for the actual task network. 
Control variables  
 
To control for other factors that may affect a firm’s organization structure, I included 
in my regressions firm size (number of employees), firm age, number of segments and its 











year dummies, and firm fixed or random effects. Since firms in more volatile 
environment and knowledge intensive industries tend to have less differentiated and less 
hierarchical structure (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Rajan & Zingales, 2001; Smith et al., 
1991; Tushman & Nadler, 1978; Van Zandt, 2003), I added industry volatility measured 
by the absolute beta of industry average stock returns, and knowledge intensity measured 
by industry R&D expenditure per dollar of sales revenue. 
4.3.4. Model specification 
 
For H4 and H5 I ran the following specification:  
itititititit DECOMPKKB ηαααα +Λ++++= 3
2
210             (2) 
where, 
itB   is the logarithm of the number of base units for firm i in year t; 
itK   is task complexity calculated based on firm i’s portfolio in year t; 
itDECOMP  is decomposability based on the modularity index; 
itΛ   is a vector of control variables for firm i in year t. 
H4 predicts 1α <0 and 2α >0. H5 predicts 3α >0. 
For H6 I ran the following specification:  
itititititit DECOMPKKS ηββββ +Λ++++= 3
2
210             (3), 
where itS  is the logarithm of the number of supervisory units for firm i in year t, and 
other variables are the same as in equation (3). H6a predicts 1β <0 and 2β >0. H6b 




4.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. The average firm has 2.05 
(exp(0.72)) thousand employees. 24  An average firm operates in about six (exp(1.8)) 
segments and three countries, and is about 36 (exp(3.58)) years old. To control for the 
possibility that some units were established mainly for tax evasion purposes, for 
robustness checks I excluded units that were located in tax havens, or whose supervising 
units were in tax heavens; results were similar.25 
An average firm has 7.4 (exp(2)) base units and 1.6 (exp(0.45)) supervisory units, 
distributed over two to nine layers of corporate hierarchy. On average, firms have 22% of 
segment pairs that are interdependent – supply more than 1% of productive inputs to one 
another.  
4.4.2. Organization structure 
Organization modularity  
 
Table 8 estimates the degree of organization modularity, measured using the number 
of base units. Column (1) uses an ordinary least square model; Columns (2) to (5) include 
year dummies and firm fixed effects; Column (6) includes year dummies and firm 
random effects. Columns (1) and (2) include only the control variables. As expected, firm 
size is positively correlated with organization modularity. Business heterogeneity, both in 
terms of product diversity and geographic diversity, is also positively correlated with 
organization modularity. Industry characteristics do not always have a significant impact.  
                                                 
24 The average sales revenue is 2.88 billion dollars. 
25 Tax havens are those listed by Hines and Rice (1994) and OECD (2002). 
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Columns (3) and (4) examine the impact of task complexity. Consistent with H4, 
organization modularity has a U-shaped relationship with task complexity. Column (5) 
investigates the impact of task decomposability. Since the decomposability of networks 
with fewer than five interconnected nodes are not very meaningful (they can be easily 
partitioned), I calculated the decomposability value for networks with five or more 
interdependent nodes. Only 2,368 networks (52% of the sample) have five or more 
interdependent nodes. I also found that the distribution of the decomposability value is 
highly skewed to the left. To avoid unduly influence of extreme values on my results, I 
used a dummy variable to show whether the calculated decomposability value is below or 
above sample average. Column (5) shows that firms with less decomposable portfolios 
have less modular organization structure. H5 is supported. In addition, results for H4 still 
hold. The inflection point, according to Column (5), is reached when 38% = 
(1.880/(2*2.473)) of the segment pairs are interdependent with each other; 38% is within 
one standard error from the mean value of task complexity based on the sample (Table 7). 
To investigate between-firm heterogeneity, Column (6) replaces firm fixed effects with 
firm random effects. Results for H4 are similar. But the result for H5 (decomposability) 
becomes insignificant. 
Organization hierarchy  
 
Table 9 estimates the degree of organization hierarchy, measured using the weighted 
number of supervisory units. Column (1) uses an ordinary least square model. Columns 
(2) to (5) are panel models. Columns (2) to (4) include year dummies and firm fixed 
effects; Column (5) includes year dummies and firm random effects. Columns (1) and (2) 
start with the control variables. Compared to Table 8, firm size has a less positive, and 
 99 
 
firm age has a more negative impact on organization hierarchy than on organization 
modularity, echoing some knowledge or problem-solving based models of hierarchy: 
Older or larger firms have more established routines that substitute for hierarchical 
coordination. Product and geographic diversification both have a positive impact on 
organization hierarchy, just as they do on organization modularity. The impact of 
industry volatility is again insignificant. 
Column (3) includes task complexity. Similar to organization modularity in Table 8 
and consistent with H6a, organization hierarchy has a U-shaped relationship with task 
complexity.  Column (4) adds task decomposability. Similar to Table 8, the task 
decomposability value is only available for about half of the networks. Consistent with 
H6b, task decomposability has a negative impact on organization hierarchy. With the full 
model in Column (4), results for H6a still hold. The inflection point is reached when 31% 
of the segment pairs are interdependent with each other. To investigate between-firm 
heterogeneity, column (5) replaces firm fixed effects with firm random effects; results are 
similar and more statistically significant. 
Overall, the results in Tables 8 and 9 show that, consistent with my hypotheses, both 
organization modularity and organization hierarchy have a U-shaped relationship with 
task complexity. In contrast, task decomposability has opposite impacts on organization 
modularity and hierarchy: While it increases organization modularity, it reduces 
organization hierarchy.  
4.5. Discussion and conclusion 
  
This study analyzes the role of organization modularity and hierarchy in coordinating 
systems of interdependent tasks. It operationalizes and quantifies four important 
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constructs in recent studies of organization design: the complexity and decomposability 
of the task systems, and the modularity and hierarchy of organization structure. It argues 
that an integrated structure generates more coordination benefits since it helps 
coordinators to take into consideration the interactions between tasks. However, when 
their task systems are highly complex, firms have to adopt modular structures to divide 
the coordination responsibilities according to the coordination capacity of individual units. 
When the task systems are highly complex or when they are not decomposable, 
organization modularization is suboptimal. A hierarchical structure with intermediate 
coordinating units that manage the interdependencies between base units is needed.  
Consistently, my empirical results show that, both organization modularity and 
organization hierarchy have a U-shaped relationship with task complexity. In contrast, 
task decomposability has opposite impacts on organization modularity and hierarchy: 
While it increases organization modularity, it reduces organization hierarchy. These 
findings confirm the coordination role of hierarchical structures in managing inter-unit 
interdependencies. 
The study has a few limitations. First, it treats the structure of the task systems as 
exogenous or predetermined. It does not further investigate why firms differ in their task 
systems in the first place, or why some firms choose to integrate complex tasks, whereas 
others outsource them. The literature provides several explanations for why some firms 
are more integrated than others. Firms may integrate to leverage its core competencies 
into adjacent value chain tasks (Leiblein & Miller, 2003). For example, as a pioneer of 
the automotive industry, Ford developed capabilities in making machine tools better than 
any suppliers, and decided to manufacture the tools in house (Argyres & Zenger, 2007; 
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Langlois & Robertson, 1995; Williams et al., 1993). Firms may also integrate to facilitate 
coordination along certain dimensions (Chandler Jr., 1977; Monteverde & Teece, 1982; 
Scherer, 1980; Williamson, 1975). Finally, firms also may integrate to accommodate 
differential positioning strategy for its products (Argyres & Bigelow, 2007). The current 
study does not argue against these justifications for integration. Rather, it points out that 
the integration choices may have an impact on the subsequent design of organization 
structure. How firms endogenously design their task systems and organization structure is 
left for future study.  
In addition, to apply theoretical models in the modularity literature, the study treats 
firms’ tasks, activities, and domains interchangeable. They are viewed as tasks at 
different levels of aggregation: Firms chose business domains to operate in, then 
activities to carry out within each domain, and finally specific tasks to perform for each 
activity. This treatment is appropriate in the context of equipment manufacturing. For 
example, depending on the level of aggregation, iron casting, machine tooling, and final 
assembly can be viewed as different business domains (with different SIC codes), 
activities, or tasks in the making of a car (a transportation equipment). Whether this 
aggregative relationship between tasks, activities and business domains is generalizable 
to other contexts is left for future study. Furthermore, the measure of decomposability in 
this study is coarse. It is available for only half of the observations in the sample. It is 
worthwhile to check the sensitivity of my results to alternative measures of 




Finally, the study only examines formal organization structure and ignores the role of 
informal structure. Informal structure, through unofficial communication, trust, routines 
and networks, facilitates important functions that cannot easily be dedicated through a 
formal structure. However, as Nickerson and Zenger (2002) pointed out based on their 
review of the literature, formal structure strongly affects the shaping of the informal 
structure, since the latter often develops in response to the former; There is often a great 
deal of overlap between the two forms of structures. In addition, informal roles do not 
convey the same degree of formal empowerment and legitimacy to the coordinator 
(Galbraith & Lawler, 1993). Nevertheless, the role of informal structure in coordinating 
system interdependencies is worth of future study. 
Despite the caveats, the study makes several contributions to the organization 
structure literature. First, it redirects our attention to the more realistic representation of 
organization structure as a multi-level hierarchy, and restores the importance of 
intermediate units in managing interdependencies and enhancing the overall coordination 
capacity of an organization. Hierarchical structures are created to meet the demand for 
“hierarchical coordination”: Tradeoffs between specialization and coordination can be 
balanced not only through inter-temporal vacillation between modular and integrated 
structures depending on the specific contingencies (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003), but 
also through a hierarchical structure that allows for inter-unit coordination. In doing so, 
the paper also sets a boundary condition to “flatter organizations” that are well-received 
in popular press and academic research (Brickley et al., 2003; Rajan & Wulf, 2006).  
In addition, this paper provides some empirical evidence of organization design 
theories based on a unique dataset of firms’ internal activities and organization structures. 
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Prior empirical studies of organization structure have suffered from lack of consensus in 
the choice of constructs and their operational definition and measure and, as a result, 
weak and inconclusive results (Child, 1973; Donaldson, 2001; Pennings, 1992; Scott & 
Davis, 2006). Consequently, scholars have resorted to formal modeling or computer 
simulation as their main method of enquiry. The current study quantifies the theoretical 
relationships between task complexity and organization structure by using a large sample 
of firms, and adopting state-of-the-art computational programs recently developed in 
physics and biology that calculate important features, such as decomposability, for task 












Scholars in the law and finance and development economics fields have long argued 
that weak institutions, such as the lack of law and order, inefficient judicial systems, 
ambiguous property rights, and underdeveloped financial markets, hinder firm growth.26 
This is mainly because weak institutions increase firms’ costs of sourcing inputs 
(including financial capital), distributing products and mobilizing resources within firms 
(North, 1990). However, despite their significantly negative impact on the growth of 
domestic firms, weak institutions do not impose an equally binding constraint on 
multinational corporations (MNCs). In fact, MNCs often employ their unique 
organizational form to arbitrage between differential institutional constraints and 
reallocate resources across national borders, effectively putting “sovereignty at bay” 
(Kobrin, 2001; Vernon, 1971: 3). Such arbitrage provides the basis of competitive 
                                                 
26For the impact of law and order, see (Johnson et al., 2002a, 2002b; Kumar et al., 2001). For the impact of 
financial constraints, see (Ayyagari et al., 2006; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998; Guiso et al., 2004; 
Pissaridesa, Singer, & Svejnar, 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). For both legal and financial constraints, see 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, forthcoming). For the impact of corruption, see (Fisman & 
Svensson, 2007; Wei, 2000).  
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advantage of the MNC vis-à-vis its domestic competitors in both home and host 
countries.27  
International arbitrage, which often involves resource reallocation across borders, 
creates demand for coordination (Kogut, 1983). Coordination is particularly demanding 
in countries with weak institutions. First, there is greater demand for resource reallocation 
within firm boundaries since external markets are weaker. In addition, alternative 
coordination mechanisms such as market disciplines and incentive contracts are less 
enforceable. How MNCs reduce coordination costs in countries with weak institutions 
that hinder the growth of local firms is therefore an intriguing question for both 
economists and strategists.  
The academic research exploring how MNCs countervail weak institutions may be 
usefully partitioned into two related themes – location and ownership. While research on 
location choice seeks to understand how MNCs select locations with the greatest market 
or production opportunities but the least institutional constraints to create value, the 
ownership literature has sought to understand how MNCs employ governance modes 
(e.g., wholly-owned subsidiary vs. joint venture) to appropriate the value that they create. 
Both strategies, however, have their limitations. Location choices are limited primarily 
because arbitrage opportunities and institutional constraints often accompany each other: 
If MNCs only go to locations where institutions are strong, then their comparative 
advantage over domestic firms trading across borders will be significantly dampened. 
Ownership choices are insufficient mainly because ownership does not guarantee control 
                                                 
27 For example, MNCs arbitrage in differential foreign exchange rates (Froot & Stein, 1991), tax regimes 
(Desai et al., 2004a, 2006a; Kramer, McDermott, & Heston, 1993), disclosure requirements of stock 
exchanges (Saudagaran & Biddle, 1995), and capital account restrictions and financial market frictions 
(Baker, Foley, & Wurgler, 2005; Desai, Foley, & Forbes, 2005; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004b, 2006b). 
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due to agency problems (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983). In addition, the 
weaker are the institutions, the more ownership rights will diverge from control benefits 
(Bertrand et al., 2002), and thus the more need for control. 
In this study, I aim to direct the lens at yet another important, but understudied, 
choice of MNCs – organization structure that facilitates coordination. Firm boundaries 
are demarcated by the comparative costs of transaction and integration (Williamson, 
1985). While institutions affect transaction costs in the market, they also affect the costs 
of integration (North, 1990). If the primary function of MNCs is to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities across institutional environments, then institutional differences create 
coordination costs as well. Since organizations are designed to delimit coordination 
complexity (Thompson, 1967), to understand the growth of MNCs, we need to first 
apprehend the interplay between their organization structure and the institutional 
environments surround their operations. How do MNCs design their organization 
structures to manage coordination costs across institutional boundaries? While the 
question of coordination has been posed by prominent scholars in the field (Doz & 
Prahalad, 1984), there have been few follow-up studies. 
The impact of institutions on the organization structure of MNCs is illustrated in 
Figure 4. When institutions are weak and a unit of a domestic firm is in need of capital 
for expansion, banks may not be willing to lend because of the risks associated with 
doing business in the country. For example, the bank may be concerned that the domestic 
firm lacks the capability to adjust its production adequately to business cycles and 
therefore faces a greater default risk. The bank may also be concerned that the local 
government or other parties expropriate the firm’s assets. Now consider another entity 
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that is almost identical except that it belongs to a multinational firm that is headquartered 
in the United States and also has operations in host countries with strong institutions. The 
parent company can offer a guarantee against the local unit’s default risk or use assets in 
a host country with strong institutions as collateral to obtain a loan from the bank, and 
then transfer the capital to the unit that is in need of capital. The arrangement, however, 
only solves the bank’s problem: It is protected from lending to a unit in weak institutions. 
However, how does the MNC manage the risk of allocating resources to the unit in weak 
institutions? How does it solve the information and expropriation problems that the bank 
faced originally? Can MNCs manage the risk by changing the reporting and supervisory 
relationship with respect to the risky unit? 
Institutions affect coordination costs via two important levers (Helpman, 1984). First, 
institutions shape the availability of complementary information which affects the cost of 
joint decision making. Second, institutions, via the prevailing rule of law and 
enforcement mechanisms, affect the clarity of property rights and consequently 
expropriation risk of assets that are valuable for joint tasks. Organization structure can be 
designed to reduce coordination costs by creating an information infrastructure within the 
firm and by differentially allocating decision rights to units. Reallocating supervisory 
responsibilities from local units in host countries with weak institutions to units in 
countries with strong institutions substitutes for scarce local information by integrating it 
with complementary regional and international data, and reduces expropriation risk by 
limiting the control rights of local units over corporate resources that are vulnerable to the 
influence of local entities such as a corrupt government. Therefore, my baseline 
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hypothesis is that units in host countries with weaker institutions will be given less 
supervisory responsibility.  
Since coordination is more important when activities are more interdependent, in 
addition to country-level differences in institutions, I explore two firm-level strategies 
that affect interdependencies among units across borders. First, the extent to which a unit 
in a host country is engaged in activities that are interdependent with the MNC’s 
activities in other host countries captures interdependencies at the task level. Second, 
diversity in institutional environments across all countries in which the MNC operates 
captures interdependencies at the policy level. Greater task interdependencies and 
institutional diversity generate more opportunities for arbitrage and, consequently, greater 
demand for coordination. They therefore magnify the impact of institutions on the 
allocation of supervisory responsibilities.  
I test and find support for my hypotheses using data about the business segments and 
organization structures of U.S. multinational equipment manufacturers from 1993 to 2003. 
Over the last two decades, the equipment manufacturing industries have experienced the 
highest ratios – both in absolute level and year-over-year growth – of intra-firm trade to 
domestic sales and the highest level of outsourcing in emerging markets. Equipment 
manufacturing also entails multiple stages and requires large quantities of intermediate 
inputs, which provides the potential for large variation in firm scope. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I elaborate on the 
relationship between institutions and organization structure, and develop the theory and 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the study setting and the research design. Section 4 
presents the results. Section 5 discusses the limitations and concludes. 
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5.2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
 
There is ample statistical evidence that the present-day MNCs are operating not just 
in rich countries with fairly homogeneous institutional environments, but are exposed to 
significant range of diversity on institutional features.28 Such a diversity of institutional 
environments, coupled with increasing complexity of MNCs’ overseas business activities, 
raises the salience of effective coordinate across the units of MNCs. Several studies have 
conjectured that coordination complexity arising from institutional diversity might reduce 
the benefits from international operations (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Sundaram & 
Black, 1992). Therefore, the ability of an MNC to operate in a web of locations with 
vastly different local environments depends critically on its ability to coordinate activities 
around the globe. 
Viewing MNCs as global networks of production and distribution, an emerging strand 
of literature examines MNCs’ internal organization of global activities as an explicit 
strategy. For example, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) investigate MNC 
strategies in assigning production and distribution tasks either separately or collectively 
among affiliates. In addition to production and distribution, Alcacer (2006) includes 
R&D activities into his analyses. He examines firms’ organization strategies to balance 
                                                 
28  As summarized by Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001), MNCs’ global activities have grown 
considerably over the last few decades. Between 1982 and 1998, the sales revenue of majority-owned 
foreign affiliates of U.S. MNCs had almost doubled to $2 trillion, while the number of foreign affiliates of 
U.S. MNCs increased by 50%, their employment was up by 40%, and their capital stock had more than 
tripled. 28 In particular, FDI has changed from a rich country phenomenon to penetrate many developing 
countries with weak institutions. For example, in 1985 the developed countries contributed 97% of the 
world FDI outflow and 75% of the inflow (Hummels & Stern, 1994). By 1998, the non-OECD share of 
employment of U.S. MNCs had grown to 36%, the most rapid growth being in non-OECD Asian countries. 
Furthermore, MNCs have expanded the range of activities in weak-institution countries. In manufacturing, 
the ratio of foreign affiliates’ exports (mostly to their U.S. parent or its affiliates in other host countries) to 
domestic sales is the highest in computers and office equipment, electronic equipment, and transportation 
equipment – industries commonly associated with high-level outsourcing by MNCs in emerging markets. 
The ratio for these industries also has risen the most sharply over time.  
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the tradeoff between agglomeration benefits and competitive pressure in making location 
choices. He suggests that MNCs colocate a centralized R&D unit with other firms to 
benefit from knowledge spillover, but disperse the production and marketing activities to 
less congested places to avoid competition. Zhao (2006) focuses on R&D activities and 
proposes that even R&D activities can be strategically disaggregated. She shows that 
MNCs can divide up R&D tasks and assign affiliates in weak IPR countries to work on 
innovations that are only valuable after being combined with innovations developed by 
affiliates in other countries, effectively reducing the independent value of the innovations 
developed in weak IPR countries and lowering expropriation risks. While innovative and 
insightful, these studies do not directly test the underlying organization structures that 
make task reassignments and coordination possible.  
5.2.1. Local institutions and organization structure 
 
Three key components of coordination are communication, information processing, 
and final decision making (Marschak & Radner, 1972). Holding the cost of 
communication between units in any two countries symmetric (i.e., the communication 
cost of a unit in Romania reporting to a unit in France is the same as the French unit 
reporting to the Romanian unit), the two varying elements of coordination costs are 
information processing costs and errors in decision making. MNCs, therefore, should 
allocate coordination responsibilities to minimize information processing costs and 
decision errors.  
Information processing involves analyzing, evaluating, benchmarking, synthesizing, 
verifying, and aggregating discrete pieces of information. Institutions, by promoting or 
discouraging disclosure, affect the availability of complementary data needed for 
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processing the acquired local information. Information scarcity in weak institutions 
creates uncertainty and coordination costs (Arrow, 1959; North, 1990). 
Following Gelos and Wei (2005), I distinguish between government and corporate 
transparency. Government transparency concerns the availability and timely release of 
macro data by the government, as well as the clarity and predictability of government 
policies. When the government provides unreliable macro data, such as national or local 
GDP, industry and trade data, demographic statistics, it is difficult for firms to make 
sense of the discrete information they collect through local units. In the United States, the 
Federal Reserve Board frequently publishes national and regional economic indicators on 
consumption, production, capacity utilization, and inflation. Such data help firms smooth 
their production cycles across multiple plants, and synchronize procurement, production, 
and delivery. Without these complementary data, local information, such as that about a 
locally contained demand or supply shock, becomes less valuable. The same is true with 
regulatory changes. Whether a government will relax its overly protective trade policy is 
likely to be related to its plan about the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Without 
the complementary information, it will be hard to decipher piecemeal data about 
regulatory changes.  
Corporate transparency, in contrast, is about the availability of corporate information 
that is either disclosed according to regulatory requirements or shared voluntarily among 
firms. Lack of (effective enforcement of) financial and accounting disclosure regulations, 
fair competition laws, and weak regimes for intellectual property rights protection 
encourages firms to practice trade secrecy, or to keep complementary information outside 
the host country so that local information by itself is of less appropriation value (Zhao, 
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2006). In addition to domestic government and corporate information, the availability of 
international information can also be affected by the institutions through censorship, 
which adds to the difficulty of making joint decisions for units across national boundaries. 
As complementary information becomes less available, it becomes less efficient to 
delegate coordination responsibilities to units in the host country. Firms react to difficulty 
in information transmission in the external environment by creating an internal 
information infrastructure: Their organization structure stipulates the rules for 
specialization in information processing (Marschak & Radner, 1972). Supervisors in 
strong institution countries supplement local data with complementary information 
available in strong institution countries. 
For example, when China first opened up its borders for foreign investment, there 
were few regulations that promoted information disclosure. Market intelligence was 
difficult to collect. When there is severe lack of information (or the perception of it), 
economic agents tend to herd in their behavior based on observed patterns of others rather 
than fundamentals (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992; Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 
2002; Powell et al., 2005). That was what happened in China. Domestic firms gambled 
with perceived business opportunities and followed each others’ past successful moves, 
often into overly crowded markets with thin profit margins. Most reliable local 
information was gathered by expatriate consultants sent in by Anderson Consulting, 
Boston Consulting Group, or McKinsey. In addition, access to international business 
information was either prohibited or censored. Therefore, the expatriate consultants 
shared and processed the discrete local information against other local, regional, or global 
data in their regional offices in Hong Kong or Singapore. Based on these reports, their 
 113 
 
corporate clients planned and directed strategies for the Chinese market from regional 
offices in Hong Kong or Singapore, where better institutions provide more opportunities 
for knowledge and information sharing. 
In addition to information, institutions also provide stable structure to guide human 
interactions (North 1990). Such structure is needed because the bounded rationality of 
human agents limits their ability to converge to a harmonized set of interactions. 
Institutions constrain human behavior through rule of law, clear property rights, and 
strong legal enforcement. Ambiguous property rights in weak institutions create 
coordination costs (Alchian, 1965; North, 1990), because the behavioral constraints are 
less binding. As a result, there is greater risk of expropriation, especially of firm 
resources by corrupt government agencies (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1991). Again, 
firms can respond to weak property rights through organization structure, which reduces 
coordination costs by specifying decision rights within firms (March, 1994; Simon, 1947). 
Supervisors in strong institution countries restrict subordinates’ set of actions that are 
susceptible to influences from local environment, and signal commitment to firm’s global 
objectives to external players. 
For example, according to a former Ford senior executive, a Brazilian politician once 
pushed Ford’s Brazilian unit to sponsor a trip for him and his girlfriend to visit the U.S. 
for the purpose of studying the Ford plants in River Rouge. The local unit accommodated 
his request, but when the politician further requested that the couple be taken by Ford’s 
corporate jet to Chicago for tours, the local unit was able to reject the request on the 
ground that it did not have the authority to use corporate jets. Here, the protection 
mechanism is to limit the resources at the disposal of the local unit, and isolate its 
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coordination responsibilities. Although this strategy may reduce local units’ ability to 
adapt quickly to local conditions, it nevertheless limits MNCs’ exposure to expropriation 
risks.   
Hypothesis 7: An MNC unit in host countries with weaker institutions is more 
likely to be supervised by a foreign unit in a strong institution country. 
5.2.2. Task interdependence and organization structure 
 
Because coordinators in MNCs are involved in information aggregation or joint 
decision making, they will affect not only local units in one host country, but also all 
interdependent units in other countries. Any decision error made by the coordinator due 
to lack of complementary information will have a more adverse effect on interdependent 
units than on unrelated ones. Similarly, any loss of corporate resources at one particular 
unit due to expropriation will be more harmful to interdependent units than to unrelated 
ones. Therefore, the proper allocation of coordination responsibilities is more salient for 
units that are interdependent with each other. Organization structure can be designed to 
reduce coordination costs when tasks are independent. Supervisors solve inter-related 
problems (Eisenmann & Bower, 2000; Mintzberg, 1994; Mulder, 1960), make joint 
decisions (Marschak & Radner, 1972), and exercise authority over assets of value for 
joint tasks (Hart & Moore, 2005). 
Thompson (1967) defined three types of interdependencies, pooled, sequential, and 
reciprocal, which provides a useful lens to understand the coordination problems of 
MNCs. Units wi127th pooled interdependencies between them may share resources (e.g., 
the proprietary knowledge of the parent company) and the consequences of deploying 
them (e.g., global profits of the parent company). But other than that, they don’t have 
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much to do with each other. They each make a discrete contribution to the MNC, and are 
not interdependent in the production process. An example is units engaged in horizontal 
FDIs, which replicate home-country production overseas in order to access foreign 
markets (Krugman, 1983; Markusen, 1984). In contrast, units that are sequentially or 
reciprocally interdependent have intermediate tasks/products fed from one to another, or 
passed back and forth between them in successive stages of production.  An example is 
units engaged in vertical FDIs, often to secure low-cost inputs (Helpman, 1984). In this 
case, the units co-specialize along the value chain in a global network of production and 
distribution (Hummels, Ishii, & Yi, 2001). Sequential and reciprocal interdependencies 
require more coordination than pooled interdependencies, since they often require mutual 
adjustments on a real-time basis. Failure in one unit can have a cascading effect on all 
dependent units.  
For both information and expropriation concerns, units in weak institution countries 
will be given even less coordination responsibilities if their activities are interdependent 
with their parents’ activities in other host countries 
Hypothesis 8: An MNC unit is more likely to be supervised by a foreign unit in a 
strong institution country if its activities are interdependent with its parent’s units in 
other countries.  
Hypothesis 8a: The effect of H8 is stronger for MNC units in weak institution 
countries. 
5.2.3. Institutional diversity and organization structure 
 
In addition to task interdependencies, the scope for coordination increases when the 
MNC operates in multiple jurisdictions and institutional environments vary significantly 
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across these jurisdictions. Trade barriers in some countries but not in others require 
MNCs to manage a global production and distribution network rather than simply trade 
across borders (Caves, 1996). Differences in tax regimes encourage MNCs to adopt ways 
to shift assets and profits among host countries (Desai et al., 2004a, 2006a). Variations in 
degree of capital account control and local financial market development push MNCs to 
allocate resources through internal capital markets (Baker et al., 2005; Desai et al., 2005; 
Desai et al., 2004b, 2006b). Disparity in IPR regimes entices MNCs to exert additional 
effort to design and configure innovation activities (Zhao, 2006). 
Hong Kong’s investor-friendly business environment, including its rule of law, free 
flow of capital, limited and transparent government regulations toward private sector, is 
in sharp contrast with its neighbors in the region. The difference allows MNCs, such as 
electronics and textile manufacturers, to ship raw materials through Hong Kong into 
cheap-labor countries for primitive production, and then back to Hong Kong for high 
value-added production. With greater potential for arbitrage, there comes greater need for 
coordination across borders. For example, global or regional headquarters must 
synchronize sales efforts such as pricing, promotion, after-sale services, etc. They must 
make sure corporate programs will be adapted to local conditions in each country, and at 
the same time the adaptation will not cannibalize regional policies across the countries 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2004).  
Because heterogeneity in institutional environments increases the demand for 
coordination, decisions made by units in different countries become interdependent at the 
corporate level. Institutional diversity not only creates arbitrage opportunities and thus 
demand for coordination, but also flexibility in structural design. For the same 
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information and expropriation concerns described above, units in weak institution 
countries will be given even less coordination responsibilities if their parents arbitrage in 
more heterogeneous institutional environments. 
Hypothesis 9: An MNC unit is more likely to be supervised by a foreign unit in a 
strong institution country if its parent operates in more diverse institutional 
environments. 
H9a: The effect of H9 is stronger for MNC units in weak institution countries. 
5.3. Empirical design 
5.3.1. Empirical context 
 
I tested my hypotheses on a sample of U.S. equipment manufacturers from 1993 to 
2003. Together these firms produce fabricated metal products, industrial machinery and 
equipment, electrical and electronic equipment, transportation equipment, and 
instruments and related products.  
I chose this empirical setting primarily because equipment manufacturing entails 
multiple stages and requires large quantities of intermediate inputs, which provides large 
variation in internal activities across firms in the same primary industry. In addition to 
cross-sectional variations, firms in the equipment manufacturing sectors have also 
experienced significant scope changes over the last two decades. Many have been 
evolving toward “vertical disintegration,” whereby a previously integrated production 
process is divided up between two sets of specialized firms in the same industry (Baldwin 
& Clark, 2005; Fine & Whitney, 1999; Macher et al., 1998). These cross-sectional and 
longitudinal variations provide strong explanatory power to my empirical models. 
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In addition, equipment manufacturing sectors are important in U.S. economy. 
According to data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), equipment 
manufacturers produce about $1.6 trillion of output in terms of shipment value, or 30% of 
the output produced by all manufacturing sectors. When adjusted for inflation, their 
shipment value grew by 85% from 1993 to 2002, whereas the average growth rate for the 
entire manufacturing sector was only 32%. In addition, they contribute a signification 
portion of U.S. MNC activities abroad. In 1998, they accounted for about 31% of U.S. 
MNC employment and 25% of U.S. MNC sales overseas, or a little over 50% of U.S. 
MNC employment and sales overseas in all manufacturing sectors (Hanson, Mataloni, & 
Slaughter, 2001: Table 2).  
Furthermore, equipment manufacturers are facing fierce global competition and 
intense pressure for outsourcing and restructuring, which makes their decisions about 
firm scope and structure critical to their growth. For example, in the automotive industry, 
Toyota just beat GM in 2007 first-quarter global car sales, ending an era that has seen 
GM dominate global car sales since 1930 (The Wall Street Journal, 4/25/2007). Sliding 
market share and profits have put U.S. automakers under tremendous pressure to 
restructure their overly cumbersome production system and outsource more components 
and processes. One of the key restructuring initiatives of Ford’s new CEO, Alan Mulally, 
was to sell 17 component plants and six component facilities, which manufacture a wide 
range of components such as glass, fuel tanks, climate control systems, powertrains, 
chassis, and steering components (Ford, 1/25/2007). At Nissan-Renault, worse than 
expected earning reports raised so much skepticism about CEO Carlos Ghosn’s ability to 
manage the company’s complex global businesses that he had to give up responsibilities 
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for North America markets to another executive and set up multiple regional offices to 
handle the Japanese market (The Wall Street Journal, 3/17/2007). 
5.3.2. Data and sample  
 
I built a unique dataset of firms’ internal activities and their interrelationships with 
data from various sources. These data have been available for a long time, but have not 
been fully exploited to the benefit of investigating the internal reality of firms.  
First, I started with the Directory of Corporate Affiliations (DCA) offered by 
LexisNexis. DCA provides corporate reporting information on parent companies and 
their “units” (e.g., groups, departments, divisions, subsidiaries, etc.), down to the seventh 
level of corporate linkage. In addition, the dataset describes up to 30 segments (four-digit 
SIC level) for each unit. Several factors contribute to the reliability of the DCA data. 
According to LexisNexis, the dataset is compiled from information reported by the 
companies, as well as from annual reports and business publications in the LexisNexis 
database. In addition, each company is contacted directly for information verification 
(LexisNexis, 2004). 
I started with the DCA dataset for publicly traded firms from 1993 to 2003, which 
covers firms with revenues of more than $10 million and more than 300 employees 
(LexisNexis, 2004). The dataset contains 9,850 parent companies and 120,113 units. 
2,075 parent companies list their primary industries as in the equipment manufacturing 
sectors.  
Second, to construct interrelationships among the business segments, I used the BEA 
Input-Output (IO) tables. The tables contain the value of pair-wise commodity flows 
among roughly 500 private-sector, intermediate industries. The tables are updated every 
 120 
 
five years. Since the IO industry code system was changed by BEA in 1997, to ensure 
comparability I used the tables for 1992.29  
Third, in order to obtain financial data for the parent companies, I augmented my 
dataset with Compustat Industrial Annual Financial and Compustat Segment datasets. I 
matched the datasets by parent company names first through a software program30 and 
then through manual checks. Ambiguous matches were further verified via company Web 
sites. I matched 1,246 (60%) diversified companies in the equipment manufacturing 
sectors. I dropped 164 firms for which there were missing values in the Compustat 
financial data, and 285 domestic firms. I was left with 797 MNCs operating in 118 
countries.  
Finally, I collected macro-economic and institutions data about host countries from 
multinational organizations such as the World Bank for 75 of the 118 countries. 64 
MNCs were dropped since they do not operate in any of these 75 countries. To control 
for the possibility that some units were established mainly for tax evasion purposes, I 
excluded units that were located in tax havens, or whose supervising units were in tax 
heavens. Tax havens are those listed by Hines and Rice (1994: Appendix 2) and OECD 
(2002).31 My final sample included 719 MNCs with 7,889 base units – units with no 
subordinate units – in 67 foreign countries, for a total of 40,118 observations.  
                                                 
29 Several authors have observed that the coefficients have been fairly stable over the years. 
30 I thank Minyuan Zhao for her help with the matching. 
31 The tax havens are, Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, 
Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Macao, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, 
Panama, Samoa, Seychelles, Singapore, St Christopher and Nevis, St Lucia, St Martine, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Switzerland, Tonga, Turks & Caicos, UK Caribbean Islands, US Virgin Islands, Vanuatu. 
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5.3.3. Variable definitions and operationalization 
Dependent variable  
 
COORDINATION RESPONSIBILITIES (CR*): The amount of coordination 
responsibilities delegated to units in a particular host country is not directly observable. 
In its place, I estimated the observed probability that a unit reports to another unit outside 
the host country. I checked the location of the supervisory units. The dummy variable, 
ForeignSuper, turns to 1 if a base unit in a host country reports to a foreign unit. In this 
case, less responsibilities of coordinating the base unit are assigned to supervisory units 
within the same host country, that is, there is more cross-border coordination.  
Independent variables  
 
WEAK INSTITUTIONS (Iw): Quality of institutions was measured using an average 
of the governance indicators developed by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2006), from 1998 to 2003. The indicators include voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption. Each of them is a composite index that is highly 
correlated with other commonly used institution indices. Each indicator has a value 
ranging from -1.8 to + 2.0 for countries in my sample. Since these indicators are highly 
correlated (ρ=0.68-0.95), I used their average value to measure a country’s overall quality 
of institutions. To be consistent with my hypotheses, I used the opposite value of the 
quality of institutions as the measure for weak institutions. 
To specifically test the impact of transparency on organization structure, in robustness 
checks I also used the transparency index developed by International Monetary Fund 
(Gelos & Wei, 2005), and the Opacity Index developed by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
 122 
 
(Zhao, 2006). Since only about 30 countries are covered by these indices, my sample size 
was significantly reduced when these indices were used. However, results were similar.  
TASK INTERDEPENDENCE (K): Interdependencies in the production process were 
constructed from BEA Input-Output (IO) tables. I used a dummy that shows whether the 
unit’s primary segment is interdependent with the MNC’s primary segment. 
This was a measure based on flow of inputs between two industries. Two industries 
were considered interdependent if they on average contribute more than 1% of the inputs 
to one another, based on the BEA IO Tables. The few prior studies that measure 
interrelationships between two industries based on the IO tables choose either 5% 
(Matsusaka, 1993; Schoar, 2002; Villalonga, 2004), or 1% (Lemelin, 1982) as the 
threshold. I used 1% in my main analyses and 5% in robustness checks; results were 
similar. 
A limitation of the measure is that it captures interdependencies at the industry rather 
than firm level. Segments within a firm can choose to supply inputs to each other more or 
less than the average flow of inputs between two industries. This results in a 
measurement error which, if correlated with the true value of the interdependencies 
variable, causes an attenuation bias toward zero and makes my results more conservative. 
Despite the shortcoming, the measure has a major advantage of being exogenous to any 
individual firm’s decision and is therefore less likely to be correlated with unobserved 
firm heterogeneity. For this reason, measures of inter-industry relationships in production 
inputs (Lemelin, 1982), human capital (Chang, 1996; Farjoun, 1998), or technology 
(Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999) have been used by various scholars to 
proxy inter-segment relationships within firms. In particular, the use of IO-table 
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coefficients as proxies for inter-segment relationships within diversified firms has been 
adopted by recent studies in both finance (Fan & Lang, 2000; Matsusaka, 1993; Schoar, 
2002; Villalonga, 2004) and economics (Alfaro & Charlton, 2007). 
INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (DIV): Institutional diversity is calculated as the 
distance between the quality of the best institutions and that of the worst institutions in 
the countries that the MNC operates in. To capture the reality that geographical distance 
matters in cross-border reporting, I used two geographically adjusted measures. The first 
measure is the institutional diversity among the host countries of the MNC that are 
located in the same continent as the focal unit. The second measure is the sum of 
institutional diversity within each time zone, weighted by the inverse of the absolute time 
lag between each time zone and the focal unit’s time zone. 
Control variables  
 
I controlled for the total number of segments the focal unit operates, to indirectly 
measure the importance of the unit’s operation. In robustness checks, I controlled for the 
number of the MNC’s base units in the focal unit’s primary segment and host country. I 
also included the unit’s type – joint venture, internal unit, subsidiary or affiliate. Results 
were similar. 
At the parent company level, I controlled for an MNC’s overall coordination burden 
by counting the total number of segments and countries the MNC operates in worldwide, 
and the number of base units the MNC operates in each host country. I controlled for firm 
size in terms of total sales revenue.  
At the country level, I included FDI inflow (from World Development Indicators) to 
control for general macro factors that affect MNC activities. In addition, I included Tax 
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rate (from University of Michigan Office of Tax Policy Research), to control for the 
impact of taxation on organization forms. Furthermore, in robustness checks I included 
the following additional macro data; results were similar: 
• GDP in 2000 constant dollars, from the World Development Indicators table, to 
control for size of demand in the host country 
• GDP per capital in constant dollars, from the World Development Indicators 
table, to control for general living standard/labor costs in the host country 
• Trade, measured using the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP, 
from World Development Indicators  
5.3.4. Model specification  
 
I adopted a nodal (i.e., unit) level of analysis that takes into consideration the 
individual MNC unit’s characteristics (Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). Since the amount of 
coordination responsibilities delegated to units in a particular host country is not directly 
observable, I estimated the probability of a base unit reporting to another unit outside the 
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jicterForeignSup is a dummy variable that turns to 1 if unit j of MNC i in host country 




jictCR  is the latent variable for the amount of responsibilities to coordinate unit j of 
MNC i in host country c, that is delegated to supervisory units in country c and 
year t;  
ejict has a standard logistic distribution.  
w
ctI  is the quality of institutions in country c and year t; 
jictK  is task interdependence between unit j in country c and its MNC parent i in year 
t; 
jctDIV  is institutional diversity for MNC i in year t, adjusted for the geographical 
location of unit j’s host country c; 
jictU  are other unit-specific characteristics; 
itF  are MNE firm-specific characteristics; 
ctC  are other country-specific characteristics. 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 10 presents the list of non-U.S. host countries ranked by the quality of their 
institutions in 2003, according to the World Bank Governance Indicators. Finland, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Sweden and New Zealand rank the highest on the list, while 
Indonesia, Venezuela, Congo, Nigeria and Zimbabwe rank the lowest. 
Table 11 shows reporting relationships among all MNE units in the DCA dataset, 
including MNCs outside the equipment manufacturing sector, in a selective number of 
countries in 2003. The first two columns report the number of base units in a host country 
and the number of base units that report to a foreign supervisory unit. The last column 
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calculates the percentage of local units reporting to a foreign supervisory unit. The lower 
the percentage of local units that are subject to foreign supervision, the more managerial 
responsibilities are assumed by units within the host country. With rare exceptions, 
countries with strong institutions rank higher than countries with weak institutions.  
Summary statistics of the final sample are provided in Table 12. Panel (a) shows 
country-level statistics. There is large variation across countries in the institution indices. 
The comprehensive index has a mean of 0.38 and a standard deviation of 0.89. The 
individual indices also have large variation across countries. The corruption index (not 
shown in the Table) has a mean of 0.39 and a standard deviation of 1.15. Despite the 
large cross-sectional differences, institution environment does not change very much for 
each country over the years during the sample period. No country has changed their 
institutions by more than one standard deviation from the population mean, and only two 
countries have ever seen their institutional environment changed by more than half of the 
standard deviation: Argentina and Zimbabwe.32 Since the index is relatively stable over 
time, I also run robustness checks by grouping countries into quantiles based on the mean 
value of their indices over the sample period; results are similar. 
Panel (b) shows MNC parent-level statistics. The average size of the MNCs in the 
sample is US$428 million (exp(6.06)=428). These MNCs operate between two and 95 
countries (including U.S.), with an average of 8 countries. They are engaged in between 
                                                 
32 For example, Argentina’s situation significantly worsened in 2002, toward the end of the economic crisis 
that started in 1999. To prevent bank-run, the government effectively froze all bank accounts in 2001. 
Street demonstrations and riots targeted at multinational firms erupted. President De la Rúa fled his 
residence on December 21, 2001. As inflation and unemployment soared,  debates and political fights about 
the next election followed. International flights were stopped for various days during 2002. The situation 
came under control after a new President, Néstor Kirchner, was elected in May 2003. 
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one and 113 segments, with an average of 9 segments. On average, they have 24 units 
worldwide. 
Panel (c) presents unit-level statistics. 93% of the units are supervised by a unit 
outside the host country. Each unit operates in between one and 12 segments, with an 
average of 1.2. 43% of the units operate in the same primary segment as their parents. 
They operate in as little as none and as many as 11, with an average of 0.44 segments that 
are interdependent with their parent’s primary segment. In the meantime, their parents 
have on average 42 other units worldwide that operate in the same segments as they do. 
A small proportion of units (10%) report their number of employees. On average they 
have 1,238 employees per unit. 
5.4.2 Cross-border supervision 
 
Tables 15 and 16 investigate cross-border supervision. The first four columns in 
Table 13 estimate the likelihood that an MNC unit in a host country reports to a foreign 
supervisor in a strong institution country; the last four columns estimate the likelihood 
that it reports to any foreign supervisor. Results are similar for the two slightly different 
dependent variables. Columns (1) and (5) investigate the impact of the control variables. 
First, the number of base units in a host country is negatively associated with the 
probability of cross-border reporting, suggesting that the scale of local operation raises 
the importance of local coordination and decision making. Second, level of product 
diversification of the unit is positively associated with foreign supervision, suggesting 
that units with broader operations are more closely supervised by foreign units. Finally, 




The rest of the columns examine the impact of host country institutions. The quality 
of institutions is quantified using three measures: a continuous institution index, a 
dummy that shows whether the quality of institutions is higher than the average across all 
host countries, and the difference between the quality of institutions where the unit is 
located and the average quality of institutions across all host countries its MNC parent 
operates in. Results are robust with all three measures: The quality of a host country’s 
institutions has a negative impact on the likelihood that the units in the country report to a 
foreign unit. H7 is supported. 
Table 14 includes the two levels of interdependencies into the analysis. The first four 
columns in Table 14 estimate the likelihood that an MNC unit in a host country reports to 
a foreign supervisor in a strong institution country; the last four columns estimate the 
likelihood that it reports to any foreign supervisor. Results are similar for the two slightly 
different dependent variables. At the activity level, Columns (2) and (6) show that task 
interdependence is positively correlated with foreign supervision, and the impact of 
institutions on cross-border reporting is magnified by task interdependence. Both H8 and 
H8a are supported. At the policy level, Columns (3) and (7) show that institutional 
diversity is positively correlated with foreign supervision, and the impact of host-country 
institutions on cross-border reporting is magnified by institutional diversity across all 
host countries that the MNC operates in. H9 and H9a are supported. To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries, Columns (4) and (8) add country dummies; 
results are similar. 
Overall, the results in Tables 13 and 14 show that, consistent with my hypotheses, 
units in host countries with weaker institutions are more likely to report to a foreign 
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supervisory unit (in a strong institution country), and this relationship is stronger if the 
unit’s activities are highly interdependent with those of its MNC parent or if the MNC 
operates in more heterogeneous institutional environments.  
5.5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study has thought to examine the role of organization structure in 
accommodating the business activities of in host countries with weak institutions. It finds 
that organization structure, a critical mechanism for coordination and governance, is used 
by MNCs to achieve arbitrage across institutional environments and resource allocation 
among their global units.  
The study makes several contributions to the international business literature. First, it 
unites differences in institutions with differences in organization structures to attempt a 
more complete theory of how and why MNCs differ in their scope and structure. It 
suggests that choices of organization structure can be an important vehicle to countervail 
institutional obstacles. This complements the work on location choices and ownership 
modes of MNCs (e.g., Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 
1993; Oxley, 1999). It extends a recent literature that starts to examine MNCs’ global 
strategies in sidestepping institutional obstacles when location and ownership choices are 
limited (Alcácer, 2006; Zhao, 2006), and sheds further light on how MNCs leverage 
supervisory units of different ranks and locations to achieve a delicate balance of 
delegation and control. 
In addition, the study suggests that the impact of institutions is contingent upon firm 
strategies; organization structure is designed differently according to the varying 
constraints imposed by institutions and strategies. Firms that operate in relatively 
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homogenous institutional environment but diverse product markets or firms that perform 
independent activities may design more decentralized structures to facilitate local 
adaptation (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Porter, 1986). But firms that choose to actively 
arbitrage in institutional diversity and exploit interdependencies may design more 
centralized structures.  
The study also has implications for policy makers, since it highlights the channel 
through which MNCs “redistribute” managerial responsibilities away from countries with 
weak institutions. Over the past two decades, governments in developing countries have 
been working to improve the “hard” conditions in their countries to attract foreign direct 
investments (FDI), such as building infrastructure, giving special tax breaks or subsidies 
to MNCs, and raising educational level of their labor force. While these incentives may 
attract FDI, MNCs in these countries may engage in fragmented business activities aimed 
mainly at the cheaper labor force, engineering talent or market potential, without 
delegating substantial corporate or regional responsibilities to local management teams.  
A case in point is the emergence of foreign consulting and financial services 
companies in China. Although powerhouses like Andersen Consulting and Citibank had 
been present in China since the late 1980s to take advantage of the great business 
opportunities there that followed the economic reforms, most of these local units 
remained branches under tight supervision and control from parent companies or regional 
headquarters in Hong Kong or Singapore.  As local staff developed the technical 
expertise and the business expanded further, many local units were promoted to 
subsidiaries and started to enjoy some autonomy. But they still reported to regional 
headquarters for important strategic decisions. Starting from the beginning of this century, 
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as the legal environment in China improved (partly stimulated with its acceptance by the 
WTO), many MNCs have moved their regional headquarters from Hong Kong or 
Singapore to China. Supervising units in China start to actively participate in the strategic 
decisions regarding their parent companies’ activities in Asia or even around the globe. 
Hence institutions not only affect capital investments and technological transfers from 
MNCs, as suggested by the literature, but may also affect MNCs’ on-going decisions 
about resource allocation across national borders, which have an important impact on the 










The broad objective of the dissertation is to investigate coordination cost as a limit to 
firm growth, and organization structure as a design element to manage the coordination 
tasks. The common thread connecting the three empirical studies in the dissertation is the 
emphasis that a firm can be viewed as a system of interdependent activities, and that the 
firm’s growth options and organization structure can be affected by the degree and 
distribution of the interrelations between its existing activities. Chapter III complements 
the dominant synergistic view of diversification by highlighting the cost of coordinating 
the interdependencies between the existing and the new businesses. It identifies the 
challenges that the complexity of existing businesses poses to firm growth. Chapter IV 
investigates the design of organization structure to enhance coordination capacity. It 
particularly highlights the role of a hierarchical structure in balancing the tradeoffs 
between specialization and coordination in managing systems of interdependent activities. 
Chapter V examines yet another dimension of organization structure – the delegation of 
coordination responsibilities within a multinational hierarchical structure. It connects 




This new perspective of the firm as an activity system contributes to existing theories 
of the firm and organization structure, and has important managerial as well as policy 
implications for firm growth.  
6.1. Contributions to theory 
 
The core theoretical contribution of the dissertation is the development of a broad 
framework that relates intra-firm activities with firm growth and organization structure, 
by emphasizing the firm as a system of interdependent activities. In doing so, it 
contributes to theories of the firm and organization structure.  
First, this theoretic framework complements existing theories of the firm. 
Neoclassical economics offers technological constraint as a limit to plant size, but is 
silent about firm size. Transaction costs economics locates individual transactions within 
or outside firm boundary but does not explain the scope of the entire firm. Resource-
based view (RBV) adds the effect of managers but emphasizes their experience and 
learning rather than coordination capacity. In addition, while the two economic theories 
focus on coordination and efficient allocation of existing resources between the market 
and the firm, RBV emphasizes growth and deployment of new resources within firms. 
The framework developed in this dissertation reunites these classic theories and 
investigate how coordination challenges could limit firm growth: Firm boundaries are not 
determined by technologies of a single plant or the “make-or-buy” decision of a single 
transaction but are a result of many choices regarding a variety of inter-related activities.  
With this new perspective, the dissertation joins the recent discussions by several 
authors around the process of vertical disintegration, modularization, and segregation of 
supply chains (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2000; Baldwin & Clark, 2005; Fine & 
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Whitney, 1999; Jacobides, 2005; Langlois & Robertson, 1992; Macher, Mowery, & 
Hodges, 1998; Schilling & Steensma, 2001; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997), and suggests that 
an implication of the process could be broader horizontal scope in related markets.  
Second, to the organization structure literature, the theoretical framework extends the 
recent debate about the benefits and limitations of modular vs. integrated structures. It 
rejuvenates Simon’s insight of a match between the hierarchical structure of the activity 
system and that of the organization: Hierarchical structure enables hierarchical 
coordination (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). Tradeoffs between specialization and 
coordination can be balanced not only through inter-temporal vacillation between 
modular and integrated structures depending on the specific contingencies (Siggelkow & 
Levinthal, 2003), but also through a hierarchical structure that allows for inter-module 
coordination.  
In addition, a hierarchical structure allows for differential delegation. Differential 
delegation helps to balance the tradeoff between adaptation and coordination. It enables 
MNCs to circumvent institutional constraints that limit the coordination capacity of 
domestic firms both at home and in host countries and consequently, their growth.  
6.2. Contributions to management and policy 
 
The dissertation has important implications for management scholars and 
practitioners at the interface of diversification, organization, and international business. 
To diversification strategists, Chapter III underscores a balanced cost-benefit analysis of 
diversification strategies. While related diversification offers potential synergies, firms 
need to actively coordinate activities to realize the synergies. This applies to both internal 
growth and acquisition strategies. While the merger and acquisition literature has 
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emphasized synergy as a major source of value creation (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 
1998; Seth, 1990; Singh & Montgomery, 1987) and growth (Danzon, Epstein, & 
Nicholson, 2004), empirical studies show zero to negative value-added for shareholders 
(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001) over the medium to long term, especially for 
acquires of growth potential (Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). As discussed in Chapter III, the 
same contradiction is also present in the diversification literature. It is therefore important 
for scholars to reconcile the evidence and theory, and investigate not only the benefits but 
also the costs of integration.  
To organization designers, Chapter IV sets a boundary condition to “flatter 
organizations” that are well-received in popular press and academic research (Brickley et 
al., 2003; Rajan & Wulf, 2006). By incorporating intermediate coordinating units into the 
analysis of specialization vs. coordination, the study reestablishes the importance of 
hierarchical structures in managing inter-unit interdependencies, thereby justifying its 
prevalence in real corporations.  
To global strategists, Chapter V unites differences in institutions with differences in 
organization structures to attempt a more complete theory of how and why MNCs differ 
in their scope and structure. It suggests that choices of organization structure can be an 
important vehicle to countervail institutional obstacles. This complements existing work 
on location choices and ownership modes of MNCs (e.g., Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; 
Hennart, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Oxley, 1999). It extends a recent literature that 
starts to examine MNCs’ global strategies in sidestepping institutional obstacles when 
location and ownership choices are limited (Alcácer, 2006; Zhao, 2006).  
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Finally, to policy makers, especially those focusing on developing countries, Chapter 
V expands the importance of institutions: Institutions affect not only capital investment 
and technological transfers from MNCs, as suggested by the literature, but also affect 
MNCs’ organization structure. To the extent that organization structure affects decisions 
about resource allocation within firms, and MNCs’ main strategic focuses include 
arbitraging and resource reallocation across national borders, quality institutions will 
have a profound impact on the sustainable development of economies in host countries. 
6.3. Contributions to methodology 
 
As mentioned in Chapters III and IV, it is a challenge to operationalize and measure 
with reliable data the key constructs covered in this dissertation – complexity and 
decomposability of interdependencies in activity systems, and the degree of modularity 
and hierarchy in organization structure. Not surprisingly, there are very few econometric 
studies of interdependencies in activity systems and organization modularity and 
hierarchy at the firm level. The prior work on system interdependencies and organization 
structure tends to employ abstract concepts and conducts computer simulations or case 
studies. This dissertation addresses some of these challenges. 
First, I build a unique dataset of a large sample of firms’ internal activities and 
organization structures with data from multiple sources. These data have been available 
for a long time, but have not been fully exploited to the benefit of investigating the 
internal reality of firms. Second, treating the firm’s business portfolio as a system of 
activities supplying inputs to one another, I operationalize system interdependencies 
based on the flow of intermediate inputs between segments within diversified firms. This 
operationalization corresponds closely to the theoretical definitions of system 
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interdependencies in the modularity literature, and allows me to capture both the degree 
and the distribution of interdependencies. Third, I adopt computational programs recently 
developed in physics and biology to quantify the decomposability of activity systems 
with non-randomly distributed interdependencies. To my knowledge, the dissertation is 
the first to comprehensively quantify the theoretical relationships between activity 
interdependencies, firm scope and organization structure on a large sample of actual 
organizations. It will hopefully encourage more empirical studies that will complement 
the extensive theoretical modeling efforts in the modularity and organization structure 
literatures. 
6.4. Potential extensions 
 
The dissertation opens up several opportunities for future research. First, the 
dissertation treats firms’ scope choices as sequentially dependent, and studies the impact 
of existing activity system on subsequent diversification moves and organization 
structure. Further work is needed to model and test how firms simultaneously decide their 
vertical and horizontal scopes, and organization structure. Future work can also 
investigate how exogenous shocks to firms’ activity systems (e.g., regulatory changes) or 
coordination capacity (e.g., technological changes) influence firms’ scope and structure 
choices. 
Second, the dissertation focuses on a form of organization design: formal reporting 
relationships among organization units. Future work is warranted to study more 
dimensions of organization design, such as incentive schemes, control systems, staffing 
of managerial positions in local units, internal networks, corporate culture, etc., with 
respect to coordinating interdependent activities. 
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Finally, the dissertation only starts to investigate the interplay between organization 
structure and institutions in influencing the relative magnitude of coordination vs. 
transaction costs. Current contract theories tend to view contracts as schedules of prices 
or quantities written between two calculative agents. In fact, contracts, especially long-
term ones, are often initiated, negotiated, authorized, implemented, and renegotiated by 
decision makers of various ranks within multiple organizations under heterogeneous 
institutional environment. Future work can be aimed at investigating how organization 
structure, by affecting coordination costs, affects contracting costs and, consequently, 
firm scope. 
In conclusion, the dissertation seeks to contribute to the literatures on firm scope and 
structure by presenting the firm as a system of interdependent activities. Using a unique 
dataset of business activities and organization structures within a large sample of actual 
business firms, I show the potential of this new perspective in analyzing firm scope and 
structure, and in operationalizing some of the key constructs in existing studies of 
modularity. I hope these efforts will deepen our understanding of the firm and its 
integration costs, and motivate future research that further exploits the rich and complex 
reality of the firm.  
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Table 1. Industries in which U.S. automakers operate 
 
Description SIC codes 
Primary industry:  
     Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies 3711 
Other industries in the transportation equipment sector  
     Truck and bus bodies 3713 
     Motor vehicle parts and accessories 3714 
     Truck trailers 3715 
     Motor homes 3716 
Industries in other sectors:  
     Apparel and other textile products  2399 
     Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products  3052 3089  
     Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 3211 
     Primary metal industries  3325 
     Fabricated metal products 3411 3462 3499  
     Industrial machinery and equipment 3519 3531 3537 3541 3544 3545 3568 
3585 3599 
     Electrical and electronic equipment 3621 3647 3651 3663 3669 3679 3692 
3694  
     Instruments and related products 3827  
     Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 3993 3999  
     Communications 4833 4841 4899  
     Electric, gas, and sanitary services  4953 4959  
     Wholesale trade--durable goods 5012 5013 5015 5051 5065 5082 5084 
5088  
     Wholesale trade--nondurable goods 5112 
     Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations 5511 5531 5599  
     Miscellaneous retail 5947 
     Depository institutions 6082 
     Nondepository credit institutions 6141 6153 6159 6162  
     Security, commodity brokers, and services 6211 6282  
     Insurance carriers 6311 6331 6399 
     Insurance agents, brokers, and service 6411 
     Real estate 6531 6552 
     Holding and other investment offices 6719 6788  
     Business services 7311 7319 7353 7359 7371 7382 7389 
     Automotive repair, services, and parking 7513 7514 7515 7539 7549  
     Engineering and management services 8711 8731 8734 8741 8742 8748 
Source: Directory of Corporate Affiliations.
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Table 2. Summary statistics (Chapter III) 
 
 mean sd min max 
Firm/Primary-industry variablesa     
Firm age: years since establishment 43.86 32.47 1 170 
Firm size: log (sales) 5.46 1.94 -4.27 12.12 
Share of sales from the primary industry (four-digit SIC) 0.86 0.20 0.11 1.00 
Firm size: log (employees ‘000) 0.36 1.83 -4.83 6.61 
Capital intensity: CAPEX/sales 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.89 
R&D intensity: R&D expenditure/sales 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.99 
Horizontal and vertical scope: number of industries (four-
digit SIC) (N) 7.27 9.22 2 105 
Geographic dispersion: number of countries 4.93 7.77 1 91 
COMPLEXITY: Number of interdependent segment 
pairs 40.46 140.12 0 3100 
Share of interdependent segment pairs 0.47 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Growth rate in the primary industry 0.05 0.16 -0.59 0.70 
Concentration in the primary industry – HHI 596 492 1 2717 
     
Destination-industry variablesb     
INPUT-SIMILARITY: coefficient between the primary 
and destination industries 0.28 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Growth rate in the destination industry 0.01 0.12 -0.60 0.78 
Concentration in the destination industry – HHI 726 655 1 2999 
Avg. growth rate in shipment value in the destination 
industry 0.03 0.05 -0.10 0.13 
Capital intensity of the destination industry 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.99 
Absolute difference in capital intensity between the firm 
and the destination industry 0.12 0.17 0.00 1.00 
R&D intensity of the destination industry 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.98 
Absolute difference in R&D intensity between the firm 
and the destination industry 0.21 0.25 0.00 1.00 
 
^ log value. 
aN=5,311 firm-year observations. 












a Percentage of actual entry 
     
Two-digit SIC     
     
34 – Fabricated metal products 122,139 9.86 0.310 0.08% 
35 – Industrial machinery and 
equipment 568,745 6.95 0.534 0.0005 
36 – Electrical and electronic 
equipment 580,796 6.50 0.572 0.0005 
37 – Transportation equipment 216,407 12.70 0.321 0.0013 
38 – Instruments and related products 485852 5.90 0.453 0.0004 
     
Year     
1994 204,895 7.50 0.517 0.0005 
1995 199,719 7.48 0.518 0.0008 
1996 203,584 7.52 0.499 0.0007 
1997 197,515 7.73 0.485 0.0007 
1998 203,194 7.56 0.482 0.0005 
1999 196,266 7.37 0.468 0.0005 
2000 175,538 7.22 0.478 0.0011 
2001 186,819 6.91 0.479 0.0002 
2002 175,881 6.99 0.477 0.0010 
2003 230,528 7.34 0.474 0.0002 
     





Table 4. Correlation matrix (Chapter III) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Entry (1,0) 1.00         
(2) INPUT-SIMILARITY 0.03 1.00        
(3) COMPLEXITY 0.03 -0.02 1.00       
(4) INPUT-SIMILARITY*COMPLEXITY 0.04 0.17 0.78 1.00      
(5) Firm Size: number of employees (‘000)^  0.02 0.00 0.48 0.36 1.00     
(6) Horizontal and vertical scope: number of industries (four-
digit SIC) (N) 0.03 -0.01 0.88 0.70 0.59 1.00    
(7) Geographic dispersion 0.02 0.00 0.40 0.32 0.59 0.49 1.00   
(8) Firm age ^ 0.01 0.03 0.24 0.20 0.33 0.35 0.27 1.00  
(9) Growth rate in the primary industry 0.00 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.10 1.00 
(10) Growth rate in the destination industry 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.09 
(11) Concentration in the primary industry – HHI 0.01 -0.10 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.18 0.05 0.05 -0.02 
(12) Concentration in the destination industry – HHI -0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(13) Capital intensity of the firm 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
(14) Capital intensity of the destination industry 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
(15) Absolute difference in capital intensity between the firm 
and the destination industry 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.06 
(16) R&D intensity of the firm 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
(17) R&D of the destination industry 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
(18) Absolute difference in R&D intensity between the firm and 





 (cont’d)          
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(10) Growth rate in the destination industry 1.00         
(11) Concentration in the primary industry – HHI 0.00 1.00        
(12) Concentration in the destination industry – HHI -0.03 0.00 1.00       
(13) Capital intensity of the firm 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00      
(14) Capital intensity of the destination industry 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00     
(15) Absolute difference in capital intensity between the firm and the 
destination industry 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.86 1.00    
(16) R&D intensity of the firm 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00   
(17) R&D of the destination industry 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.32 0.27 0.00 1.00  
(18) Absolute difference in R&D intensity between the firm and the 
destination industry 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.40 0.02 0.58 1.00 
 




Table 5. Direction of diversification: Probability of entry 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit RELogit RELogit 
INPUT-SIMILARITY  4.703*** 4.697*** 5.047*** 5.244*** 5.047*** 5.243*** 
  [0.129] [0.129] [0.148] [0.153] [0.153] [0.181] 
COMPLEXITY   -0.002*** -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
INPUT-SIMILARITY*COMPLEXITY    -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
    [0.470] [0.472] [0.395] [0.395] 
Firm size: number of employees (Mil)^ 0.423*** 0.461*** 0.473*** 0.467*** 0.479*** 0.468*** 0.479*** 
 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
Horizontal and vertical scope: number of 
industries (four-digit SIC) (N) 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.011] 
N2 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Geographic dispersion: number of countries^ -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.128*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.120*** -0.126*** 
 [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.041] [0.045] [0.045] 
Firm age^ 0.011 -0.035 -0.038 -0.042 -0.051 -0.043 -0.052 
 [0.044] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.045] [0.046] 
Growth rate in the primary industry -0.337 -0.228 -0.251 -0.251 -0.826*** -0.248 -0.818*** 
 [0.215] [0.214] [0.209] [0.209] [0.250] [0.183] [0.263] 
Growth rate in the destination industry 1.203*** 1.408*** 1.408*** 1.400*** 1.321*** 1.414*** 1.342*** 
 [0.099] [0.119] [0.119] [0.119] [0.149] [0.076] [0.108] 
Concentration in the primary industry – HHI -0.000*** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Concentration in the destination industry – HHI -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Capital intensity of the firm -4.600*** -5.662*** -6.020*** -6.331*** -6.807*** -6.302*** -6.772*** 
 [1.040] [1.069] [1.073] [1.080] [1.098] [1.015] [1.040] 
Capital intensity of the destination industry 0.123 0.136 0.130 0.129 0.096 0.122 0.088 
 [0.106] [0.102] [0.103] [0.102] [0.102] [0.121] [0.118] 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit RELogit RELogit 
Absolute difference in capital intensity between 
the firm and the destination industry -0.151 -0.124 -0.118 -0.118 -0.083 -0.103 -0.066 
 [0.105] [0.100] [0.100] [0.100] [0.100] [0.122] [0.118] 
R&D intensity of the firm -4.363*** -4.742*** -4.493*** -4.507*** -3.917*** -4.483*** -3.894*** 
 [0.892] [0.873] [0.867] [0.867] [0.879] [0.864] [0.888] 
R&D of the destination industry 0.092*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.052** 
 [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.019] [0.021] 
Absolute difference in R&D intensity between 
the firm and the destination industry -0.064*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.045** -0.044** -0.043** 
 [0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.018] [0.019] [0.022] 
Constant -7.821*** -9.984*** -9.956*** -10.146*** -10.023*** -10.132*** -10.004*** 
 [0.212] [0.224] [0.224] [0.229] [0.259] [0.244] [0.264] 
Sector dummies (two-digit SIC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No No No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,973,939 1,973,939 1,973,939 1,973,939 1,973,939 1,973,939 1,973,939 
Log-likelihood -7949.18 -7301.72 -7293.49 -7281.47 -7149.22 n.a. n.a. 














Standard errors in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. ^ log value. 
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Table 6. Direction of diversification: Robustness Checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 RELogit RELogit RELogit 
INPUT-SIMILARITY     
=====Between the primary and the new 
businesses  4.602*** 4.724*** 
  [0.166] [0.215] 
=====Between all existing businesses and the 
new business    5.266***   
 [-0.002]***   
COMPLEXITY    
=====Number of interdependent segment pairs 0.000   
 [0.000]   
=====Share of interdependent segment pairs  -0.026***  
  [0.175]  
=====Share of interdependent segment pairs 
weighted by number of units   0.311 
   [0.382] 
=====Number of interdependent segment pairs 
(5% as the threshold for interdependence)    
    
INPUT-SIMILARITY*COMPLEXITY -0.002*** -0.588* -1.067* 
 [0.000] [0.355] [0.566] 
All control variables in Table 5, Column (1) Yes Yes Yes 
The constant term Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies (two-digit SIC) Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,973,939 1,973,939 1,973,939 






Table 7. Summary statistics and correlation matrix (Chapter IV) 
 
  mean sd (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Number of supervisory units^ 0.45 0.73 1.00       
(2) Number of supervisory units (weighted by rank)^ 2.49 0.68 1.00 1.00      
(3) Number of average levels for all units^ 0.66 0.15 0.81 0.80 1.00     
(4) Number of average levels for base units^ 0.76 0.12 0.80 0.79 0.83 1.00    
(5) Number of base units^ 2.00 1.22 0.64 0.64 0.77 0.36 1.00   
(6) Complexity: Share of interdependent segment pairs 0.22 0.27 -0.22 -0.22 -0.29 -0.18 -0.29 1.00  
(7) Decomposability 20.65 19.65 -0.32 -0.32 -0.40 -0.23 -0.43 0.20 1.00 
(8) Firm size: number of employees (‘000)^  0.72 1.81 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.39 0.71 -0.17 -0.39 
(9) Horizontal and vertical scope: number of industries (four-digit SIC) (N) ^ 1.80 0.80 0.70 0.71 0.65 0.47 0.69 -0.31 -0.67 
(10) Geographic dispersion: number of countries^ 1.15 1.05 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.24 0.79 -0.24 -0.24 
(11) Firm age ^ 3.58 0.78 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.17 0.35 -0.09 -0.33 
(12) Environment volatility – absolute beta of industry stock returns 1.21 0.66 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.05 
(13) Industry R&D intensity 1.39 5.53 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 
(14) Growth rate in the primary industry 0.07 0.20 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.09 
           
  mean sd (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(8) Firm size: number of employees (‘000)^ 0.72 1.81 1.00       
(9) Horizontal and vertical scope: number of industries (four-digit SIC) (N) ^ 1.80 0.80 0.65 1.00      
(10) Geographic dispersion: number of countries^ 1.15 1.05 0.57 0.42 1.00     
(11) Firm age ^ 3.58 0.78 0.32 0.43 0.22 1.00    
(12) Environment volatility – absolute beta of industry stock returns 1.21 0.66 -0.06 -0.09 0.01 -0.10 1.00   
(13) Industry R&D intensity 1.39 5.53 -0.05 -0.09 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 1.00  
(14) Growth rate in the primary industry 0.07 0.20 -0.04 -0.12 0.04 -0.13 -0.01 0.08 1.00 
 
p>0.01 for |r|>0.04; ^ log value.  
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Table 8. Organization structure: Degree of organization modularity 
 
DV=Number of base units^ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Task complexity   -0.215* -1.054*** -1.880*** -0.911** 
   [0.112] [0.256] [0.591] [0.385] 
Task complexity squared    0.846*** 2.473*** 1.087** 
    [0.248] [0.772] [0.501] 
Above-average task decomposability 
(1,0)     0.062* 0.042 
     [0.038] [0.037] 
Firm size: number of employees 
(‘000)^ 0.112*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.054* 0.063*** 
 [0.016] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.032] [0.022] 
Product diversification: number of 
segments 0.514*** 0.569*** 0.539*** 0.558*** 0.822*** 0.766*** 
 [0.031] [0.060] [0.061] [0.061] [0.106] [0.080] 
Geographic dispersion: number of 
countries^ 0.640*** 0.797*** 0.797*** 0.792*** 0.579*** 0.595*** 
 [0.023] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.073] [0.048] 
Firm age: years since establishment^ 0.051** -0.008 -0.018 -0.014 0.072 -0.012 
 [0.025] [0.099] [0.101] [0.098] [0.140] [0.032] 
Growth rate in the primary industry 0.054 0.031 0.03 0.027 0.094* 0.082 
 [0.059] [0.032] [0.032] [0.031] [0.055] [0.053] 
Environment volatility – absolute 
beta of industry stock returns -0.056*** -0.011 -0.01 -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 
 [0.020] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] 
Industry R&D intensity -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Constant 0.149 0.08 0.214 0.256 -0.335 -0.016 
 [0.099] [0.343] [0.354] [0.341] [0.543] [0.163] 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Firm random effects No No No No No Yes 
Observations 4522 4522 4522 4522 2368 2368 
Number of firms 865 865 865 865 444 444 
R2 0.8 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.62 (within) 0.77(between) 
0.61(within) 
0.79(between) 
F-stats/Chi2  49.11 49.04 47.29 25.14 1443.78 
 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in 




Table 9. Organization structure: Degree of organization hierarchy 
 
DV=Weighted number of 
supervisory units ^ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Task complexity   -1.492*** -1.413*** -0.962*** 
   [0.473] [0.471] [0.274] 
Task complexity squared   2.416*** 2.250*** 1.543*** 
   [0.766] [0.747] [0.414] 
Above-average task 
decomposability (1,0)    -0.075** -0.126*** 
    [0.035] [0.032] 
Number of base units^ 0.087 0.085* 0.069 0.073* 0.084** 
 [0.054] [0.045] [0.043] [0.042] [0.035] 
Firm size: number of 
employees (‘000)^ 0.047*** 0.018 0.029 0.028 0.039*** 
 [0.017] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.014] 
Product diversification: 
number of segments^ 0.711*** 0.621*** 0.640*** 0.677*** 0.719*** 
 [0.067] [0.074] [0.071] [0.076] [0.054] 
Geographic dispersion: 
number of countries^ 0.063* 0.110** 0.113** 0.113** 0.078** 
 [0.034] [0.051] [0.047] [0.047] [0.032] 
Firm age: years since 
establishment^ -0.031 -0.275** -0.273** -0.276** -0.025 
 [0.031] [0.125] [0.122] [0.124] [0.031] 
Growth rate in the primary 
industry -0.146 -0.017 -0.027 -0.029 -0.051 
 [0.100] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.041] 
Environment volatility – 
absolute beta of industry stock 
returns 
-0.028 -0.030* -0.029* -0.029* -0.031** 
 [0.024] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] 
Industry R&D intensity 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Constant 0.856*** 1.923*** 2.018*** 1.960*** 0.916*** 
 [0.162] [0.500] [0.495] [0.501] [0.148] 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Firm random effects No No No No Yes 
Observations 4522 4522 4522 2368 2368 
Number of firms 865 865 865 444 444 
R2 0.58 0.23 0.24 0.35(within) 0.52(between) 
0.34(within) 
0.63(between) 
F-stats/Chi2  9.3 8.94 11.38 749.06 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the firm level appear in 








institutions Rank Country 
Quality of 
institutions Rank Country 
Quality of 
institutions 
1 FINLAND 1.932 33 LITHUANIA 0.810 65 TURKEY -0.200 
2 SWITZERLAND 1.840 34 GREECE 0.790 66 MOROCCO -0.200 
3 LUXEMBOURG 1.812 35 COSTA RICA 0.787 67 SAUDI ARABIA -0.247 
4 SWEDEN 1.805 36 CZECH REPUBLIC 0.783 68 BOLIVIA -0.255 
5 NEW ZEALAND 1.797 37 LATVIA 0.765 69 INDIA -0.300 
6 DENMARK 1.792 38 SLOVAKIA 0.673 70 PERU -0.313 
7 NORWAY 1.712 39 POLAND 0.625 71 ARGENTINA -0.322 
8 NETHERLANDS 1.707 40 URUGUAY 0.607 72 PHILIPPINES -0.382 
9 CANADA 1.623 41 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 0.598 73 GABON -0.420 
10 AUSTRALIA 1.608 42 SOUTH KOREA 0.557 74 LEBANON -0.493 
11 AUSTRIA 1.585 43 OMAN 0.477 75 CHINA -0.497 
12 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 1.568 44 ISRAEL 0.463 76 EGYPT -0.498 
13 SINGAPORE 1.548 45 BAHRAIN 0.388 77 VIETNAM -0.543 
14 IRELAND 1.460 46 QATAR 0.373 78 HONDURAS -0.547 
15 GERMANY 1.455 47 MALAYSIA 0.368 79 RUSSIA -0.613 
16 BELGIUM 1.403 48 SOUTH AFRICA 0.362 80 UKRAINE -0.618 
17 LIECHTENSTEIN 1.345 49 
TRINIDAD & 
TOBAGO 0.303 81 ECUADOR -0.643 
18 MALTA 1.257 50 KUWAIT 0.273 82 GUATEMALA -0.680 
19 PORTUGAL 1.245 51 CROATIA 0.222 83 COLOMBIA -0.683 
20 CHILE 1.192 52 MONACO 0.205 84 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA -0.708 
21 FRANCE 1.190 53 BULGARIA 0.203 85 KENYA -0.718 
22 SPAIN 1.168 54 PANAMA 0.118 86 SYRIA -0.830 
23 BAHAMAS 1.167 55 THAILAND 0.117 87 ALGERIA -0.843 
24 BARBADOS 1.138 56 BRAZIL 0.108 88 PARAGUAY -0.925 
25 JAPAN 1.135 57 MEXICO 0.058 89 PAKISTAN -0.925 
26 BERMUDA 1.113 58 TUNISIA 0.053 90 INDONESIA -0.927 
27 ESTONIA 1.008 59 JORDAN 0.052 91 VENEZUELA -1.033 
28 SLOVENIA 1.005 60 ROMANIA -0.040 92 CONGO -1.190 
29 CYPRUS 0.928 61 GHANA -0.115 93 NIGERIA -1.205 
30 HUNGARY 0.890 62 JAMAICA -0.147 94 ZIMBABWE -1.588 
31 TAIWAN 0.860 63 EL SALVADOR -0.187    
32 ITALY 0.827 64 
DOMINICAN 









Host country Number of base 
units in the host 
country
Number of base 
units supervised by a 
foreign unit
% of base units 
supervised by a 
foreign unit
(1) (2) (3)=(2)/(1)
New Zealand 126 90 71.4%
Canada 1375 1092 79.4%
Norway 102 83 81.4%
Mexico 357 319 89.4%
Germany 690 621 90.0%
Japan 452 407 90.0%
U.K. 1233 1114 90.3%
Sweden 156 143 91.7%
China 179 165 92.2%
Australia 436 408 93.6%
France 514 483 94.0%
Austria 96 91 94.8%
Chile 63 60 95.2%
Argentina 90 86 95.6%
Brazil 237 230 97.0%
India 124 121 97.6%
Venezuela 95 94 98.9%
Colombia 65 65 100.0%
Indonesia 56 56 100.0%
Malaysia 91 91 100.0%
Philippines 63 63 100.0%
Poland 58 58 100.0%




Table 12. Summary statistics and correlation matrix (Chapter V) 
 
Panel (a) host-country statistics 
  N mean sd (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Quality of institutions 644 0.38 0.89 1.00       
(2) Human capital 644 2.12 1.15 0.77 1.00      
(3) GDP in constant 2000 U.S. dollars^ 644 25.08 1.76 0.50 0.51 1.00     
(4) Trade (as % of GDP) 644 67.12 32.56 0.15 0.12 -0.27 1.00    
(5) Tax rate 644 32.75 6.63 -0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.03 1.00   
(6) GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars^ 644 8.31 1.39 0.88 0.80 0.60 0.09 -0.06 1.00  
(7) FDI inflow^ 644 7.18 2.14 0.55 0.47 0.77 0.01 -0.17 0.56 1.00 
Note: These are statistics for the 67 non-U.S., non-tax-haven countries that MNCs in my sample operate in. 
 
Panel (b) MNC statistics 
  N mean sd (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) MNC  size: log (sales) 4,049 6.06 1.92 1.00     
(2) MNC geographic dispersion: Number of countries 4,049 7.70 9.00 0.54  1.00    
(3) MNC product diversification: Number of segments 4,049 9.20 11.79 0.61  0.43  1.00  
(4) Number of all units an MNC has in all host countries 
(including U.S.) 4,049 23.95 44.90 0.55  0.79  0.68 1.00 
Note: These are statistics for the 917 MNCs in my sample. 
 
Panel (c) MNC base unit statistics 
  N mean sd (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Subject to cross-border supervision (1,0) 40,118 0.93 0.26 1.00      
(2) Number of segments a unit operates in 40,118 1.20 0.62 0.02 1.00     
(3) Unit operates in MNC's primary segment (1,0) 40,118 0.43 0.49 0.06 -0.10 1.00    
(4) Number of segments a unit operates in that are interdependent with MNC's primary segment 40,118 0.44 0.59 -0.02 0.39 -0.54 1.00   
(5) Number of other units of the same MNC that operate in the same primary segment of the focal unit 40,118 42.2 88.84 0.04 -0.13 0.32 -0.19 1.00  
(6) Number of employees 5,853 1,236 4902 -0.02 0.13 0.21 -0.05 0.12 1.00 




Table 13. MNC organization structure: Cross-border reporting and the impact of host-country institutions 
 
DV=Reporting to a foreign supervisor in strong institution country (1,0) in Columns (1) – (4), DV=Reporting to a foreign supervisor (1,0) in Columns (5) – (8). 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the country/MNC level appear in parentheses.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. ^ log value. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Weak institutions in host countries         
Negative value of institutions  0.875***    0.871***   
  [0.212]    [0.216]   
Below-average institutions (1,0)   1.396***    1.364***  
   [0.435]    [0.439]  
Negative difference between host-country 
institutions and the average host-country 
institutions for the MNC parent    0.651***    0.635*** 
    [0.196]    [0.197] 
Number of base units in the country^ -0.819*** -0.797** -0.812*** -0.803*** -0.831*** -0.810*** -0.823*** -0.814*** 
 [0.314] [0.310] [0.295] [0.307] [0.318] [0.313] [0.299] [0.311] 
Unit product diversification: Number of segments 1.169*** 1.132*** 1.182*** 1.249*** 1.164*** 1.127*** 1.175*** 1.241*** 
 [0.222] [0.231] [0.223] [0.226] [0.226] [0.234] [0.226] [0.230] 
MNC  size: log (sales) 0.159 0.158 0.16 0.176 0.139 0.138 0.14 0.156 
 [0.116] [0.121] [0.120] [0.118] [0.114] [0.119] [0.118] [0.116] 
MNC product diversification: Number of segments 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
MNC geographic dispersion: Number of countries^ -0.640*** -0.685*** -0.681*** -0.650*** -0.649*** -0.693*** -0.689*** -0.658*** 
 [0.086] [0.088] [0.086] [0.085] [0.087] [0.088] [0.087] [0.085] 
Host country FDI inflow^ -0.073 0.052 -0.017 0.018 -0.08 0.044 -0.025 0.009 
 [0.116] [0.114] [0.111] [0.116] [0.119] [0.117] [0.114] [0.119] 
Host country tax  rate -0.016 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.016 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 [0.017] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] 
Constant 7.110*** 6.861*** 9.107*** 5.763*** 7.286*** 7.042*** 9.233*** 5.973*** 
 [1.659] [1.592] [1.495] [1.662] [1.690] [1.622] [1.515] [1.700] 
Observations 40118 40118 40118 40118 40118 40118 40118 40118 




Table 14. MNC organization structure: Cross-border reporting and the impact of interdependence and institutions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Weak institutions 0.615*** 0.398*** 0.569*** 1.655*** 0.596*** 0.396*** 0.553*** 1.655*** 
 [0.058] [0.102] [0.066] [0.539] [0.058] [0.104] [0.067] [0.539] 
Task interdependence (1,0) 0.547*** 0.577*** 0.535*** 0.743*** 0.557*** 0.585*** 0.543*** 0.812*** 
 [0.123] [0.124] [0.123] [0.140] [0.125] [0.126] [0.125] [0.141] 
Weak institutions_X_Task 
Interdependence 0.546*** 0.562*** 0.545*** 0.681*** 0.576*** 0.589*** 0.573*** 0.752*** 
 [0.086] [0.086] [0.086] [0.098] [0.087] [0.088] [0.087] [0.098] 
Institutional diversity         
Diversity in MNC regional host 
institutions  0.282***    0.287***   
  [0.085]    [0.087]   
Diversity in MNC global host institutions 
weighted by the inverse of the time 
differences 
  0.017*** 0.024***   0.017*** 0.022*** 
   [0.004] [0.005]   [0.004] [0.005] 
Weak institutions_X_Institutional 
diversity  0.121** 0.005* 0.010***  0.105* 0.005* -0.009*** 
  [0.056] [0.003] [0.003]  [0.056] [0.003] [0.003] 
Number of base units in the country^ -0.815*** -0.846*** -0.781*** -0.531*** -0.831*** -0.868*** -0.797*** -0.544*** 
 [0.031] [0.033] [0.031] [0.038] [0.031] [0.033] [0.032] [0.038] 
Unit product diversification: Number of 
segments 1.153*** 1.084*** 0.998*** 0.782*** 1.150*** 1.066*** 0.991*** 0.791*** 
 [0.040] [0.045] [0.046] [0.050] [0.040] [0.045] [0.046] [0.050] 
MNC  size: log (sales) 0.173*** 0.177*** 0.183*** 0.177*** 0.155*** 0.159*** 0.165*** 0.160*** 
 [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.043] 
MNC product diversification: Number of 
segments 0.003** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
MNC geographic dispersion: Number of 
countries^ -0.698*** -0.693*** -0.701*** -0.673*** -0.707*** -0.701*** -0.711*** -0.684*** 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Host country FDI inflow^ 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.033* -0.008 0.041** 0.040** 0.024 -0.01 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.025] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.025] 
Host country tax  rate 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.013* 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.012* 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] 
Constant 6.702*** 6.505*** 7.141*** 19.157*** 6.883*** 6.728*** 7.350*** 20.350*** 
 [0.284] [0.302] [0.304] [1.092] [0.288] [0.307] [0.309] [0.807] 
Country fixed-effects No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 40118 40118 40118 34178 40118 40118 40118 34151 
Log-likelihood -7750 -7743 -7727 -7358 -7610 -7601 -7587 -7251 
 
DV=Reporting to a foreign supervisor in strong institution country (1,0) in Columns (1) – (4), DV=Reporting to a foreign supervisor (1,0) in Columns (5) – (8). 
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